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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Gerasimov 7 May Briefing on World Issues 1
Upcoming Mitterrand Visit *[TASS]* 1
Mubarak Visit *[TASS]* 1
South Africa Dialogue *[TASS]* 1
Managua Declaration *[TASS]* 1
United Germany in NATO *[TASS]* 1
U.S. Tactical, Air-Launched Missiles *[TASS]* 2
Talks of 'Threat' to Japan *[TASS]* 2
'Satisfied' With Bonn Talks *[Moscow Radio]* 2
Weekly 'Observers Roundtable' Aired; Victory Day *[Moscow Radio]* 3
Further on 'Two Plus Four' Talks in Bonn 6
United Germany in NATO Rejected *[East Berlin ADN]* 6
Shevardnadze on Bonn Talks *[TRUD 8 May]* 7
Talks Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 8 May]* 8
Solton Views Unified Germany *[Moscow International]* 9
Yazov Comments on Germany, NATO, Geneva Talks *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 8 May]* 9
Yazov Says U.S. Seeks 'Unilateral Advantages' *[TASS]* 10
Zholkver Comments on Future of NATO *[Moscow Radio]* 11
CSCE Economic Conference Held in Bonn *[NEW TIMES No 17]* 11
WPC President Cites Council's Crisis, Status *[IZVESTIYA 19 Apr]* 13

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

U.S. Begins Preparing for Gorbachev, Bush Summit *[TASS]* 15
PRAVDA Ponders U.S. Stance on Lithuania *[8 May]* 15
White House Easing of Cocom Curbs Viewed *[PRAVDA 4 May]* 17

Northeast Asia

Mongolian Leadership To Visit in Mid-May *[TASS]* 17
Phase Two of Troop Pullout From Mongolia Detailed *[PRAVDA 7 May]* 17
Mongolian Leaders To Form Consultative Council *[TASS]* 18

Near East & South Asia

Egypt's Mubarak To Visit in Mid-May *[TASS]* 18
India's Stance on Nonproliferation Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 4 May]* 18

East Europe

Defense Minister Eppelmann Arrives in Moscow *[East Berlin ADN]* 19
Lukyanov Greets GDR Citizens on Victory Day *[TASS]* 19
Berlin Talks on State Treaty Successful *[TASS]* 20
Aboimov, Czechoslovak Envoy Cited on Disruptions *[TASS]* 20
Change in CSFR WWII Celebrations Reported *[Moscow Radio]* 20
Troop Withdrawal From CSFR on Schedule *[TASS]* 20
Bondarenko Briefs Poles on 'Two Plus Four' Talks *[TASS]* 20
Lukyanov Congratulates Hungary's Goncz *[Moscow Radio]* 21

Latin America & Caribbean

Soviet, Cuban Foreign Ministers Exchange Telegrams *[TASS]* 21
U.S. Caribbean Manuevers Criticized *[Moscow International]* 21

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

Reportage on 7 May Kremlin Veterans Meeting 23
Gorbachev Opening Speech *[Moscow TV]* 23
Kulikov Address *[Moscow TV]* 23
Popov Speech *[Moscow TV]* 24
Talk by Lithuania's Gavrilis *[Moscow TV]* 26
Yazov Speech *[Moscow TV]* 27
Gorbachev Closing Speech *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 May]* 29
Yazov Presents Gold Star Awards to War Heroes *[Moscow Radio]* 31
Interview on Presentation *[Moscow Radio]* 31
Gorbachev Attends Tchaikovsky Anniversary Night *[Moscow TV]* 32
Roy Medvedev Interviewed on Gorbachev's Position *[Budapest Radio]* 32
Ligachev Interviewed on Perestroyka *[Moscow TV]* 33
Prosecutors Office Issues Corruption Warning *[TASS]* 38
Yakovlev Stresses No Cabinet Resignation *[Moscow International]* 38
Writer Salutskiy Assails Yakovlev *[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 13]* 39
May Day Slogans Still Leave Many Questions *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 1 May]* 41
Lukyanov Eulogizes Patriarch Pimen *[Moscow International]* 42
Official Discusses Compensation for Refugees *[IZVESTIYA 3 May]* 42
Letters Highlight Assault on Civil Rights *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 May]* 44
Liberal-Democratic Chairman Interviewed *[MOSCOW NEWS No 17]* 46
Journalist Examines Destiny of Komsomol *[IZVESTIYA 11 Apr]* 47
Report on Komsomol Central Committee Plenum *[Moscow TV]* 48
Consequences of Arms Plant Thefts Viewed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 21 Apr]* 49

Economic

Prices for Foreign Automobiles Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 3 May]* 51
Cost of Animal Husbandry Products Assessed *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 26 Apr]* 52
Goskomstat Criticized for Useless Information *[Deynekin in IZVESTIYA 3 May]* 52
Postponement of Market Will Worsen Problems *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 1 May]* 53

Scientific

'Cosmos-2077' Satellite Launched 7 May *[TASS]* 55
Progress 42 Docks With 'Mir' Complex *[TASS]* 55
Cosmonauts Preparing for 1 Jun Module Lift-Off *[TASS]* 55

Military

Zaykov Visits Western Group Forces *[TASS]* 55
Prosecutor Confirms No Change in Spring Draft *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 May]* 56
General Assails Lack of Perestroyka in Army Body
[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 27 Apr] 56
Officers Cited on Problems of Demobilization *[Vienna DER STANDARD 4 May]* 57

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Discusses Lithuanian Situation *[Vilnius Radio]* 59
Lithuanian Volunteer Detachments Assessed *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 29 Apr]* 60
IZVESTIYA Reports on Effect of Rationing *[4 May]* 61

Lithuanian Deputy Interviewed on Blockade *[Moscow Maritime Service]* 62
Oil Supplies Redistributed After Blockade *[TASS]* 63
Abandoned Oil Wells To Be Reactivated *[Vilnius Radio]* 63
Lithuanian Free Trade Unions Begin To Organize *[TRUD 25 Apr]* 63
Military Unable To Prosecute Lithuanian Deserters *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Apr]* 65
Congress of Pro-Soviet Citizens Groups Held *[Vilnius Radio]* 66
Formation of Opposition to Landsbergis Viewed *[GIMTASIS KRASTAS No 16]* 66
Ministry Official Discusses Lithuanian Supplies *[Moscow TV]* 66
Review of Readers' Letters Concerning Lithuania *[IZVESTIYA 3 May]* 68
Historian Inteviewed on Lithuanian Status Claims *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 26 Apr]* 70
Two Poles Arrested With Tear Gas for Lithuania *[TASS]* 72
Lithuanian Communist Party Issues New Magazine *[Vilnius International]* 72
Estonia Congratulates Latvia on Independence *[Tallinn Radio]* 72
Estonian Supreme Soviet Passes Law on 'Symbols' *[Tallinn Radio]* 72
Statute on Transition of Estonian Party Outlined *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 30 Mar]* 73
Riga Radio Carries 7 May Latvian Supreme Soviet 73
Working Procedures Debated 73
Economic Situation Viewed 74
Possible Blockade Viewed 74
Candidates for Premier Proposed 75
Agricultural Problems Viewed 75
Godmanis Elected Premier 76
Bisers Elected Deputy Premier 77
War Anniversary Noted 78
Godmanis Interviewed on Government Program *[Moscow Radio]* 78
Career of New Latvian Premier Profiled *[TASS]* 79
Faction Leader 'Worried' About Declaration *[Moscow TV]* 79
TASS on Threatened 'Political Strike' in Latvia 79
Latvian 'Equal Rights' Group Urges Referendum *[TASS]* 80
Latvian Deputy on Baltic-Center Dialogue *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 29 Mar]* 80
Rules of Latvian Citizens Committees Reviewed *[IZVESTIYA 27 Apr]* 81
Latvian Procurator Opposes Citizens Committees *[Riga International]* 82
Latvian War Veterans' Privileges Withdrawn *[KRASNAYA ZVEDA 2 May]* 83
Independent Latvia Party Congress Viewed *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 17 Apr]* 84

RSFSR

Report on Gorbachev Visit to Moscow Clock Factory *[PRAVDA 8 May]* 85
Discusses Market Economy *[Moscow TV]* 86
Popov on Conversion to Market Economy in Moscow
[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 18] 88
Goals, Problems of New Moscow Soviet Discussed *[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA 13 Apr]* 91
Deputy Discusses 'Potential' of Russian Republic *[UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA No 18]* 94
Further on Russian Communist Party Congress *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 28 Apr]* 96
Leningrad Party Conference Views Possible 'Split' *[TASS]* 97
Restructures City, Oblast Bodies *[Moscow TV]* 97
Report on Leningrad City Council Proceedings *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 17]* 98
New Karelian Supreme Soviet Chairman Elected *[Moscow Radio]* 98

Western Republics

Ukraine Plenum Discusses Constitutional Changes *[Moscow Radio]* 98
Ivashko Chairs Ukrainian Party Commission *[Kiev Radio]* 98
Ivashko Receives Canadian Delegation *[Kiev International]* 98
Ivashko Nominated for Ukrainian Chairman *[Kiev Radio]* 99
Dnepropetrovsk Officials Abusing Positions *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 1 Apr]* 99
Artists Picket Against Ukrainian Appeal *[Kiev International]* 99
Lvov Christian Democratic Party Convention Held *[Kiev International]* 99
Ukrainian Committee Flies Illegal Flag *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 30 Mar]* 100
Ukrainian Independent Journalists' Union Formed *[Kiev International]* 100
Problems Over Party Newspapers Reported *[Kiev International]* 100

Presidum Changes Voroshilovgrad to Lugansk Oblast *[Kiev Radio]* 101
Repeat Elections Held in Belorussia *[TASS]* 101
Report on Beating of TV Reporter in Moldavia *[IZVESTIYA 20 Apr]* 101

Caucasus

Armenian 'Guerrillas' Attack Police Posts *[Moscow Radio]* 102
Armenian Party Leader Warns of 'Civil War' *[ARMENPRES]* 102
Armenia's Movsisyan Elected Presidium Member *[ARMENPRES]* 102
Armenian Construction Agreement Signed With UN *[TASS]* 102
Armenian Government Sets Up NKAO Committee *[ARMENPRES]* 103
Letter to Gorbachev on NKAO Armenians Viewed *[Yerevan Radio]* 103
Foteyev Views Demographic Change in NKAO *[ARMENPRES]* 103
26 Apr Stepanakert Incident Reported *[Yerevan Radio]* 104
Residents Appeal Against Election of Deputy *[BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 22 Apr]* 104
Turkish Journalists Freed in Azerbaijan *[TASS]* 104
Ethnic Georgian Club Set Up in North Ossetia *[Moscow Radio]* 104

Gerasimov 7 May Briefing on World Issues

Upcoming Mitterrand Visit

LD0705113990 Moscow TASS in English 1137 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—According to an arrangement made, President Francois Mitterrand of France will visit the Soviet Union on May 25, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

Mubarak Visit

LD0705124890 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—"The Soviet Union welcomes Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's forthcoming official friendly visit to the USSR and hopes it will give a fresh impulse to the development of friendly relations between the two countries," spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

"President Mubarak's visit to the Soviet Union, scheduled for mid-May, will be an important event in the past twenty years of bilateral relations," Gerasimov noted.

"The Soviet side has received with satisfaction the report about Mubarak's visit to Damascus," Gerasimov added. "It is believed in the Soviet Union that the consolidation of relations between two such very important parts of the Arab world as Syria and Egypt will increase the chances of achieving a just settlement in the Middle East," Gerasimov stressed.

South Africa Dialogue

LD0705135290 Moscow TASS in English 1343 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman today welcomed the three-day meeting between delegations of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the Pretoria Government as the real start of a dialogue towards dismantling apartheid and creating a democracy in South Africa.

Speaking at a news conference here, Gennadiy Gerasimov said: "A first and perhaps the most difficult step has been taken. The negotiating process in South Africa is assuming a practical shape.

"It is important that the South Africans facing each other across the negotiating table were able to rise above prejudice and find a common language.

"The final communique of the meeting declares their shared desire to do away with the existing atmosphere of violence."

Gerasimov said that the Soviet Union has repeatedly voiced its support for peaceful change in South Africa. "The complex process of change that lies ahead demands that both sides demonstrate political self-control, realism and an ability for reasonable compromise," he said. "But we are convinced that their good will can form the basis of success."

"All forces favoring democratic change in South Africa can count on our active political, moral and diplomatic support," the Soviet spokesman added.

Managua Declaration

LD0705142490 Moscow TASS in English 1401 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov hailed the declaration on disarming contra detachments with the assistance of the UN peace-keeping force in Central America, which was signed in Managua by Nicaraguan President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and Nicaraguan resistance leaders.

Gerasimov told a news briefing here that the practical implementation of agreements envisaged under the Managua declaration may help remove a major obstacle to national reconciliation in this country and pool the efforts of all Nicaraguans in order to promote socio-economic development.

"One would like to hope that all main political forces in Nicaragua, especially representatives of the armed resistance, will display realism and responsibility at this key movement in the country's history, rise above narrow group interests, and do everything to achieve genuine national accord among all Nicaraguans," the diplomat said.

Gerasimov said it was important that the government's obligation "to ensure political and economic possibilities to resistance fighters during and after their demobilisation" was included in the Managua declaration.

"This step," he said, "is evidence of the government's readiness to pursue political pluralism and a mixed economy in order to end internal conflict and promote the country's socio-economic development. It deserves broad support from all those who are sincerely interested in the restoration of peace in Nicaragua."

United Germany in NATO

LD0705153490 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov today said that the first meeting between the foreign ministers of the four World War II Allies and West and East Germany in Bonn revealed the "proximity of their views on the linkage of military-political issues in German unification with the formation of security structures in Europe."

The foreign ministers of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the United States and both Germanys gathered in the West German capital on Saturday to

discuss the international implications of German unification. Gerasimov told reporters that the ministers disagreed on the military-political status of a united Germany.

He said NATO membership for the future German state was "unacceptable to the Soviet Union, because it would upset the current balance of forces in Europe."

He added that the Soviet Government "is also taking into account public opinion in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people must be confident that the line under the past is being drawn in a just way."

Speaking about quadripartite rights and responsibility, Gerasimov said their termination "must crown the talks between the six nations" and that "the entire range of issues under negotiation must not be reduced to this issue."

"The Soviet Union reiterated in Bonn that all issues should be considered on the basis of a 'package approach' and a search for the complete balance of interests," he said.

"The Soviet Union favours drafting a single comprehensive document that would cover all aspects of a peace settlement." The spokesman pointed out that "on the whole, the Soviet side is satisfied with the Bonn meeting, which has given impetus to more intensive work at the level of experts."

U.S. Tactical, Air-Launched Missiles

LD0705154190 Moscow TASS in English 1527 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—The Soviet Union was satisfied with President Bush's statement on the United States' refusal to modernize its ground-based tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and to deploy more powerful Lance tactical missiles there, Soviet Foreign Minister spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The decision can be assessed as the result of a sober-minded analysis of the situation in Europe, he said. The Soviet side considers it expedient to start negotiations on tactical nuclear missiles before an agreement on conventional armed forces is signed.

The Soviet Union believes "these issues should be discussed in tandem, taking into account also air-based nuclear systems, of course," Gerasimov said.

Against this background, reports that some NATO circles are preparing to deploy new air-launched missiles with nuclear warheads, capable of reaching the European part of the Soviet Union, on West German territory are "harshly dissonant", Gerasimov said.

Talks of 'Threat' to Japan

LD0705160890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1550 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov today refuted a statement by Japanese Defense Minister Ezo Ishikawa during his visit to Thailand about the "Soviet military might in Asia."

Gerasimov said this statement was based on the thesis that the Soviet military potential in the Far East is the main source of instability in the region, a thesis he described as "confrontational."

"This statement contradicts the real state of affairs and ignores well-known Soviet proposals on military detente and confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region, including proposals directed at Tokyo," he said.

"Many politicians, including in Japan, state now that there is no threat to Japan. However, the Japanese Defence Agency, judging by the statement by its chief, does not wish to assess the situation in the region in an unbiased way."

'Satisfied' With Bonn Talks

LD0705170990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists was held today in Moscow in the press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was conducted by Gerasimov, chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Directorate. Speaking about the Bonn foreign ministers' meeting on the "Two Plus Four" formula, he noted in particular:

[Gerasimov] The ministers expounded the principle positions of their countries and reached agreement on the agenda and timescale of subsequent meetings. It is possible to register the closeness of the views of the participants in the talks on matters of linking the military-political problems of the unification of Germany and the shaping of security structure in Europe, the so-called syncronization of these processes.

The ministers differed in their views with regard to the military-political status of a future Germany. For the Soviet Union, membership of a united Germany in NATO is not acceptable. This would signify the break-up of the current balance of forces in Europe. In this we take account of public opinion inside our country. The Soviet people must be certain that the book on the past has been closed in a just manner.

The Soviet Union confirmed in Bonn that all matters must, in our view, be considered in a comprehensive manner, on the basis of a package approach. We are in favor of the elaboration of a single, integral document which would embrace all aspects of a peace settlement.

However, on the whole, we are satisfied with the Bonn meeting. It provided a stimulus for intensifying the work at the level of experts. We hope that at the next meeting in Berlin, in June, the ministers will continue their talks.

As Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze stressed in his speech in Bonn, history is presenting us with a truly unique opportunity to build a new European peace order in such a way that it might become a model for Europe of the 21st century.

Weekly 'Observers Roundtable' Aired; Victory Day

LD0605185890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 6 May 90

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Gennadiy Vedenyapin, Boris Andrianov, and Nikolay Agayants, all-Union radio foreign political commentators]

[Excerpts] [Vedenyapin] Good day, comrades. We are beginning our next conversation at the roundtable. The program is conducted by Gennadiy Vedenyapin, at the microphone. I have with me my colleagues Boris Andrianov and Nikolay Agayants, foreign political commentators of the all-Union radio. On the eve of a great holiday—Victory Day—we automatically turn to the past in our thoughts, to those days when the war that was the most bloody war in the history of our continent, came to an end. And do you know what, in my opinion, makes this May resemble the May of 1945? Now, as then, an atmosphere of expectation prevails in the world, the expectation of better times and hopes that human reason and statesmanlike wisdom will triumph after all. And in the same way, as then—our country made a decisive contribution at that time to the cause of defeating fascism—now the new thinking in international affairs is directly connected with our perestroyka and the democratization of our society. The cold war epoch that is sadly remembered has been consigned to the past. The notorious image of an enemy is gradually fading. Suspicion is giving way to trust. And regular consultations have become an indispensable attribute of today's political life. The new thinking proceeds from the fact that security is not based on having as many weapons as possible, but on the contrary, the point is different: As few as possible of them should be directed at one another.

[Andrianov] Absolutely, and one can't fail to take heart at this. The process of the revival of hopes that the world will at last acquire a firm foundation is truly under way. There is a lot of evidence of this. This week, by the way, U.S. President Bush announced that Washington has decided to give up its plans to modernize ground-launched tactical nuclear armaments in Europe and would not deploy a more powerful type of the Lance tactical missile there. Thus, the rumors that were circulating lately have been confirmed. The president made a no less symptomatic pronouncement at the same White House news conference. The revolutionary changes that are transforming Europe, he noted, allow us to move from the postwar era to a new era in history outside the framework of the policy of deterrence. We have come to this historic turning point as a result of maintaining strong partnership relations with our European allies.

[Agayants] But, as for me, Boris Vasilyevich, I would not be excessively optimistic, for military and other circles—which, unfortunately, do not stop thinking in cold war categories and refuse to admit that in the epoch of nuclear missiles the world can, and must, be based not on the balance of forces, but on the balance of the interests of the sides and their equal rights in implementing measures of defensive character—are still very strong and influential in NATO. Meanwhile, this truth is manifestly contradicted by the following fact, for example. The U.S. Air Force, the British GUARDIAN newspaper reported, started to prepare military bases for the deployment of a new generation of the air-to-surface tactical nuclear missiles on the territories of the countries of West Europe and Turkey. These missiles, the newspaper stresses, will be mounted on planes that can penetrate far into the depths of the Soviet Union's territory. Altogether, in excess of 400 new tactical nuclear missiles will be deployed. How could it fail to influence the balance of forces in both military-political alliances—the North Atlantic Bloc and the Warsaw Pact? The answer is simple here.

[Vedenyapin] I don't stand for unsound and groundless optimism here as well. Nevertheless, you must agree that we all hope that the new political thinking will gain the upper hand in the end. It already bears tangible fruits. The North Atlantic Alliance, though as yet in an insufficiently decisive way, is in fact moving toward political dialogue with the Warsaw pact. It is worth remembering the recent speech by Belgium Foreign Minister Guy Coeme [title as heard], who spoke in favor of NATO's politicization and a review of its military structures and doctrines. Points of view close to this are being expressed in other Western countries as well, and that is above all connected with the pan-European process, of course.

[Andrianov] This process looks to be, as I see it, a rather promising one. It is just a pity that everything doesn't go smoothly here. Let's just take the problem of Germany's unification.

[Vedenyapin] Yes, and evidently it has to be mentioned here and now that on Saturday the foreign ministers of the two German states and the four victorious powers met in Bonn. Thus, the talks under the known "Two Plus Four" formula started. The issue of the military-political status of a future Germany is the focus of attention.

[Agayants] That is an issue which is still very contentious, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich. As you know, the West would like to resolve this problem by making Germany part of NATO, which for wholly understandable reasons is unacceptable to us. It would sharply upset the military-political balance in the continent.

[Vedenyapin] But you see, if NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to transform themselves from military-political organizations into political-military ones—let me remind you that this was an idea put forward by us, and incidentally given political good will this is wholly realistic—then the need to argue over where a united Germany should actually fit in would fade away. That, however, remains a matter for the future, whereas for the moment, like it or not, agreement must be reached regarding the continuing presence of allied troops on German territory.

[Andrianov] Yes, this is a time when life demands that out-of-the-ordinary solutions and fundamentally new approaches be found. One which is cited as such is simultaneous German membership of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Arguments abound around this. Some reject the idea as unworkable. Others find it acceptable. Let me quote what the KOELNER STADT-ANZEIGER said about this: Despite the scepticism, such a dual membership is fully workable, provided both alliances were to radically change their strategies and move from deterrence to collective defense. For does this not really correspond to our dream of a common home for Europe? In this case Germany would serve as a connecting link between the two parts of Europe formerly at odds; in other words it would play a truly peaceful role.

[Agayants] A tempting prospect. Another matter is how quickly this could become reality. But one thing is clear. The process of transforming the Wasraw Pact into a politically-military alliance will proceed in direct relation to how far NATO will—in deeds and not just in words—pursue a similar course. So the transformation should proceed in parallel, so that the existing military-strategic parity is not disturbed. In the meantime the North Atlantic bloc remains a military alliance spearheaded against us. FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg says that nuclear weapons must be retained on his country's territory in the future, too. According to him there should be fewer of them but apparently it is not possible to do without them altogether. If that were not enough, we have already mentioned that NATO has no intention whatsoever of forgoing the new nuclear systems which are planned for stationing in West Europe and Turkey. I am thinking here of the air-launched system about which both Washington and London are being very insistent. As carriers it is intended to use U.S. F15E, F-16, and F-111 fighter- bombers, with the greater part of this weaponry again being stationed in the FRG. It is qite evident that when the West insists on a united Germany being in NATO they are claculating on weaking the Warsaw Pact and strengthening the North Atlamtic alliance.

[Vedenyapin] Well, as you see, those who favor maintaining a tough line with our country are calling for there to be not too much haste in politicizing NATO's activities, evidently putting their hope in centrifugal forces in the Warsaw Pact. Of course, it may well be that the changes taking place in the countries of East Europe will not fail to leave their mark on the Warsaw Pact. It has to be said that we cannot rule out the appearance of various opinions and even of possible disagreements in the course of working out collective decisions. Here it is important above all that relations and actions within the alliance should be dealt on a basis of equal rights. Only this will make it possible to avoid possible frictions. But they can be avoided, I think, provided the partners conduct a policy which is properly weighed and deeply pondered.

[Andrianov] I should like to round off this subject—which I regard as supremely important—with this hopeful report from Brussels. An extraordinary NATO meeting was held there this week. Summing up its results, the alliance's Secretary General Manfred Woerner noted that the meeting was the start of a series which will be examining the alliance's tasks in the changed situation, as well as questins concerned with adapting its policies and strategies to the new conditions. The North Atlantic Alliance, Woerner said, must use the historic opportunity with which it has been presented to move from confrontation to cooperation with the countries of East Europe.

[Vedenyapin] And incidentally, one more point which I would see as encouraging from Manfred Woerner's comments at that same news conference. Although he again insisted on a united Germany being a member of NATO only, at the same time he made what I think is an important proviso. The zone in which the bloc's armed forces are stationed, he said, should not be expanded and a future united Germany should be obliged to renounce the posession of nuclear and chemical weapons. In this I see a certain movement toward drawing the positions of the sides closer together. Well, to tell the truth, it looks as though harmony between them is still some way off. Our Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze said on arrival in Bonn for the "Two Plus Four" talks that we continue to reject the idea of Germany being a member of NATO. Our country would like Germany to become a factor for calm and stability in Europe. In his view, such a Germany ought to be a free unified state for which additional control mechanisms on the part of the military-political blocs would not be needed. Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze recalled that the Soviet leadership's view is that the process of German unification should be synchronized with the creation of all-European security structures.

[Andrianov] In the course of our conversation, colleagues, we have touched on several aspects of the all-European process. This is very instructive—instructive in the experience of attaining mutually-acceptable accords which has been accumulated in the old continent, as well as in the Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks. It is wholly evident how the situation in Europe has been transformed now. Intensive collective efforts are going on to seek a considerable reduction of armaments and armed forces and to eliminate states of military confrontation in the continent. And so the thought occurs to me, the question inevitably arises: Can

this all-European experience be extended to the Asia-Pacific region? For there is enormous area there inhabited by almost half the world's population, and you will admit that the situation in that region is a complex one.

[Vedenyapin] Yes, there are clashes there not only between the interests of states with different social systems. The past decade has been marked by flare-ups of interimperialist contradictions, and new economic and political centers of contention have developed. And moreover there are concentrated there no fewer—and in some categories, relating primarily to naval armaments—even heavier forces than in Europe.

[Andrianov] The United States regards the Asia-Pacific region as the second main strategic zone after Europe, and as one of the possible theaters of global confrontation with the Soviet Union. For this reason it has deployed within that region the second—in terms of combat capability—grouping of armed forces after that in Europe, accounting for over half a million personnel.

[Agayants] And what weaponry they are equipped with! Some 200 warships alone, among them seven multirole aircraft-carriers and atomic submarines. There are over 30 ships with long-range cruise missile launchers. A significant part of the U.S. strategic offensive forces are concentrated in the Pacific zone. Out of 1,200 warplanes more than half are nuclear weapons carriers. And that is not to mention modern tanks and artillery systems including nuclear ones available to this powerful grouping of U.S. armed forces.

But, friends, we have, without noticing, moved away from answering the question I posed, concerning the possibility of extending to the Asia-Pacific region the experience accumulated in the all-European talks process.

[Vedenyapin] Indeed, one might wonder why not embark there on reducing armaments and armed forces, for indeed the need to curtail them in that region, in the name of those same constructive goals which are advanced as applying to the all-European process, is no less obvious. And it should be recalled that it was almost four years ago that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made a speech in Vladivostok setting out our comprehensive policy program in the Asia-Pacific region. And then two years later, let me remind you, the Soviet leader put forward in Krasnoyarsk a new initiative of ours. In essence these initiatives amount to an appeal to get down to collective discussion of problems of security, confidence and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, in a word, to seek a common denominator to the great variety of interests and positions. Incidentally, let me mention that the Soviet Union regards the experience of the all-European process as instructive. But this is not to say that we are binding others to a ready-made formula for all-Asian security. Moscow calls on the countries of Asia and the Pacific to work this out together.

[Andrianov] It is understood that there are no ready recipes for this. But there are lines of reference, which the Soviet Union set out at Vladivostok. These fall within a comprehensive program for action along five lines. First: settling regional conflicts. Second: blocking the profileration of nuclear weapons. Third: restricting naval activity and the military presence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins. Fourth: making radical reductions in armed forces and conventional arms in Asia. And five, of course: embarking on practical discussion of confidence-building measures. These were the suggested lines of reference which the Soviet Union advocated as guidelines for the road to strengthening peace, security and cooperation in the region.

[Agayants] It goes without saying that all these targets retain their relevance today. I would even go as far as to say that today they have acquired even greater urgency. I would note, however, that positive developments have occurred in the first and second categories. Let me remind you that in the time since the proclamation of the Vladivostok initiative—that is, less than four years—the Soviet Union has improved, restored or established anew its relations with the overwhelmed majority of countries in the Asia-Pacific region. At the end of last September Vietnamese troops left Cambodia. As in Afghanistan, there too the search is now continuing for a political settlement on the basis of national reconciliation. The Soviet Union has unilaterally begun reducing its military presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and there are no longer any of our warplanes there.

[Vedenyapin] Moreover, there are grounds for saying that the process of military relaxation in the region is continuing. Confirmation of this, for instance, is provided by, among other things, the agreement signed between Moscow and Ulaanbaatar for total curtailment of the Soviet military presence on Mongolian territory. And in accordance with declared plans the reduction by 200,000 personnel of the grouping of Soviet forces in the East of the country is under way, including a reduction of 120,000 in the Far East. Our Pacific Fleet is being cut by 16 warships. And, incidentally, we are prepared to take even more major measures to demilitarize that region, but naturally this would have to be on a basis of reciprocity with the United States, for beyond any doubt there is a definite ceiling to unilateral steps of that kind.

[Andrianov] Nevertheless, regardless of all those evident facts, Washington still claims that there has been no diminution of the Soviet military threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Those who adhere to such views state that the approaches to strengthening confidence and security, born in Europe, are supposedly not applicable in Asia, and before beginning on something similar to the all-European process, they say, there has to be a total settlement of regional conflicts and contentious problems have to be resolved. It seems to me that this evasive position conceals a reluctance on Washington's part to engage in dialogue with Moscow on Pacific security. The reasons for this reluctance are that the U.S. side is still trying, as it has done previously, to legitimize its naval presence in the region as the superior force. In fact, Washington is speaking quite openly of this. Pentagon

figures never stop talking of their intention to pursue their strategy of forward basing. But, just look, why do they need outposts in Asia?

[Agayants] Incidentally, Boris Vasilyevich, other supposedd justifications for that position have also been advanced. U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney calls his country nothing other than some kind of balancing element in the Pacific region. And the Pentagon chief, along with other military leaders, alludes with total openness to some kind of danger which will allegedly arise in the region if the U.S. troops leave. As they put it, a strategic vacuum arise, which some kind of unspecified hostile forces will rush to take advantage of.

[Vedenyapin] Yet, Nikolay Ivanovich, our weighed and pondered initiatives and effective measures for diminishing and limiting military activity seem to be starting to produce their first, albeit modest, results. As far as we can judge, Washington and a number of Asian capitals have been forced to acknowledge the need to introduce a collective element into military policy. What I have in mind is a report on strategic structure in the Asia-Pacific region which has been passed to Congress by President Bush' admdinistration. According to this document the Pentagon is planning to cut the number of U.S. troops in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines by 10 percent over the next three years.

[Andrianov] Well, compared with what our country is doing this is very little indeed. And it seems to me that much of the U.S. press has reacted—not by chance—with disappointment to these measures by the U.S. Government, noting that they are of a rather symbolic nature.

[Agayants] To what has been said I would add that three countries where partial reductions of U.S. troops may occur are at the same time due to increase their spending on national defense and maintenance of U.S. military bases. And yet another thing: While promising to carry out such reductions Washington at the same time turns down what I see as a most important Soviet initiative to begin talks on possible measures for restricting military activity in Asia and the Pacific. Yet this is one of the fundamental points in the process of creating a system of reliable security for all peoples living in the Asia-Pacific region:

[Vedenyapin] No doubt about it, Nikolay Ivanovich. The future of this enormous area of the world depends on the ability of the states located in it to seek and find an optimal balance of their interests, and, when necessary, to subordinate these to the interests of the whole of makind. And there can hardly be any doubt that the process of building peace-loving communities in Europe and Asia must conclude with a unified security system for the whole Eurasian area. [passage omitted: Vedenyapin recalls the inauguration of Violeta Chamorro and notes that the path to normalization in Nicaragua is far from smooth. Agayants lists some of the measures for national reconciliation announced by the new regime, and notes that the future of the Sandinist army is a delicate issue. Chamorro's solution is to act as defense minister herself and keep Humberto Ortega as commander in chief. Andrianov notes that the Contras strongly object to this and have threatened to withdraw their support. Vedenyapin quotes REUTER comment on the situation. Agayants describes the conditions insisted on by the Contras, who, he thinks, are keeping up tension. Andrianov notes that their actions could pose a threat to the whole of Central America. Vedenyapin says the UN Security Council's extension of its observers' mandate is a hopeful sign, but Andrianov notes the Contras have threatened to leave their designated zones if Ortega is not removed. Vedenyapin refers to the Contras maneuvering and expresses the hope that despite the tension things will not again go as far as bloodshed.]

Further on 'Two Plus Four' Talks in Bonn

United Germany in NATO Rejected

LD0505143690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1324 GMT 5 May 90

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has once again rejected (?NATO) membership of a future united Germany. In his speech at the opening of the "Two Plus Four" ministerial conference in Bonn, Shevardnadze explained his objection by saying that membership of NATO is irreconcilable with Soviet security interests. From Moscow's view the Western military alliance continues to be what it has always been. For instance, NATO continues to affirm doctrines which provide for the first-use of nuclear weapons. Shevardnadze mentioned domestic issues as a further reason for his rejection. The Soviet population, much afflicted in the Second World War, views the prospect of an all-German NATO membership as a "very negative idea."

The foreign minister asked his other colleagues present at the table to show understanding for this attitude. At the same time, Shevardnadze suggested looking together for other options on the issue of alliance membership which would not jeopardize the Soviet interests and which take into account the striving of the peoples for peace and security.

Following reunification within the borders of the present Federal Republic and the GDR, including Berlin, the Germans should renew their renunciation of ABC [atomic, bacteriological, chemical] weapons, and state that never again would war emanate from German soil, Shevardnadze said. At the same time, the revival of Nazi ideology would have to be prevented.

From the Soviet viewpoint the issue at a European level should be to impart additional impulses to the Vienna disarmament negotiations and to develop cooperation on the continent within the framework of the CSCE process. Parallel to the "Two Plus Four" negotiations, discussions by all the 35 CSCE states with regard to a pan-European security structures should take place. The

speedy developments require regular CSCE summit meetings every two years and a meeting of foreign ministers once a year. The CSCE should set up a coordinating office at ministerial level and a technical secretariat.

The Soviet Union considers the establishment of a pan-European center for the prevention of a military threat, which should be set up in Germany, of special significance. An institution should be set up, also on German soil—in Berlin—with the equal participation of German representatives, to coordinate the armed forces from seven countries which are deployed in Germany.

Shevardnadze on Bonn Talks

PM0705222090 Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 May 90 p 3

[Interview "on board aircraft from Bonn to Moscow" on 7 May with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, by correspondent I. Belov: "Difficult But Essential Work"]

[Text] Bonn-Moscow, 7 May—The spacious congress hall of Bonn's fashionable Maritim Hotel began filling with journalists last Saturday, long before the start of the news conference of the six foreign ministers scheduled for 1730 local time. There were many reasons for this. First, journalists had not been admitted (this was agreed beforehand) to the FRG Foreign Ministry building, where the leaders of the foreign policy departments had been in session all day within the framework of the meeting according to the "Two Plus Four" formula. Second, each of the reporters naturally wanted to "secure" a seat as close as possible to the stage. Third, it was unprecedentedly hot in the streets of the West German capital for this time of year—over 30 degrees in the sun, 27 degrees in the shade and the hall was cool.

Secret service agents very carefully yet quite quickly checked the contents of bags and attache cases as people entered the hall. The recent attempt on the life of chancellor candidate O. Lafontaine in the FRG had undoubtedly proved once again to all sober-minded people the importance and necessity of the difficult work that security employees perform at international forums.

The news conference attracted approximately 1,000 journalists from dozens of countries. There is great interest in the topic of German unification and its consequences not only in Europe. Following the introductory speech by FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher, who appeared in the role of host and chairman of the meeting, all the other ministers made brief statements of a general nature. When it came down to questions, according to my calculations at least three-fourths of them were addressed to the head of the Soviet delegation, and the rest mainly to J. Baker, leader of the U.S. Department of State, and to R. Dumas, leader of the French Foreign Ministry. This circumstance gave E.A. Shevardnadze grounds for remarking not without humor that the journalists were displaying a "one-sided approach." But this attests, in my view, to recognition of the weighty role which our country plays in resolving the problems associated with Germany's unification.

To be brief, the essence of the statements and replies by the Western countries' representatives may be reduced to the following. The "Two Plus Four" meeting reflects the fact that the historical process of Germany's unification has begun. The future unified sovereign country must be guided by democratic values and act with due regard for the interests of others in the European and world community. Surmounting the split in Germany marks an important step on the way to finally surmounting the split in Europe.

On board the aircraft from Bonn to Moscow E.A. Shevardnadze answered the TRUD correspondent's questions.

[Belov] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, what significance does our country's leadership attach to the talks according to the "Two Plus Four" formula?

[Shevardnadze] Very great significance. Because the very process of building German unity is of historic significance both for Europe and for the whole world. The cold war is over. The European Continent and the entire planet are entering a new stage, a peaceful period in their development. The process of overcoming military confrontation is under way, and a real reduction in arms, including nuclear arms, has begun. Without Helsinki, without the talks on conventional forces in Vienna, and without the all-European process, which is developing intensively, it would probably be difficult to talk of building German unity. All these factors are a favorable background for the unification of the two sovereign German states. We believe that a united Germany will join the family of European peoples as a democratic, peace-loving state conscious of its responsibility and its duties in maintaining international peace and security.

To what I have said I will add that I have participated in many bilateral and international talks and meetings. However, I consider my participation in the work of "the Six" the most important and decisive thing ever entrusted to me.

[Belov] How would you describe the results of the Bonn meeting which has just ended?

[Shevardnadze] The meeting of "the Six" was useful, constructive, and very necessary. We did not set ourselves the task of concluding it by signing some major document—a final document on a settlement, let us assume. That would have been naive. The chief task of all the foreign ministers participating in the meeting was to expound the fundamental views of their governments and states on external aspects of the building of German unity and on the further dynamization of the all-European process. I believe that we succeeded in resolving this task. We all expounded our views and discovered that there are very many fundamental questions on which our approaches are identical. But, for the

sake of the truth, I must also mention the serious disagreements that exist, primarily on the question of the military-political status of the unified Germany. I believe that we should not dramatize this. This is a usual phenomenon for the negotiating process. From our viewpoint it is extremely important to lose no time and to begin forming—within the framework of "the Six" and at all-European forums—a fundamentally new structure of European security to replace the bloc structure.

[Belov] How do you see the further progress of the talks of "the Six" both at the level of experts and at the level of foreign ministers? How difficult will it be?

[Shevardnadze] The talks will be difficult. The expert groups are to do the main or, as we usually say, the dirty work. They include not only diplomats but also military men, scientists, and competent representatives of other ministries and departments. I have said that the process of the talks will be difficult, even agonizing at times. But it is essential to reach a decision. Because there is a very important factor—the time factor. The process of Germany's unification is already under way, and we cannot afford to be "catching up" with events. So it is necessary to seek mutually acceptable solutions and to act promptly and competently, not losing sight of our own interests and the interests of our allies, as well as those of our partners in the talks, including the Germans of course. [Shevardnadze ends]

This is our foreign minister's opinion of the talks marathon that has begun according to the "Two Plus Four" formula. It only remains to add that it was decided at the meeting in Bonn to hold a further three meetings at the foreign minister level over the next few months. They will take place in Berlin, Paris, and Moscow. The meeting participants agreed on the agenda for further talks. They will discuss, with Poland's participation, the question of its western borders, military-political problems with due regard for the subsequent creation of European security structures, the Berlin question, and also the question of the four powers' rights and responsibility with regard to the whole of Germany and Berlin.

Talks Viewed

PM0805092590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[S. Guk "International Commentary": "Concession to Common Sense"]

[Text] The "key to the unity" of Germany has now been presented to the Germans—that is the description of the results of the conference of six foreign ministers in Bonn given by Genscher.

Exultation in the FRG mass media: If the Germans want they can unite before the end of the year. Moscow is no longer insisting on its former demands: unity only after the question of the future Germany's bloc allegiance has been settled. An "historic breakthrough" has been achieved—thanks to the realism displayed by the Kremlin during the final minutes.

Yes, Moscow has indeed made a decisive concession: not to the West but to common sense. Demanding that the FRG leave NATO (since the GDR will soon leave the Warsaw Pact as it sails West) is unrealistic and unfeasible.

What other approach did we have in the impasse which had arisen, when the USSR remained alone: The idea of Germany's neutrality was supported by neither Poland nor Czechoslovakia which, incidentally, are no less interested than we are in their security. Imposing a veto? In other words preventing the persistent desire of the majority of East Germans—the main catalyst of unification? It would have been possible, of course. But then we would have added one more hotbed of instability to those which have already arisen in East Europe, and what a hotbed—in the center of the continent. Where the troops of seven states are concentrated, where saturation with arms—from conventional to nuclear—has long surpassed all permissible norms dictated by simple security. The consequences of such a step are unpredictable.

The fact that the West insists on keeping Germany in NATO is understandable. But how to explain the position of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic or of Poland, which also want to see the Germans in NATO? There is one reason: fears of a Germany which could remain "unsupervised" and without the fetters of commitments as an ally. The lesser of two evils is being chosen: Expansion by NATO seems to them less probable than the potential threat from a future Germany, which would start to "walk by itself...."

But have we who suffered terrible damage from fascist aggression therefore come to terms with the fact that a united Germany will switch to a Western alliance which continues to be unfriendly toward us? By no means. Anyone who read E.A. Shevardnadze's speech in Bonn attentively could not fail to notice that unification will be implemented as it were on two planes, at two speeds.

The first aspect—the purely internal state aspect—is a matter for the Germans themselves. There remains the second, external, aspect: the borders, the level of armaments, and security. Without elaborating a formula which rules out forever the threat to Germany's neighbors there will be no agreement from Moscow or agreement from all interested European states. They will do without us? They will not. Ignoring the just interests of the security of too many countries (we are not alone in this matter) means returning to the confrontation positions from which East and West are gradually moving further and further away and of which we have all grown thoroughly tired. Indeed, to judge by the reaction of the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition, there are no fundamental differences here.

There are nuances, they concern details: For instance, should the presence of allied troops on German territory be maintained or not? We are in favor of it: Not in order

to preserve a "sphere of influence" but because the troops of the four powers are a stabilizing factor in the stormy process of unification. When the transitional period ends they too will leave.

But the main thing is that Germany's split was the material embodiment of the split of postwar Europe. And to create genuine security it is not enough to eliminate only the first factor, there is an even greater demand for the elimination of the latter. The path toward it is longer than the unification of the Germans. It is essential to move forward the process of disarmament (real chances appeared at the Vienna talks) and to renounce bloc antagonism in favor of all-European security structures. Security for all. That is more complex. The West is afraid of letting go of its "lifebelt"—NATO. But without that all talk about security for all will remain good intentions.

As a first step the USSR suggested creating in Berlin a center for the prevention of military danger which could exercise control over the military-strategic situation not only in Germany but also in all Europe. So far NATO's reaction is restrained. But obviously on this question the West will still have to make a concession: not to the USSR but to common sense.

Solton Views Unified Germany

LD0705142590 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 7 May 90

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Politicians and media have been analyzing the Bonn meeting of six foreign ministers, those of the German Democratic Republic and Federal Germany and the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France. The international aspects of German unification were discussed under the "Two Plus Four" formula. The West has claimed Moscow made concessions when it unblocked the way for a united Germany, but is this really so? Yuriy Solton comments:

As Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has said, this country has not become allergic to the German wish to enjoy unity. On the contrary, the Soviet Union supports the Germans' right to self-determination. But it treats Germany in a special way. Next Wednesday it will celebrate the 45th anniversary of victory over German Nazism in a war that cost the Soviet people dearly. Naturally, the Soviet people want firm guarantees. They want to forestall a repetition of the past and they want the two Germanys' unification to cause no damage to Soviet security. That's why the Soviet people strongly object to the idea of a united Germany joining NATO. This would upset the balance of strength in Europe and bring this country face to face with a dangerous military situation.

This country's partners disagree. They want the two Germanys to join NATO as soon as they unite, and this is a stumbling block but no blind alley. Moscow believes the parties concerned can and must compromise. It's anyone's guess how long this will take, but this search for a compromise must not hinder the unification.

Eduard Shevardnadze told the six-nation Bonn meeting the solution of both the internal and external aspects of unification, as Moscow believes, must not necessarily coincide. After a united German parliament and government are formed all aspects could be solved during a transition period that could last for some years.

The west labelled Moscow's stand as Moscow's concession. But isn't it wiser to call it a flexible and constructive search for variants acceptable to all?

The Soviet Union suggests preserving the rights, responsibility, and presence of the troops of winner nations on German soil for the duration of the transition period. Moscow still believes it would be fitting and proper to press for a peace treaty with Germany, but it met the wishes of its partners on the matter. It agreed to look for some other variant if it defined the borders of a united Germany and its military status and stipulated commitments to have no weapons of mass annihilation.

The Bonn meeting showed the six nations hold the same or close enough views in many areas. They agree—and that's a fine point—there must be a direct relationship between German settlement and development of new structures of European security. And this holds the promise that the complicated problems of the foreign policy aspects of German unity will be solved.

Yazov Comments on Germany, NATO, Geneva Talks

PM0705183190 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 8 May 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR defense minister, by APN parliamentary observer Vladimir Ostrovskiy; date, place not specified; first paragraph is introduction: "Is This Constructive? Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov Puts Questions to NATO"]

[Text] When Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, had listened to my questions about the prospects for the transformation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO and about the future united Germany's place in the military-political structure of Europe, he said:

The existing situation in Europe, and indeed the world as a whole, is out of the ordinary at present. The traditional approaches toward resolving even yesterday's international problems can scarcely help politicians today, still less us military men. This situation was reflected to some extent in the decisions of the extraordinary NATO Council session in Brussels, which recognized that the situation prevailing on the European Continent should be used in order to switch from confrontation with the

East to cooperation with it. However, it also said that the united Germany's NATO membership cannot be a subject of discussion.

I am sure that this approach toward ensuring reliable security for the European peoples, and not only for them, suffers from a substantial flaw. It is futile since in effect it does not take into account the novelty of the present international situation in the world as a whole and Europe in particular. Therefore the declaration of U.S. President G. Bush, who is calling for a conference of NATO heads of state to be held in order to begin to study the organization's broad strategy regarding a transformed Europe in the nineties, will maybe introduce an encouraging element into this situation of impasse. In view of what I have just said, I would probably put a number of questions to the NATO bloc.

My first question, the marshal continued, is this: Will the NATO concept of forward defenses be reviewed? Another question is equally important—Where will NATO put its nuclear weapons withdrawn from FRG territory? The third question: Why has the United States found it necessary to plan to station new enhanced-range "air-to-surface" tactical nuclear missiles in the allied countries, including Britain, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the FRG, and the Netherlands, along with Turkey? The effective replacement of one type of nuclear weapon with another that is more powerful and more accurate and has a longer range will in no way serve the idea proclaimed in Brussels—cooperation between NATO and the East. That is obvious even to the uninitiated.

As for your perfectly natural interest in the fate of the GDR Army when a united Germany is created, the resolution of this problem is the prerogative of the GDR Government. Although I must say that we are by no means indifferent to how it is resolved. It is obvious that such an important component of the Warsaw Pact must not become part of NATO. And here I would like to draw attention to the peculiar approach displayed toward this dilemma by Western politicians. They have no doubt about the expediency of retaining NATO. Although life itself has brought people to realize the objective reality that the opposing military-political alliances must be transformed. I have already spoken, in France, of the need to disband them. And this Warsaw Pact proposal has never been removed from the agenda in recent years. As for what is to replace these anachronisms, there will have to be a quest for a solution within the framework of the Helsinki process. Especially as the Soviet side recently put forward a whole range of measures in Bonn: ranging from the presence of troops of the allied powers in Germany during the transitional period to the creation of a center to avert military danger and the emergence of crisis phenomena.

Now for your question concerning the situation at the strategic offensive arms talks in Geneva: You are right that the U.S. delegation's proposal for a ban on mobile ground-launched MIRVed missiles affects only the Soviet SS-24 missiles since the United States has not yet deployed such missiles. The United States would like to eliminate these missiles of ours. This clearly shows that the U.S. negotiators are seeking unilateral advantages for themselves.

Incidentally, whenever it is a question of reductions in Soviet arms, the United States has no objections. But as soon as it is a question of any components of the U.S. arms, naval forces, for instance, the question is immediately blocked. You will agree that such an approach cannot be deemed constructive.

I hope that our partners in the talks also realize this. It is scarcely possible to reach agreement on such a platform. Indeed, this proposal does not take into account the sides' mutual interests, therefore consensus is inconceivable. In general, I would like to note that the U.S. delegation's recent proposals in Geneva on air- and sea-launched long-range cruise missiles work toward ensuring that after the 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms (for the United States and the USSR) the number of U.S. nuclear charges on strategic systems, as the Americans themselves testify, would actually increase from 12,341 (at present) to 12,363 after the "reduction." Those are also the figures we come up with. And we will not accept this method, since we are holding talks about reducing arms, not building them up.

If we proposed to eliminate primarily the arms in which the United States has the edge, it would most probably reject the proposal. I hope, I really do, that common sense will prevail at these most important talks of our time, D. Yazov concluded.

Yazov Says U.S. Seeks 'Unilateral Advantages'

LD0805090390 Moscow TASS in English 0855 GMT 8 may 90

[Text] Moscow May 8 TASS—The current situation in Europe and in the world is ambivalent, Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov said in an interview published in RABOCHAYA GAZETA today.

Traditional approaches to the solution of international problems cannot be used by politicians today, and especially not by the military men, he said.

The emergency session of the NATO Council in Brussels admitted that the emerging situation in Europe should be used for the transition from confrontation with the East to cooperation.

However, they said that the united Germany's membership of NATO is not an issue for discussion.

This approach to ensuring reliable security for the European and other peoples is faulty and hopeless, since it does not take into account the novelty of the modern international situation in the world and in Europe, Yazov said.

In this connection Yazov put several questions to NATO leaders: "Will NATO change its forward defence doctrine? The other question is equally important—where will NATO withdraw its nuclear weapons from West Germany to? Thirdly—why would the United States need to plan the deployment of new nuclear tactical air-to-land long- distance missiles on its allies' territory, including Great Britain, Belgium, Greece, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey?"

"The replacement of one type of nuclear weapons with another, which is more powerful, precise and has a longer range contradicts the idea of NATO cooperation with the East, declared in Brussels."

As for the economic interest in the fate of the East German Army during the creation of a united Germany, this is within the authority of [the] East German Government, he said.

"We are not indifferent to how it will be solved," he stressed.

Apparently, this important component of the Warsaw Treaty shall not become a part of NATO, he said.

"As for the situation at the Geneva strategic offensive forces talks, the proposal of the U.S. delegation to ban mobile land-based missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads covers only Soviet SS-24 missiles, since the United States has not yet deployed such weapons," Yazov said.

"The United States wants to eliminate these Soviet weapons. The U.S. side clearly seeks unilateral advantages for itself."

Zholkver Comments on Future of NATO

LD0405174490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] As we reported earlier, an extraordinary session of the NATO Council at foreign minister level has been held in Brussels. A latest news commentary. [sentence as heard] At the microphone is our political observer, Aleksandr Zholkver.

[Zholkver] The present meeting in the Belgian capital has been called "extraordinary" because it has been discussing preparations for the beginning of the "two plus four" mechanism in Bonn tomorrow—the first session of the foreign ministers of the two German states and of the four powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition to discuss the external aspects of German reunification. But, I think there is something more at issue, the need for NATO to review its entire concept in view of the radically changing situation in Europe and in the world as a whole. This was admitted in principle by President Bush at his news conference yesterday. He said NATO must carry out a far-reaching strategic reappraisal for the nineties. As a United States contribution to that reappraisal, the president announced the Pentagon's intention not to modernize the American short-range nuclear missile Lance and the American atomic artillery.

I can quite understand the West German politicians who, as the newspaper SUEDKURIER writes, have "at last breathed easy" after this announcement, since, as the paper also writes, all this "atomic devilry" is concentrated in the FRG. But, there is something else that cannot fail to make one uneasy. NATO command has at the same time announced plans to deploy in West Europe—including the FRG—the next generation of U.S. air-based nuclear missiles. And no secret is being made of the fact that the missiles will be mounted on aircraft capable, it is stated, of flying deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. Acording to the NATO classification, these air-to-land missiles are known by the abbreviation SRAM [Russian for shame]. I think the name is truly symbolic. It is indeed shameful to be replacing one nuclear weapon with another at a time when we ought to be moving toward disarmament—including nuclear disarmament. And no wonder a considerable proportion of the West German press and prominent members of the Social Democratic Party declared at once that the deployment of new types of American nuclear missiles in the FRG would be without justification. And besides, how is all this to be reconciled with plans to include all of Germany in NATO? I think that at this crucial time, what we should be doing is working out really new approaches to security in Europe and the world, and not indulging in tactical trickery and maneuvering.

CSCE Economic Conference Held in Bonn

PM0105155890 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 17, 24-30 Apr 90 pp 15-16

[Nikita Zholkver and Vladimir Razuvayev dispatch: "Market—A Guarantee of Prosperity"]

[Text] This was the unanimous opinion of the participants of the CSCE Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe. How does one implement the decisions of this forum which has recently concluded in Bonn? Moscow and its allies are not the only generators of progressive ideas in the world. The idea to hold the Bonn forum belongs to the FRG, and the draft document of the Bonn conference was prepared by member states of the European Community. All the 35 participants of the conference agreed with the underlying principles of this document. The West's positive attitude to the development of all-European economic cooperation is by no means accidental.

The gigantic gap between living standards in the east and the west of Europe has widened of late. East Europe is living through a disastrous economic crisis. This situation seriously worries West Europe. It is understood in the European Community that possible social explosions and emergence of dictatorships in East Europe could endanger stability and prosperity of West Europe. This

makes EC member states objectively interested in improving economic situation in the neighbouring East European countries. Another interest is to create the common European economic space.

Initially, the Bonn forum was planned as a rather restricted conference in the framework of the CSCE process. However, the radical changes in East Europe which occurred in 1989 added a new dimension to East Europe's relations with the European Community. Poland, Czechoslovakia and especially Hungary are contemplating the possibility of joining the EC. The Bonn conference did not only mirrored these changes, but also became an important step towards European economic integration.

The principal topic of discussion at the conference was the problem of mechanisms which could help replace planned economic structures wth market-regulated ones, the efficiency of which is obvious. Everybody agrees that such a transition was necessary. Some of the journalists accredited at the conference were even disappointed to observe no superpower fencing, opposition of the blocs, conflicts between individual states and attempts to derail the adoption of the concluding document which used to be the unavoidable features of such international forums only recently.

The constructive atmosphere of the conference did not mean, though, that participants were not upholding their own interests. The Soviet delegation, for instance, while sharing the idea of transition to market relations, insisted that terms "principles" and "market economy" be replaced by "aims" and "market-oriented economy" respectively—implied was the possible negative reaction inside the Soviet Union to the turn towards new economic methods. Representatives of Poland and Hungary wanted a more liberal wording of the concluding document in the section dealing with East European countries' foreign debts. One Polish delegate explained this when he said that Western loans to his country had been unfair hinting that the West shared the responsibility for Poland's colossal foreign debt. The delegations of Malta and Yugoslavia advocated increased aid to developing nations. The United States insisted on lifting all the restrictions and limitations which hamper the free flow of capital between nations.

The participants of the conference were unanimous that planned economies could extract themselves from the dramatic crisis only if they switch over to market principles. Whether or not Soviet conservatives like it, the market is the best regulator of economic activities so far known to mankind. The transition to market relations must be resolute and quick. Many people in the Soviet Union are worried by the uncertain prospects of this transition, but then again, the first step is always the most difficult. To learn to swim, one must step into the pool and not put on new life jackets standing on the diving board.

The Soviet delegation was the largest at the Bonn forum. Before, many people used to become members of such delegations solely by virtue of the positions they occupied. Naturally, their performance could not be effective. This time the delegation consisted of experts, not bureaucrats. Businessmen were the backbone of the delegation: directors of enterprises and joint ventures, directors of industrial associations, representatives of non-state sectors of the Soviet economy, who came here to establish contacts with Western business circles. Some of them rushed to conclude a joint-venture agreement during the first five minutes they had spoken to a business partner. Others were trying to sell something, often undecipherable for a layman. Businessmen from Kazakhstan were looking for foreign purchasers of graphite electrode cinders (80 tons), copper cake (1,000 tons) and metallic niobium in ingots (12 tons) or in moulds fullets (31 tons). All in all, businessmen from Kazakhstan were offering a list of 30 different items....

The cumbersome and backward economy of this country is an obstacle to development of mutually profitable ties. This problem must be resolved by the USSR. Obstacles are erected in the West, too, however. One such obstacle is the old problem of Cocom. This topic was not officially on the agenda, but in private businessmen devoted a lot of time to discussing it. It is clear that the restrictive lists of Cocom prevent profitable deals. Most businessmen agreed that in its present form Cocom is outdated and a drag on cooperation. Speaking at the concluding plenary session of the conference, Stephan Sitaryan, chairman of the State Commission for Foreign Trade under the USSR Council of Ministers, proposed abolition of Cocom and a start of East-West consultations on the rules of the transfer of dual-purpose technology. Sitaryan said that after-sale inspections could be considered to make sure how dual-purpose technologies are used.

The Bonn forum affirmed the principles of economic cooperation, creation of the common European economic space and norms of economic activities of CSCE member states. Although documents of CSCE conferences are not binding, the national legislations of member states must comply with them. However, the human rights commitments undertaken by the Soviet Union in Vienna over a year ago have not so far been included in Soviet legislation. Meanwhile, the decisions taken in Bonn concern more important aspects of domestic policies of the USSR than, for instance, the right to emigrate from or return to the country freely, or the right to form a political party or publish a newspaper.

How will Soviet MPs react to the provision of the Bonn document which bans discrimination of different forms of ownership, including private property? Is the Soviet Union ready to permit complete freedom of contacts between businessmen of different countries and free exchange of commercial information? Is it ready to encourage small and medium private firms? Will the Soviet official bodies regard as an infringement on the national security the provision on the participating

states' "resolve to publish and make available comprehensive, comparable and timely economic, commercial and demographic information... and detailed, comparable and up-to-date data on balance of payments and gross national product statistics"? Will some bureaucrats see a danger to the country's economy in the provision of "international and domestic policies aimed at expanding the free flow of trade, capital, investment and repatriation of profits in convertible currencies" or on that the "participating states will facilitate, on a non-discriminatory basis, the establishment and operation of business offices and firms in their territory, including the renting and purchasing of commercial premises and housing, the acquisition of equipment and transport facilities, access to telecommunications, utilities and social services... as well as the unhindred recruitment of local staff required by firms?"

The Soviet delegation in Bonn was aware of the difficulties, and still its head, Deputy Foreign Minister Ernest Obminskiy, sounded optimistic:

"We attach the main importance to the problem of switching over from planned economy to market relations," said he when asked about the priorities of the Soviet diplomacy in Bonn. "Different opinions exist in the USSR on that score. Here at the conference we depart from the conviction that this process is irreversible. I am sure that without such a transition we shall never be ready for equal partnership with the world economy without which our own economy cannot develop."

"The subjects of market economy are immediate producers, that is firms and businessmen. The freedom of markets suggests independence in the relations between businessmen of different countries. The state must not interfere. Wasn't the conference simply wasting time, since the concluding document was still signed by states?"

"The state exists to remove all hurdles on the way to market and to provide legal, economic and other conditions for its functioning. The participants of the conference confirmed, I am now citing the concluding document, that 'while governments provide the overall framework for economic activity, business partners make their own decisions.'"

"Could one hope the concluding document will facilitate economic reforms in the USSR?"

"I think so. It will help galvanize Soviet business activity and make Soviet businessmen feel responsible for the economic health of the country. It will also be a serious argument for changing the Soviet legislation."

One of the key provisions of the concluding document is that only a transitional period to market economy will create necessary conditions for the inclusion of East Europe and the Soviet Union to the all-European nations cannot be imagined without international division of labour. Of course, the process may be painful and, say, West German farmers are worried about competition with farmers from other EC countries. It is evident, however, that a state which joins the European integration gains more than it loses. And the consumer who has a better choice of less expensive goods stands to gain most.

Soviet integration to all-European economic structures is hindered by domestic reasons. Integration, for instance, implies shedding of a part of national soveriegnty. Many West Europeans do not even imagine what part of their countries' national sovereignties is delegated to the bodies of the European Community. The Soviet Union, in its turn, is far from prepared to follow their example.

This is not the only thing that matters, though. The EC is very skeptical about the prospects of the Soviet Union's speedy inclusion to the European division of labour. The imposibility to aligne planned economy with market economy is not the only obstacle. The problem is that the backward behemoth of the Soviet economy, if it joins common European economic structures, can destabilize economic situation in West Europe. West Europeans are far more attracted by the prospects of associating themselves with East European economies. This possibility is accepted by Soviet allies with much optimism. Hence the attitude to the CMEA. Its East European member countries want to see this organization not as a close East European Common Market, but as an closed East European Common market, but as an open community oriented at the joining of the pan-European economic space. This prospect is objectively in the interests of the USSR.

At the same time an opinion is widespread in the Soviet Union that the East European countries' tilt to the West means weakening of the Eastern bloc and strengthening of its Western opponent. This approach seems to us to be not only a relapse to old thinking but also a distortion of today's European realities. The objective logics of European development consists not in the autarkist tendencies, not in cementing of the split and division of Europe, but in continental integration, interdependence and interconnection of all the European regions and states.

Interdependence, including economic interdependence, is the best remedy from confrontation.

WPC President Cites Council's Crisis, Status

90UF0097A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report on interview with Evangelos Makheras, president of the World Peace Council, by IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Charodeyev: "WPC Does Not Claim a Monopoly"]

[Text] Evangelos Makheras, a prominent public figure from Greece and renowned lawyer, who was recently elected the new president of the World Peace Council (WPC), is in Moscow on a short visit at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (WPC).

What legacy did the new president inherit? "Internal dissensions are tearing the Council apart," declared M. Hedminen, editor in chief of the WPC journal PEACE COURIER to the Finnish newspaper UUSI SUOMI. "The movement is in a crisis. All that remains is to wait to see how long the Soviet Union will continue to finance the WPC. Without this support, its activity will come into question."

"I never belonged to any party," E. Makheras said in an interview with an IZVESTIYA correspondent, "and I never aspired to occupy a ministerial post. I like independence. There is every opportunity for this now."

"I will not deny: For many long years, the USSR and countries of East Europe carried the main burden of financing the World Peace Council by themselves. But your country always came forward with peace-making positions. The WPC supported this policy, and the Soviet Union in turn supported the WPC. Including with dollars also. Perhaps that is why confidence in the Council as a political force was decreasing."

[Charodeyev] It is asserted that the WPC budget today amounts to about $60 million....

[Makheras] Who told you this? We do not have that kind of money. I know exactly that the WPC has available about $1.5 million. At the last session, participants in the financial working group of the WPC proposed making a radical reform of all aspects of the activity of the Council, placing its main emphasis on changing its financing principles. In particular a decision was made to create an "international peace fund," for which all of the country participants will make their contribution to the budget of the organization and a campaign to collect money will be conducted. Sponsors will begin to finance various measures. We are counting on the voluntary donations of all of those who are striving to promote the activation of the fight for peace.

[Charodeyev] Opponents of the WPC continue to assert that apparently only after the war did it really work "in the interests of peace, but that in the succeeding decades it spent money to no purpose, conducting its magnificent sessions in the best hotels of the world...."

[Makheras] This is also a half-truth. Yes, large congresses were held in which thousands of people took part. Perhaps this is a bit much. But they did not at all lead a luxurious life. I also took part in such forums in Prague and Sofia. We all lived in ordinary hotels. Incidentally, as is known, I recently was compelled to suspend my professional activity and devote more time to the movement for peace. My work is meetings and trips. For 45 years of my legal practice I earned a little. The WPC does not pay me one cent. Everything is at my own expense. I do not even have an official vehicle. I think that this is proper.

[Charodeyev] By the way, what is the size of the WPC apparatus?

[Makheras] About 30 employees work in Helsinki, where the WPC headquarters is located. Half of them are in the administrative council, and the other part is engaged in publishing activity. You see that for such a powerful organization the staff of permanent employees is not large.

[Charodeyev] Many problems have come up recently in your organization, and they are frequently connected with the name of R. Chandra, the former WPC president. The opinion is expressed that he represents those circles that considered the Council an assembly of people who praised the foreign policy of the USSR. The WPC awarded honorary medals for those who were selected as "fighters for peace"—L. Brezhnev, E. Honecker, and N. Ceausescu. What can you say about this?

[Makheras] I believe that changes must take place in the leadership. It is bad when one person remains "at the wheel" over several decades. However, R. Chandra accomplished a lot of useful things for the WPC. It is not without reason that the last session elected him as an honorary president.

[Charodeyev] What movements left the WPC after the crisis broke out?

[Makheras] There is no crisis in the WPC. Perhaps there is a crisis in individual organizations. But this concerns first and foremost those countries in East Europe where major political reforms have occurred. Changes are taking place there in organizations that are related to us. But this, I emphasize, is a temporary phenomenon.

[Charodeyev] It is possible that tomorrow organizations will appear in the Soviet Union that are alternatives to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, which is a member of the WPC. Will they be accepted into the World Peace Council?

[Makheras] Of course. And we strive for this. I emphasize that from now on the WPC will not attempt to monopolize the fight for peace.

United States & Canada

U.S. Begins Preparing for Gorbachev, Bush Summit

LD0805061590 Moscow TASS in English 0612 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Washington May 8 TASS—The most important preparations for the summit between Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, to be held between May 30 and June 3, have begun in Washington.

The first official meeting of Soviet and American teams on protocol and technical issues of the summit, was held at Blair House, a residence for high-ranking foreign guests of the U.S. Government, on Monday.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told a news conference that work is proceeding according to a schedule and relatively well. The meeting was attended by Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Yuriy Dubinin.

PRAVDA Ponders U.S. Stance on Lithuania

PM0705191190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 First Edition p 5

[Anatoliy Karpychev "Journalist's Notes": "Lithuania's Lesson for the Rest of the World"]

[Text] We quite frequently refer to the will of history, although we sometimes emphasize not so much the wisdom of its choice as the presence of an element of unpredictability in the movement of things—precisely this is what happened, people say, and nothing else, and there is nothing you can do about it.

I noticed the following words in the message which President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl sent recently to Lithuania: "...History has created a complex situation."

I do not dispute the conclusion. What is more, I agree with it. Nevertheless, reflecting on the situation, you feel a certain inner protest at the surprises of esteemed history and... your own helplessness. Because history always controls great destinies, the "price" of a situation is so high that you do not know whether to thank history or to go on your knees before it...

Of course, the Lithuanian crisis is not the 1962 Caribbean crisis, when peace was hanging by a thread and being threatened by nuclear war and history, in the persons of N.S. Khrushchev and John Kennedy, was weighing up the options to find a way out of the impasse. However, for all the dissimilarity of the situations, the Lithuanian crisis is very serious and is probably the most significant one during the time of perestroyka. We had every reason to fear the worst. And we have now too.

It is not for me to judge which forces are to blame for fanning the conflict. History will judge and put everything in its proper place and will fairly reward Moscow, Vilnius, Washington, London, etc. But the thought of Lithuania's lesson gives me no rest. Not so much for itself or for the Kremlin as for the rest of the world, which has gotten involved in discussing the problem with such fervent insistence, as though its survival depended on it alone. And such an understanding is perfectly possible. I also speak of a lesson because history will repeatedly create other complex situations and make different opinions and positions clash in a confrontation; and it is necessary to be ready to act sensibly and calmly, without bringing matters to an explosion or a retreat to yesterday.

What do I see as the meaning and value of the lesson? I will try to explain.

Only yesterday, it seems, we breathed the fresh air of freedom, only yesterday the Berlin Wall fell, only yesterday we started speaking of the end of the "cold war," of a bright hope, of life without fear, yet suddenly today history presents us with a situation in which both this bright hope and the peacemaking trend itself are jeopardized. Therefore when I see passions seething around the Lithuanian question and the "defenders of the rebel republic" becoming inflamed, demanding that the Soviets be punished, I become afraid: What if senselessness suddenly prevails over common sense? No, I do not believe in this. Yet the impasses of history do not arise of their own accord but are provoked by thriving people. It frightens me that these people are prepared to do anything for the sake of ambition.

The stakes are extremely high. Let us state frankly that the Lithuanian crisis affects the fate of the democratic processes in East Europe, the fate of the disarmament talks, Soviet-U.S. relations, and a number of other aspects. Even the top-level meeting in Washington scheduled for the end of May has been thrown into the pan of the scales by certain politicians. They are threatening sanctions, already applying something, already intimidating and cursing... So much work has been done, starting with Geneva-85, and has all this—please forgive the nonliterary expression—gone down the drain?

People might say that I am laying it on a bit thick. What if I am not? If someone is faced with the choice—Moscow or Lithuania? Perestroyka or a return to the old? Of course, in our own home we could calmly investigate ourselves, alone, reducing to a minimum the West's nervous movement and hiding nothing from it; but here we have not been allowed to investigate alone, the problem has been deemed "nondomestic," and the Lithuanian leaders very much want to "leave home," appealing to the Western pattern.

Headlines are glimpsed in foreign newspapers every day: "Landsbergis Interview," "Kazimiera Prunskiene's Trip." In my view, their statements boil down to inclining foreign readers and listeners against Moscow, accusing it of not wanting a dialogue, and thereby evoking compassion for themselves. They talk of the "old Russian imperial thinking," of the malicious inventions of the Soviet press, of the "Kremlin boa constrictor," and of the fact that Lithuania would like "a more

resolute Western reaction to the Soviet Union's actions." Also, the Lithuanian leaders generally suggest that the problem must be viewed not as a conflict between the republic and the USSR but "from the viewpoint of European security and East-West relations."

I cannot say definitely whether people in Lithuania thought up this formula themselves or whether it was suggested to them (some three months ago, after the events in Romania, I encountered this rhetorical question in the Western press: "Now Lithuania?"). But I will note, not without satisfaction, that times have changed. Previously the West would have perceived such a situation at once and unhesitatingly as a propaganda gift of fate and would have squeezed everything possible out of it—not to our benefit, of course. Today the picture is different. It is more realistic. Many Western political leaders have realized how undesirable a crisis is at the present stage and how serious the lesson is for the rest of the world. They look and act more wisely than the Lithuanian leaders. This is my opinion.

Les Aspin is an influential member of the U.S. Congress. He is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He was a guest of our country not so long ago and will not play up to us. Responding to a request to "describe Bush's policy toward Lithuania" on an ABC program, he declared:

"The overall direction has been chosen correctly. In principle, the interests of the United States and of the whole world are far broader in this case than the temporary tactical problems associated with Lithuania's independence."

Note: the interests of the United States and of the whole world.

The press has also reported that in one confidential conversation President Bush supposedly voiced displeasure with the Lithuanian leaders, who, in his opinion, are going too far too fast, creating a confrontation with President Gorbachev.

If anyone thinks that I am selecting quotes that are "convenient" for me, that would be a mistake. USA TODAY also wrote: "President Bush's decision not to take any steps with regard to the situation in Lithuania has to be applauded."

The Lithuanian leaders' assessment was different: "We were afraid that America might sell us out, and now let the people decide whether this has happened." And again: "Washington has succumbed to the Kremlin's blackmail and not taken economic measures against the USSR."

The Americans did not let the outburst go unanswered, as can be judged from a rejoinder in THE NEW YORK TIMES. "In response to the continuing criticism from Lithuania, President Bush has frankly declared that he does not need excuses for his refusal to 'punish' the Soviet Union for intesifying economic pressure on the rebel Baltic republic. Replying to Landsbergis, who had accused him of betraying the Lithuanian people, Bush said unusually sharply: 'The policy and the decisions that I make enjoy the active support of the American people, and it is precisely them I work for.'"

The Soviet press has cited data from a poll conducted by the WALL STREET JOURNAL and NBC TV. It seems, they conclude, that the American people are on the side of Gorbachev and the administration under Bush, who is trying to "avoid a skirmish over Lithuania." Some 61 percent of those polled favored holding the next summit meeting. A majority of Americans generally do not advise interfering in Lithuanian affairs. The administration once expressed the opinion that the Lithuanians are more responsible than Moscow for provoking the crisis and have suffered less than they maintain and that the further improvement of East-West relations is of infinitely greater significance than "an immediate response to the Lithuanians' appeals."

There are so many appeals for recognition that you feel bitter about the appellants and you want to say a few words about a sense of dignity. But... they do not recognize. That is, they appear to recognize, but not at all in the way the Lithuanian leaders would like. Kazimiera Prunskiene is not greeted at airports as premier, honor guards are not lined up, she is asked to show her passport...

The decision to recognize is too crucial.

Speaking recently, Secretary of State Baker elucidated another aspect of this problem which "requires a considered decision." He remarked: "In particular, the Lithuania which we recognize as an independent state differs from the Baltic republic that is now a part of the Soviet Union. It has a different territory today to that prior to joining the USSR. Some parts of present-day Lithuania were given to it at the expense of the Soviet Union."

I would be wrong to keep quiet about those people in the West who support Lithuania's position. Attacks on President Bush are still continuing—why will he not bang his fist? Certain senators grow angry. In connection with the events around Lithuania, THE WASHINGTON POST bluntly writes: "Moscow thinks that it has gotten the 'green light' from the United States to stifle Lithuania. And there is nothing surprising about this. Because of its incorrect assessment of the situation in the USSR as a whole and of Mikhail Gorbachev's role in particular, the Bush administration is undermining the real opportunities for democratic changes in the USSR."

"It is unacceptable for the United States to enter into a favorable trade agreement with the Soviet Union at a time when it is crushing Lithuanian freedom," Senator A. d'Amato declared. "This is a betrayal of the ideals of freedom and, quite honestly, it makes me sick."

Incidentally, V. Landsbergis at once sent this senator a letter calling on the United States to recognize Lithuania.

As is known, this senator recently made his way from Poland into Lithuania without a visa, and so he was stopped by our border guards and got very angry.

He is not alone. I do not wish to lay it on thick, but this is a struggle—between the old view of the world and the new political thinking. We are tired of this word, but there has been and will be a struggle—between common sense and ambition. A struggle of interests—between good and evil.

It is hard to move politicians to pity, for they, like Moscow, do not believe tears. But in any situation created by history there are, apart from everything else, lessons. Whether or not they are liked, they cannot be disregarded. We spent five years panning out the valuable aspects of the new relations grain by grain, for all this happened with such difficulty. **Are we to lose what we extracted? Deepen the crisis? It is the answers to these questions that I see as the lesson for the rest of the world.**

White House Easing of Cocom Curbs Viewed

PM0405141190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 90 Second Edition p 1, 7

[Dispatch by Viktor Linnik: "Keeping One Step Ahead"]

[Text] New York, 3 May—The U.S. Administration has announced its decision to lift a number of restrictions on exports of high-technology goods to the Soviet Union. It is a question of personal computers, high-precision goods, and satellite communication ground equipment.

The administration's recommendations apply to a total of 30 of the 120 categories of goods included in the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Controls on Exports to Socialist Countries [Cocom] list of banned goods. Cocom is to discuss the U.S. proposals at its next session in early June.

Allow me to recall that at a similar meeting in February the United States was the only country which opposed lifting restrictions on exports of banned goods to the Soviet Union. Clearly, this kind of isolation has caused a certain amount of embarrassment to the administration. And this is one of the reasons why it has adjusted its position. Another reason is the pressure put on the White House by Congress and business circles in the country.

The local press has focused attention on the fact that the administration's announcement of the relaxation of restrictions came exactly a day before the opening of hearings on the question of export restrictions at the U.S. Congress House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Commission. Congressmen are making no secret of the fact that they intend to considerably liberalize export laws.

"The administration's current proposals are better than anything we have heard so far," Congressman S. Gejdenson said, commenting the White House statement. "But they are insufficient, and, moreover, in a number of spheres of crucial importance for the United States." In announcing the relaxation of its former approaches a day before the opening of Congressional hearings, the White House was clearly trying to keep one step ahead of the game. The near future will show whether this "relaxation" of the administration's position is sufficient to appease Congress, U.S. business circles, and the U.S. allies in Western Europe on the question of exports to the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Incidentally, there is an explanation, of course, for the administration's hesitancy in renouncing such relics of "cold war" as export controls.

Even White House recommendations viewed by congressmen as half-measures get a hostile reception from the conservatives, who view them as totally unfounded concessions to the Soviets. According to the U.S. press, the strongest opposition to the announced decision exists in certain Pentagon circles. The Washington security policy research center has expressed utmost puzzlement that President Bush "is rewarding Moscow for imposing economic sanctions against Lithuania."

Clearly this pressure from the right is the reason for the selective approach of the White House to the question of lifting restrictions. In any case, the current list of permitted exports to East European countries is slightly longer than the same list for the Soviet Union.

Northeast Asia

Mongolian Leadership To Visit in Mid-May

LD0705142190 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—The president of the Presidium of the Mongolian People's Great Hural, Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, and the chairman of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, Gombojabyn Ochirbat, will pay a working visit to the Soviet Union in mid-May at the invitation of Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet president and general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, it was officially announced here today.

Phase Two of Troop Pullout From Mongolia Detailed

PM0805082190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 90 Second Edition p 7

[Report by unidentified PRAVDA correspondent: "Fully Mobilized"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 6 May—The second stage of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Mongolia has been announced at a press conference here. The remaining Soviet infantry troops numbering 26,800 soldiers and officers, 436 tanks, 375 guns and mortars, 400 armored personnel carriers, and 5,430 units of other equipment have still to be withdrawn.

Essentially only one reduced-personnel motorized rifle division will be left in Mongolia. Its task will be to ensure

the removal by 1992 of all the ammunition and other material facilities which have accumulated over the last 20 years. This will require 17,000 railroad cars.

We could withdraw all this much quicker, Lieutenant General L.S. Mayorov, commander of the Soviet troops in Mongolia, said, but in that case we would have to use the entire rolling stock of the one railroad. And that is impossible. Mongolia is an importing country. Moreover, a lot of transit freight passes through it. The slightest disruption in freight transportation would affect the state's life support system.

Military camps are fully mobilized [obyavlena gotovnost nomer odin]. Residential buildings, barracks, clubs, and canteens are being put in order. All facilities are being handed over in perfect condition. In 55 military camps, 6,800 apartments alone are being handed over to the Mongolian side. The one task now is to dispose of this wealth sensibly and carefully.

As it was said at the press conference, deciding the question of whom to hand the facilities over to is taking a disappointingly long time. The safekeeping of equipment being dispatched by train is also a source of concern.

Mongolian Leaders To Form Consultative Council

LD0605043790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0250 GMT 6 May 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 6 May—TASS correspondent Kim Boldokhonov reports:

The development of a joint document has concluded the latest round of negotiations between representatives of the official authorities and leaders of the country's new political forces in Ulaanbaatar. They have reached accord on three points.

It has been decided to form a consultative council of all political forces, connected to the presidium of the People's Great Hural. Its task will consist of the joint development of draft laws concerning the renewal of the country's political system.

The second point concerns the institution of a "People's Minor Hural". —a continuously [postoyanno] functioning parliament. According to the protocol, it will be elected by a sitting of the People's Great Hural by secret ballot. The proposal of the setting-up of a "Minor Hural" will be put forward for study at the forthcoming session of the republic's People's Great Hural on 10 May.

The third point of the accords envisages that representatives of political parties which have received official status will be included in the composition of the electoral commission.

The document on the results of the latest round of negotiations was signed by all its participants, except for the leader of the Mongolian Democratic Party, who deferred until today.

Discussion of other issues put forward by the new political forces will be continued.

Near East & South Asia

Egypt's Mubarak To Visit in Mid-May

LD0605192690 Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT 6 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 6 TASS—It was announced here today that President Husni Mubarak would pay an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union in the middle of May at the invitation of the president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

India's Stance on Nonproliferation Viewed

PM0405140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 May 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Dispatch by N. Paklin under the rubric "India and Nuclear Weapons": "Will Delhi Change Its Stance?"]

[Text] According to the oriental custom, guests only say pleasant things to their hosts. In the very first round of the talks with Indian head of government V.P. Singh in New Delhi, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu touched on a subject which is a delicate one for his hosts. He insistently recommended that India, along with Pakistan, should sign the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Until recently we avoided writing about India's attitude toward this very important international agreement which came into force 20 years ago. It was believed that it was inconvenient to touch on this theme. India, it was said, is already pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy and fighting for a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons. Indian newspapers, totally unembarrassed, have written and continue to write that Delhi does not want to associate itself to the 140 countries which have voluntarily undertaken to not create nuclear weapons and not deploy them on their territories.

What reason does India give for its refusal to accede to the treaty? In its opinion, the question of banning and eliminating nuclear weapons should be examined on a global scale, involving everyone, as they say. Partial measures produce little in the nuclear sphere. The treaty itself, India believes, is of a discriminatory nature for nonnuclear countries.

The "all or nothing" approach toward the problem of disarmament and primarily nuclear disarmament is not new. It has its reasoning. Who will dispute that it would be better to ban nuclear weapons and with them other types of arms at a stroke?. But experience shows that this is not how it happens.

With regard to the small nonnuclear countries which have not signed the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the world community has suspicions as to their desire to acquire these weapons. In addition to

Israel, the Republic of South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, Pakistan and India are cited among these countries. As for India, frequent reference is made to the nuclear explosion which it carried out in the desert in 1974. Indian governments, irrespective of party allegiance, categorically deny the country's nuclear aspirations and invariably stress the peaceful nature of the Indian nuclear program. But the question arises: Why is India reluctant to accede to a treaty which in no way impedes research or the generation and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes?

Indian politicians, as though trying to justify themselves, often cite the fact that neighboring Pakistan, with whom India has tense relations, has either already created a nuclear weapon or is close to doing so. But as far as is known, Pakistan also denies the military nature of its work in the nuclear sphere. It has repeatedly proposed to India that they sign the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons together and simultaneously. Pakistan agrees to mutual inspection of nuclear installations and laboratories. Incidentally, monitoring of the fulfillment of commitments under the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been imposed on the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, Pakistan has suggested turning South Asia into a zone free of nuclear weapons. But India has given no reply to these proposals.

From time to time the Indian Government issues statements to the effect that if necessary it will have to alter the nature of its peaceful program. These statements should be understood as the likelihood that India will create its own atom bomb. Several of the country's influential political parties and organizations, which as a rule stand on positions of Hindu chauvinism, are openly calling for this. One of the supporters of the creation of an Indian atom bomb is L.K. Advani, president of the Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP]. And at the recent elections the BJP increased its representation in the Indian Parliament and the legislative assemblies of a number of Indian states several times over. This party gives he National Front government outside support without which it would lose its majority and be obliged to resign. L.K. Advani again repeated his demand for the creation of an atom bomb to journalists in late April.

The proposal made to India and Pakistan by the prime minister of Japan, which has suffered from nuclear weapons, is not the only one of its kind. The leaders of other states have also made similar appeals to the two countries. There is no doubt that the accession to the "nuclear-free club" of India and Pakistan, which mutually suspect each other of nuclear ambitions, would lead to an improvement in their bilateral relations and to the normalization of the situation in the region in which there is no denying people are speaking of India's "imperial aspirations." The expansion of the number of states which have voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons would strengthen security in the world as a whole.

East Europe

Defense Minister Eppelmann Arrives in Moscow

LD0705172890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1626 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Disarmament and Defence Minister Rainer Eppelmann arrived in Moscow on Monday evening [7 May] to attend the celebrations marking the 45th anniversary of the victory over Hitler and fascism. At Sheremetyevo Airport he was welcomed by the commander in chief of the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact, General Pyetr Lushev, and other military men. GDR Ambassador Gerd Koenig was also present. The minister, who is in Moscow at the invitation of his counterpart, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, is accompanied by State Secretary Werner Ablass, Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, chief of the National People's Army and by the chief of the branches of the National People's Army. Minister Eppelmann told ADN that his visit was linked with a look backwards—that is, to May 1945, and the liberation of Germany from Hitler-ite fascism, and the self-sacrificing struggle of the Soviet people. The Soviet Union deserves thanks and recognition for this. The minister said that this entailed a responsibility to bear in mind, with a view to the present and to the future, the fact that never again should war emanate from German soil. Regarding the two-plus-four talks, he stressed that the GDR had to see itself as one of the two members of the Warsaw Pact "which are negotiating with the four NATO countries about what a new security strategy for the whole of Europe is to look like." The important thing here was to tell our Soviet friends and allies again today, to assure them that the interests of the USSR were being very much taken into account at the two-plus-four talks.

Lukyanov Greets GDR Citizens on Victory Day

LD0705214290 Moscow TASS in English 1820 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov sent cordial congratulations to president of the East German Parliament Sabine Bergmann-Pohl and all citizens of the Republic on the 45th anniversary of the German people's liberation from Nazism.

May will always be associated with the victory over fascism and liberation from Hitler's tyranny. The victory allowed Europe to enter a peaceful period of development, the telegram reads.

Today, the role of new political thinking in world affairs is growing. It opens up prospects for the full elimination of war and the termination of the arms race, Lukyanov writes.

The Soviet people, who suffered uncountable losses during World War II, are interested in European and universal security, the telegram stresses. They want to

live in peace, friendship and good-neighbourliness with the German people and all other peoples.

Lukyanov wished happiness and prosperity to citizens of the Republic.

Berlin Talks on State Treaty Successful

LD0405213890 Moscow TASS in English 2116 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Berlin May 5 TASS—A two-day Berlin round of conference of experts who took part in elaborating a state treaty between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has ended successfully. Full accord has been reached over many a matter, the leaders of the two delegations told a news conference here on Friday.

An optimistic evaluation of talks by officials not always coincides with the opinion of political parties and public organisations, not to mention the population, who feels serious concern for its future.

The Association of Free German Trade Unions (FDGB) addressed on Friday an open letter to the country's Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere, urging a 50 per cent wage increase for the citizens of the GDR upon the introduction of a monetary union with the FRG.

This would make it possible if only somehow to draw the living standards in the two countries closer together and avert the ruin of the lowest-income sections of the population of the GDR, FDGB maintains. "We are firmly resolved to struggle for justice and democracy," the letter says.

It is being increasingly demanded that the parties represented in parliament be invited to participate in talks on concluding a state treaty and not to endorse it in its final version until the country's public at large expresses its opinion.

Next round of experts' conference will be held in Bonn at the end of next week. Hans Tietmeyer, leader of the West German delegation, believes that experts have entered the finishing straight in their work and will soon pass the baton to politicians.

Aboimov, Czechoslovak Envoy Cited on Disruptions

LD0705161890 Moscow TASS in English 1613 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov today invited Czechoslovak Ambassador to Moscow Rudolf Slansky and called his attention to the inadmissibility of activities by some groups of people in Czechoslovakia, which disrupt the normal working rhythm of the Soviet Embassy in Prague.

Aboimov demanded immediate and effective measures to ensure proper conditions for the embassy's work.

Change in CSFR WWII Celebrations Reported

LD0605172390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 6 May 90

[Text] the main festivities relating to the 45th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from fascist occupation are currently being held not at Dukla Pass, in Banska Bystrica, or Prague. For the first time, the center of festivities has shifted to the western Czech town of Plzen, which on 6 May 1945 was liberated by the U.S. Army. President Havel of Czechoslovakia took part in the celebrations. He unveiled a memorial plaque which was set up in Plzen in 1946 but later replaced by a monument to Red Army soldiers. The celebrations, in which U.S. veterans also took part, ended with the solemn adoption of a new military oath and a parade of Czechoslovak Army units.

I may point out here that U.S. troops stepped onto Czechoslovak soil on 18 April 1945, at a time when the Soviet Army, which bore the main burden of the fight against the Wehrmacht, had already liberated the territory of virtually the whole of Slovakia, crossed into Moravia and was rapidly moving westward. The Americans, however, in the last weeks of the war liberated a number of other small towns in western and southern Bohemia, in addition to Plzen. In so doing, the Americans lost about 300 men. At the same time, Soviet losses amounted to 144,000.

At present, the Czechoslovak authorities prefer not to mention this.

Troop Withdrawal From CSFR on Schedule

LD0505112290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1038 GMT 5 May 90

[Text] Prague, 5 May (TASS)—The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia is continuing precisely on schedule. To date, 17,300 servicemen and over 8,600 members of their families have left the CSFR. A total of 403 tanks, 649 infantry combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 236 artillery guns and mortars, 18 rocket launchers, 92 helicopters, and more than 4,000 trucks have been withdrawn.

The residential and ancillary installations in which the Soviet sub-units were stationed are being handed over to the Czechoslovak side.

Bondarenko Briefs Poles on 'Two Plus Four' Talks

LD0705220890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1743 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Warsaw, 7 May (TASS)—A.P. Bondarenko, special representative of the USSR foreign affairs minister, Collegium member of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry, has visited Warsaw today. He was received by K. Skubiszewski, the Republic of Poland's foreign affairs minister, and had a talk with B. Kulski, secretary of state, in the Polish Republic's Foreign Affairs Ministry.

A.P. Bondarenko submitted extensive information about the course of the first meeting in Bonn under the "Two Plus Four" formula. He gave a detailed briefing on the position which the Soviet side took at the meeting in Bonn, and he also gave a briefing on the Soviet Union's resolute support for Poland's position regarding the principles of, and the procedure for, confirmation by treaty of the international and legal character of the Polish-German border along its present line, as well as for Poland's participation in the "Two Plus Four" talks, when the questions about its border and security are being discussed.

The representatives of the USSR foreign affairs minister stressed that the USSR favors the concept of a comprehensive settlement of the issue of Germany's unification in all foreign political aspects in a single international and legal document. This settlement should be of an all-European nature, because the emergence on the continent of a new German State will involve the interests of all European countries, first of all Germany's neighbors.

The USSR also favors maximum synchronization of the German unification process with the construction of new structures for all-European security.

Lukyanov Congratulates Hungary's Goncz

LD0405200590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Comrade Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has sent congratulations to Arpad Goncz, speaker of the National Assembly of the Hungarian Republic. Lukyanov sincerely congratulated him on his election to this high post. Confidence was expressed that the development of diverse links between the higher legislative bodies of the Soviet Union and Hungary will aid the maintenance of good-neighborly relations and peaceful cooperation between the states of Europe and the whole world. Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov wished Arpad Goncz success in his activities for the good of the Hungarian people.

Latin America & Caribbean

Soviet, Cuban Foreign Ministers Exchange Telegrams

LD0705165790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1322 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 May (TASS)—On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Cuba, which falls on 8 May, the ministers of foreign affairs of the two countries have exchanged congratulatory telegrams.

Soviet-Cuban relations, embracing all fields of the life of our peoples, have in the past few years been developing steadily and fruitfully, Eduard Shevardnadze's message stresses. The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty of 1989, consolidating the fraternal nature of relations between the two countries on the basis of the unchanging principles of noninterference and respect for sovereignty and equal rights, has become an important landmark on the path of the further deepening of bilateral relations and their conveyance to a new qualitative level, in keeping with the requirements of today and of the mutual consideration of interests and existing opportunities.

The past 30 years have been marked by dynamic and fruitful interaction in the foreign policy field. In the Soviet Union high value is attached to the bilateral political dialogue that has been established, making it possible to compare attitudes, to coordinate steps, and to plan directions of joint action on key questions of international policy. The Soviet Union is full of resolution to further develop this dialogue and perfect our political cooperation.

Isidoro Malmierca's message says that Soviet-Cuban interaction in the course of the past three decades has been strengthened and developed in all fields; the unbreakable bond linking Cuba with the great homeland of Lenin constitute an example of real friendship and cooperation. It notes the big contribution of the USSR to the cause of ensuring peace and international security, and expresses confidence that bilateral relations will be given their further development on the basis of the existing treaty.

U.S. Caribbean Manuevers Criticized

PY0705141490 Moscow in Spanish to Cuba 0030 GMT 5 May 90

[Text] The Soviet people are paying particular attention to the naval maneuvers that the United States are performing near the territorial waters of the island of freedom. Let us listen to the opinions of two people have first-hand knowledge of Cuba. First we will listen to (Vladimir Borodayev), chief of the Cuban division of the Latin American Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

[Begin (Borodayev) recording in Russian, fading into Spanish] Right after the victory of the Cuban revolution, the United States adopted a hostile, aggressive position against Cuba.

The Cuban-U.S. conflict stems from the fact that the United States does not want to recognize the Cuban people's right to choose the Socialist option and to live in a fully sovereign country. During all these years, the White House has maintained an economic blockade on Cuba, doing its best to harm the commercial, humanitarian, and tourist relations between Cuba and other countries.

Against the will of Cuba, the United States maintains a naval base in Guantanamo, in Cuban territory. The United States also supports anti-Cuban migration groups.

U.S. Air Force planes have permanently flown over Cuban territory, while the U.S. station Radio Marti has

sought to exercise ideological pressure on the Cuban people. At the end of March 1990, the United States began to test its television beams to Cuba.

Seeking to frighten Cuba, the United States has systematically performed military maneuvers in the Caribbean, simulating air and sea attacks against Cuba.

The current maneuvers are of the same type. Following the successful operation against Panama, and after achieving some kind of success in its policy against Nicaragua, U.S Government circles have now concentrated their efforts in the liquidation of the last stronghold of independence in Latin America, which the United States has for a long time regarded as its own property.

Through these maneuvers, the United States has sought to exercise psychological influence on the Cuban people, probably hoping to force a change in Cuban internal and external policy. Or perhaps the United States believes that it will be able to mobilize some forces, like a fifth column inside Cuba.

Those who know Cuba and the Cuban people, however, harbor no doubt that the independent and free Cuban people will react against such frightening actions. I am sure that the United States will not frighten the people of the island of freedom or force a change in their political system. The U.S. maneuvers can only increase tension in Cuban-U.S. relations and in the Caribbean. [end recording]

Our interlocutor now is Major General (Leonid Garbus), member of the central executive board of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society.

[Begin (Garbus) recording in Russian, fading into Spanish] The Cuban choice has been for socialism. All of the people's aspirations and thoughts focus on the improvement of socialism and on the resolution of problems in the areas of education, public health, and culture.

Over more than 30 years, the Cuban people have made many advancements. Apparently, this is not good for the U.S. Government.

Creative work calls for peace and tranquillity. Once again, however, we have learned through the radio that major U.S. maneuvers have begun near Cuba.

In the past, during the cold war, there could have been a reason for such maneuvers. But now that the world is tired of confrontation, now that international detente is within sight, a strong power is trying to frighten and impair the morale of the people of the small island of Cuba. This power, however, will not succeed. We know the monolithic unity of Cuban people. Socialism will succeed in Cuba.

But these U.S. actions against a sovereign country will not do any good to the White House. [end recording]

Political & Social

Reportage on 7 May Kremlin Veterans Meeting

Gorbachev Opening Speech

LD0705130790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1147 GMT 7 May 90

[Speech by USSR President Mikhail S. Gorbachev at a veterans meeting in the Kremlin to mark the 45th anniversary of the USSR victory in the Great Patriotic War—recorded]

[Text] Dear comrades: Here in the Kremlin, in the party's Central Committee, I would like to cordially greet those who have assembled in this hall; greet the Heroes of the Soviet Union, the holders of the full Order of Glory, the veterans of the war and of labor, the representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the young people in the prelude to our great holiday, Victory Day. [applause]

I would also like, dear comrades, to greet all of you—the creators and the heirs of victory—and to congratulate you on this holiday. [applause]

The Soviet people bow down before the feat wrought by the frontline soldiers and those who selflessly, and without thought for themselves, labored throughout those hard years at the home front, and forged victory in the factories, at plants, on collective farms, in the farmsteads, and in science laboratories. They are grateful to the generations of those years for all they did after the war, too, to raise our country from ruins, and to revitalize it for life in peacetime.

All of us who are alive are infinitely grateful to the older generations of Soviet people who shouldered the unbelievbable privations and difficulties of the terrible wartime years. The lives lived by the veterans encompasses a lot: the great, the heroic, the dramatic and—there's no avoiding it—the tragic. It is thanks to their labor under arms that the mighty state was created, a state which has in great part exerted a huge influence on the destinies of the whole world. Without this feat, and without the immense contribution to the great victory from this generation of Soviet people, it would be hard to imagine us being able today, at this state in the development of our society, to set ourselves the great tasks of the revolutionary transformation of our country along the lines of revealing socialism's potential, and along the lines of moving toward a humane and democratic society. Our victory cost us dearly. Let us honor the memory of those who fell in that terrible war and those whose lives were shattered by the incredible strain on the home front. Let us honor them with a minute of silence. [silence for several seconds]

Please take your seats.

The great feats of the people during the war years will live eternally in the memory and deeds of all the generations of Soviet people.

Dear comrades, a solemn soiree devoted to the 45th anniverary of the great victory will take place tomorrow. We will be happy to see veterans at this soiree and to welcome them on behalf of the whole people. Today I would like to once again sincerely and cordially congratulate you and to again express the most profound feelings of gratitude on behalf of the whole people. I see in this a supreme duty of today's generations. I think that all the honest people in our society think likewise today turning their gaze and feelings to war veterans, frontline soldiers and to those who forged the victory in the rear. Your feats, your devotion to duty and patriots are an example for all those who today are solving the historic tasks of the great transformation. I thank you all for your active participation in all these deeds. We are aware of this, we know the firm civic stand of the veterans. They all have grounds for making their stand known to everyone, to every member of our society and every citizen, and to the country's leadership, for they have a moral right to this. I think this is a very strong and important human factor in our affairs today—the viewpoint, position and opinion of the veterans. I thank you for your contribution to our affairs today. I would like to wish you all very good health for many years to come, so that we can again meet and celebrate the 50th anniversary and then agree on what to do next. [applause]

With this I open our meeting with you, dear comrades in the party's Central Committee, and I would like to give the floor now to Viktor Georgiyevich, who has asked for it. Where is he?

[Kulikov says: "Here I am."

[Gorbachev] Please, on behalf of the veterans. And if anybody else wants to take the floor, simply from the heart, and in such good company, say what you have to say. I will give you the floor. Please, Viktor Georgiyevich, Comrade Kulikov.

Kulikov Address

LD0705154890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1154 GMT 7 May 90

[Speech by Viktor Georgeyevich Kulikov, deputy chairman of the Veteran and Invalid Affairs Committee of the Joint Committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at a veterans meeting in the Kremlin on 7 May to mark the 45th anniversary of the USSR people's victory in the Great Patriotic War—recorded]

[Text] Much Esteemed President of the USSR, much esteemed war and labour veterans, friends in arms: for the 45th time, the Soviet military and the whole of progressive humanity is solemnly marking Victory Day. A great deal can be remembered and a great deal is seen in these difficult days. Most importantly, above all, is that in the cruelest battle with the fascist invaders, the

Soviet people defended their Soviet homeland, brought liberty to the countries of Europe that had been enslaved by the Hitlerites, and saved world civilization. Victory over Hitler's Germany provided the entire world with convincing proof of the invincible might of the Soviet people and its valiant armed forces. It was and remains a subject for our pride and optimism, the source of our readiness to overcome anything, to triumph over anything, when called on to do so by the fatherland.

The magnitude of the victory and its historic significance for the whole world are becoming clearer today in light of the changes taking place in the country and throughout the world. We are very grateful to have been invited to this meeting and for the kind words Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has just addressed to the veterans of war and labor. We see this as another sign of the Communist Party and Soviet Government's concern for those who took the road to war and went through all its tribulations, bearing in their hearts an unquenchable love for their motherland, hatred for its enemies, and selfless commitment to their military duty and the ideals of Leninism.

We see the meeting as a tribute to the bright memory of those who gave their lives for our motherland. In the harshest and most unfavorable conditions for our troops, the border districts joined unequal battle with the foe, the German Fascist invaders. Victory brought closer all those who fought at the front or labored in the rear. The victory won was one and the same for all. It live on in the deeds of the working people of our country today and above all among those who forged it. That victory lights the way and gives strength to daily activities and provides intentions, connected with constructive labor, aimed at successfully carrying out the tasks of perestroyka.

Veterans of war and labor are doing all they can to hoost our economy and bring order to the country. Millions of war and labor veterans are playing an active part in our country's labor, public, and educational activities.

Today I would like to say a good word for those comrades with whom I fought in the war years. Now we are all fulfilling our service and party duties. I would like to mention the group of general inspectors. We have six marshals of the Soviet Union and today have the right to congratulate our minster of defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on being awarded the military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Congratulations on becoming a Marshal of the Soviet Union. [applause]

Two air chief marshals, 25 Army generals, 15 marshals from combat arms, four admirals of the fleet. Almost all of these hold the top government awards. Twenty-three Heroes of the Soviet Union—four have twice had this, our highest award, conferred on them. And Aviation Marshal Ivan Nikitich Kozhedub is a Hero of the Soviet Union three times over.

A number of my comrades have been in the party for more than 50 years. And we remain true to our party at this difficult time. [applause]

In spite of the burden of their years, most of our comrades continue to play an active part in sociopolitical work. They direct their efforts toward taking part in working out and studying topical problems pertaining to improving the combat readiness of our troops and Navy. They are engaged in military problems, social sciences, the theory and history of military science, and military hardware. Marshals, generals, and admirals devote much time to working among the troops and in higher educational establishments with matters relating to the production and testing of military hardware. Drawing on their very rich experience from war and peacetime, they help the young commanders of military districts, fleets, and armies in the making. As chairmen of state examination commissions, they are of great help to educational establishments in professionally selecting students and officer cadets, and they take part in all sorts of operational strategic exercises and serve on commissions and editorial boards which draw up manuals, regulations, and so forth.

Their contribution in disseminating the combat experience they have gained in battle—at Khasan, Khalkin Gol, in the Great Fatherland War—is invaluable. Much time is set aside for the patriotic education of our young folk. We war veterans do all we can to help our native land overcome its difficulties. However, we are now finding political loudmouths who arrogantly reject our advice and experience. In belittling the military feat of the Soviet people, they do not pause to ponder the fact that they are alive thanks to those people who, without counting the cost, laid down their lives on the battlefield fighting the enemy.

We are not icons. There is no need to pray to us. However, we do not deserve insults, either, and will not put up with them. Most of those present here to this day carry shrapnel in their bodies from the enemy's bombs, shells, and bullets. These wounds heal, but wounds inflicted by insults are worse than those inflicted by bullets or shrapnel.

The laws of some states stipulate administrative punishment for insulting servicemen and defiling a military uniform. Unfortunately, in this country by no means is everything in this regard in good shape. By virtue of their service and their work, veterans have and still deserve universal respect and are within their rights to expect it. They are optimists. They believe in the transformation of our society.

Many years ago, when we took our oaths as soldiers, we swore loyalty to our motherland and we will keep our oath.

Thank you very much for your attention. [applause]

Popov Speech

LD0705140690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1202 GMT 7 May 90

[Speech by Nikolay Vasiliyevich Popov, from Tambov, bearer of the Order of Glory, (not further identified) at a

meeting of veterans in the Kremlin to mark the 45th anniversary of the USSR people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, on 7 May—recorded]

[Excerpt] Esteemed comrade president, esteemed comrade members of the Presidium, esteemed comrades in arms, friends: For the elder generation of Soviet people, the motherland and the party are indivisible. This was underlined with particular clarity during the terrible years of the war. We entered our party as rank-and-file guardsmen, went off to battle, and brought the enemy to a halt. It was not for the sake of glory that we fought at the front, but for the sake of a just life on earth. We are disturbed today by tension in the social and political sphere, manifestations of crisis in the economy, and conflicts of interethnic grounds—something which, naturally, did not exist before—by the rising crime rate and the slackening of discipline and order. The soldiers of the Patriotic War and veterans of the party—and we are one and the same—solemnly declare that we fully and completey support the open letter to the communists of the country from the Central Committee of our party. We are categorically opposed to a split in the party. We are in favor of consolidating the ranks of the party and the Central Committee can be safe in the knowledge that our party will be defended by former soldiers of the ranks. [applause]

It is too early to bury our party or our motherland or to send out death notices. As for the organizers of fractional groupings, they are not going the same way as the party today and the party must shed this burden. I should now like, today, from this lofty rostrum, to say a few words about the great victory in the Patriotic War and about history. One can hear all sorts of things nowadays: that the war was waged in vain, the wrong methods were used, they say that we didn't even fight properly. Slanderers of all shades find it easy to say today, 45 years on, that fighting was too costly. As a former soldier I would say that every demagogue and slanderer should have been taken along just once to repel a pyschological attack by the adversary or to launch an attack on the enemy, and every one of them would lose the desire to talk all kinds of rubbish and be quite tongue-tied. Every veteran of the combat has dreams about the war to this day. They have nightmares. Friends in arms, we dream especially of those who died the death of the brave on the field of battle, who never had time to say a word about their feat. But that feat exists and has passed into history.

But along with the feats of the nameless heroes there also passes into history—and this is much to be regretted—the memory of them. How offensive it is for us as veterans to hear and to observe how monuments to our servicemen who perished in the countries of Eastern Europe are desecrated. I also took part in the liberation of Poland and Germany, and lost my right hand in what was already the Western Sector of Berlin. Indeed, especially in Czechoslovakia, but also in our own country, in Lithuania, it is even more offensive to our own Soviet Army whose servicemen in Lithuania are called occupiers. In liberating those countries and their own Baltic region, our friends in combat fell for their lands, that they might become free. What blasphemy! What savagery and barbarity! The homeland's assets which belong to all the nationalities must be defended as sacred.

We, war and labor veterans, call on USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and on our government to defend the memory of those who fell on the fields of battle and the armed forces from slander, and to defend the history of our homeland from deliberate and considered censure.

We realize that a struggle is going on between supporters and opponents of socialism. Our opponents are trying to erode the foundations of socialism, and naturally they are to some extent succeeding. They are not beneath any forms or methods of struggle, and they seek out and find the errors in our system, and poke their dirty hands into our history. In the struggle for socialism we have negative phenomena because there are very frequent occurrences of nonfulfillment of laws and resolutions which are passed in such great numbers, yet are not complied with in life. There is occurring a sort of watershed in the struggle between supporters and opponents of socialism. But this struggle for power unfortunately sometimes does not go in favor of socialism. In the struggle for socialism we lose particular positions because there is an evident paralysis of power. Yes, it is understandable that there can be no perestroyka without democracy, just as democracy cannot develop without discipline and order. Konstantin Dmitriyevich Ushinskiy said at one time—and I am a pedagogical expert—that a school cannot work without discipline, just as a mill without water cannot. And here we have the whole country working.

We, veterans of war, labor, and the armed forces who have survived—though the ranks of those who fought at the front are rapidly dwindling, which is natural and totally logical—are now doing everthing to help our state overcome the difficulties and to support perestroyka. Today's economic difficulties and problems cannot be allowed to obscure the fundamental values which took shape in the years when our society was being built. This means the acquisition of national statehood, the overcoming of the enormous socio-economic backwardness of many peoples and the drawing into line of their levels of development, the creation by joint efforts of a unified economic complex for the country, the powerful raising of cultural standards for all peoples, and the development of Soviet science on a multiethnic basis. All of this is an object of common pride for us and serves as an inexhaustible source of patriotism and internationalism. Our ideal, the ideal of the older generation, and particularly of active frontline soldiers, is internationalism based on complete equality of rights for citizens of whatever nationality, on friendship and fraternity between peoples.

The whole of the experience of life of the older generations of Soviet people provides convincing evidence of the fact that it is not rallies and strikes, but only conscientious labor and a creative attitude to the work in

hand that can ensure that all economic, including ethnic [as heard], problems are resolved. If we speak frankly today, then it is much easier and quicker to raise the country's economy than to establish the morality and spirituality which our society has lost. Why do the press, radio, and television—the cinema, too—seldom talk now about conscience, honor, and duty? The gulf between word and deed has already worked its evil by corrupting the consciousness of more than one generation and creating hypocrites, money-grubbers, bureaucrats, and people who are indifferent to everything. Nationalistic, chauvinistic, and extremist elements have become active in the country; irresponsible politicos have raised their heads: from Sajudis in the Baltic and the Popular Fronts in Azerbaijan and Armenia—nationalist careerists, who prey on economic and social difficulties and who exploit the ideas and slogans of perestroyka to mount attacks on our party and the fundamental principles of the Soviet federation. They strive to sow discord and mistrust among the peoples and to partition the country into separate ethnic quarters. With their own unseemly and sometimes straightforwardly criminal aims in mind, these forces attempt to push people onto the path of interethnic hostility. They spread false rumors and provoke hostility. This has already led to armed clashes, to the appearance of hundreds of refugees, to the death of totally innocent people, and to enormous material loss. Tambov, too, has these refugees. No political objectives or slogans can justify this barbarity and this challenge to the elementary norms of morality as accepted by all mankind. We cannot allow the seeds of interethnic discord that have, in recent times, been cast into the social milieu to germinate in the future and maim the lives of our children and grandchildren. For all these antisocialist forces are banking on the young people. Unquestionably, the young want to know the truth, and to have objective assessments of history and the present day. One must not, however, be led along by those who try to falsify history, to denegrate the people's past and its armed forces, as is being done in the Baltic, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldavia, and other parts of the country. As the famous philosopher Santayana said, whoever does not remember his past is condemned to relive it.

And now several proposals and requests from war and labor veterans of our oblast. The maturity and humaneness of any society, especially our, depends on its attitude to the elderly, invalids, and the family of those who died. [passage omitted on poor living conditions and low pensions of war veterans and demand that something be done to improve the situation]

Talk by Lithuania's Gavrilis

LD0705163790 Mosow Television Service in Russian 1348 GMT 7 May 90

[Speech by Gavrilis, head of the Vilnius veterans' organization, at a veterans meeting in the Kremlin on 7 May—recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, esteemed leaders of our country and party, friends in combat, comrades:

As representatives of veterans' societies of Soviet Lithuania, we received with great pleasure the invitation to Moscow to take part in this meeting with you in honor of the 45th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany, which is so dear to us. We have come here to this important meeting as brothers in one Soviet family. [passage omitted]

And so, 45 years passed since the end of that exhausted and fiery battle, since the long-awaited historic victory over Hitlerite domination. And we, former participants in that war, have now found ourselves to be, in our own native land, not patriots of the homeland, not liberators of the native land from fascist bondage; rather in our very own republic they have started calling us occupiers, and they have started mocking our combat awards received during the war years.

The present leaders of the republic have gone so far as to remove from the facade of the Supreme Soviet the depiction of the Order of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, and the Order of the Friendship of Peoples which were awarded to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] during the years of Soviet power. They have scoffed at the memory of the great Lenin and have removed his name from the city of Vilnius' main avenue, only to rename it Prince Gediminas. They have also given their consent to the changing in all the republics' towns and rayons of the names of streets, squares, enterprises, farms, and teaching and scientific establishments which carried the names of Lithuanian revolutionaries, of the Soviet Army, of Soviet military chiefs, and of heroes of the Soviet Union. These have been replaced with the names of princes, bourgeois figures, priests, and people who took part in the struggle against Soviet power in Lithuania. All the monuments of the bourgeois times have been restored, and the reburial of the remains of bandits and bourgeois nationalists who fought against Slovak power in the postwar period on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR has been carried out with great pomp. Monuments have been erected to each of these people, bearing inscriptions to the effect that they perished for a free Lithuania.

The dismantling of the Soviet system and Soviet way of life is proceeding at full tilt in the republic. All of this is being done by the members of Sajudis who have now come to power. Many of them are successors to accomplices of the Hitlerites in the years of the Great Patriotic War or are successors of the "Forest" bandits. Eloquent testimony to this is provided by the fact that the father of the main leader of Sajudis, the current chairman of the presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, Mr Landsbergis [sniffs], was a member of the insurgent government during the years of the Great Patriotic War and who, along with other Lithuanian traitors, signed a letter of gratitude to Hitler for liberating Lithuania from Bolshevik oppression.

At the very first Sajudis congress, he was deemed a patriarch of Lithuania. Sajudis members have selected deputies to the Supreme Soviet according to the principle of loyalty to the bourgeois system, and cadres for most important governmental posts are now being selected on the basis of the same principle. The legitimate question arises: Who is primarily responsible for the current tragedy in the republic? We can say with all responsibility that the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and, first of all, in our view, Algidras Brazauskas personally are mainly to blame for the destruction of all the good relations that had existed between people in the republic. As soon as he had become the first secretary of the party Central Committee he was enthralled by the leaders of Sajudis. Sajudis stooges became leading officials in the party Central Committee Ideological Department. They opened a free road to the media for Sajudis members. For over a year Sajudis has had radio, television, and the press fully in its hands. For the purpose of removing good feeling for the USSR from the minds of Lithuania's indigenous population and stupefying them, especially young people, with nationalistic fervor and the bourgeois paradise they preach, Sajudis members, with assistance from the party Central Committee Ideological Department, have started open blackmail against all those who disagree with them, primarily against the Lithuanian communists who adhere to internationalist positions, especially against such comrades as Burokevicius, Kuolyalis, Gureckas and other USSR patriots, calling them traitors of the fifth column.

They have started a campaign of open terror against Iozas Baltushis, Lithuania's eldest people's writer, after his criticism on All-Union Television directed at Sajudis activists. They burned his books, sent him threatening letters, and called him a traitor in telephone calls. They use blackmail and defamation against other patriots of the Soviet Union. This way they have managed to dampen the political activity of those who adhere to the position of preserving Lithuania within the composition of the USSR.

There is a complex situation in the republic now. The restrictions that have been introduced on deliveries of oil, gas, and other important raw materials have made many residents of Lithuania reappraise their view of the USSR. Many people have understood that it is not Lithuania that feeds Russia but rather that Russia and other union republics share their goods with Lithuania in a fraternal and selfless way. These and other measures have weakened the prestige of Sajudis members and their leaders in the eyes of Lithuania's working people. In our view, however, it is unlikely that these measures will make Messrs [as heard] Landsbergis, Prunskiene, Motieka, Ozolas, and other anti-Sovietists, and Brazauskas, after all, too, change their attitude to the USSR. They will endeavour to hang on with all their might to the Lithuanian independence that they have declared and keep power in the republic in their own hands. Working people and especially people who have, in their time, come into contact with the Soviet Union, support the principles of internationalism and fraternity between the peoples of the USSR, and impatiently await the adoption of active measures on the part of the country's central bodies in order to preserve the socialist gains of our republic.

The Lithuanian Republican Council of Veterans is engaged in active work to explain the importance of preserving the Soviet system in Lithuania. To that end, our Council of Veterans has, for almost six months, been publishing a weekly veterans' newspaper, called OUR CONCERNS [NASHE ZABOTY], in Lithuanian and Russian. This is practically the only newspaper in the republic which defends the interests of patriots and internationalists and people of the older generation and is conducting a dialogue with those enthralled by the bourgeois nationalists. Lithuania's extremists are trying to block our veterans' newspaper. They have banned subscriptions to it. It cannot always be found in kiosks. They hide it and then send the paper to be recycled. Paper is not provided for its publication. We have already been warned that the publishing house of the party Central Committee, now in the hands of Sajudis members, will stop printing it in May.

Comrades, this is only an insignificant part of the measures being adopted in the republic by the anti-Soviets in order to keep power in their own hands. We hope that their raging will not last long in Lithuania and believe that Soviet power will be preserved and restored in the republic and that we will be able to live and work in conditions of the fraternal family of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Yazov Speech

LD0705172490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 7 May 90

[Speech by USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov at a veterans meeting in the Kremlin on 7 May—recorded]

[Text] Dear, greatly esteemed comrade frontline men, comrades-in-arms, colleagues, rear workers, servicemen who served in Afghanistan, and young reservists:

Permit me, on your behalf, to express heartfelt gratitude to the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the government of the country for the decision that they have taken to celebrate the 45th anniversary of our great victory! [applause]

I would like to ask you, and all of us, to bow down low before the Soviet soldier, who bore the banner of victory from Moscow, from the Volga, across the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe, and hoisted it above the vanquished Reichstag! [applause]

Immediately following the war, our victory arose at the center of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. Many began looking for reasons why it was

that we won. Instead of finding the real reasons—that is the loyalty of our people to the policies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which lay in the depths of the people, the unity of the Soviet people, and our strong social and state system—they began thinking up ideas that we had won by swamping the Germans with corpses.

I would like to report at this esteemed gathering that we did not lose so many, as some academics—even from among our own—say, that we lost nearly 50 million and 46 million for certain. We lost, rather, we called up, in all during the war, 29 million people; 3.2 million were called up for work in the national economy. Following the war 3.7 million people immediately returned on demobilization. During the war 18 million people were wounded, but some, like Comrade (?Azarov) who spoke here, were wounded five times, some were wounded seven times over, and again they returned to the ranks. Consequently, 12 million people in all were wounded, and we lost a total of 8.53 million people in battle. The Germans lost more than 5.5 million people, that is without the satellites, and with the satellites, they lost approximately as many as we lost in the years of the Great Fatherland War.

The main losses in the war years were in the first stage when we were retreating to Moscow. We really did lose a lot then and more than 3 million people were captured by the Germans. Only 1.8 million returned from captivity; 1.76 million did not return from captivity. Evidently, they were killed or perished. The main losses were borne by the Soviet people not in war or in battle, but in the gas chambers or when taken against their will to fascist Germany where they labored in dungeous and died of starvation. It is our duty, esteemed veterans, to restore the truth about this. We are currently compiling a 10-volume work on the Great Fatherland War, and I ask everyone to take the most active and direct part in putting together all 10 volumes. Many are already saying it was all bad. Well, much of it was bad, we're not hiding that. We had talked about Stalinism today. We have talked of the annihiliation of the cadres, but that does not mean that the cadres who ultimately led the companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions to victory did not exist. Who did lead them? Illiterate military leaders and unskilled commanders? It could not be the case that the commanders could do nothing and only the soldier could do everything.

We are proud of our soldiers, but we cannot play down the importance of commanding officers, a majority of whom are present here today and I would like to pay them tribute as a commander. [applause] We cannot today say that the Red Army was alone the victor; we say that the entire Soviet people was the victor. Could a people that did not trust its party, nor loved its motherland have created—having lost almost the whole of its industry in the west—108,000 planes and 94,000 tanks? Think: Who was doing it? It was done by boys, and so that they could reach up to their machine tools, they had to stand on empty cartridge cases. It was done by old people and it was done by women. And for 18 hours they would not leave the factory, while many even lived in the factories. We bow low to these toilers of the rear! [applause]

At present we are setting up a remembrance book. We do not want even a single Soviet person who lost his life during the years of the Great Fatherland War to remain forgotten. No one has been forgoten; nothing has been forgotten. This should not be an abstract slogan, poster, or appeal; it should express itself in remembering every single individual.

A commission has been set up. However, the commission alone, 50 people, will not be able to create the book of remembrance. These books are being compiled in oblasts, krays, republics, and I would ask all the veterans invited here to have a chat with other veterans and to draw everyone in so that we can create the book of remembrance as soon as possible and so that we can, at long last, produce a monument devoted to the Great Fatherland War as soon as possible. [applause]

I am not entirely in agreement with some people who say that there is some sort of generation gap. No, comrades, in principle there is no gap between generations. There are some deformations, but as for a gap of such dimensions that we would, when we depart from the scene, leave the country, as it were, bereft of those who would carry on our work, there is no such thing. Let me give you a small example. We were having the general rehearsal, and a boy came up and said to me: Allow me to greet you on this festive day as a participant in the war and a participant in the parade. I said: Well, thank you. He gave me flowers and said: Allow me to recite a poem by Yuliya Drunina. I said: Go ahead. He said: "Battalion Commander." And he started to recite this poem with an expression as though he, this small boy, was himself at the front. And I thought: No, there is no gap between generations, but there do exist certain deformations and we should be working on this.

It is, of course, very well to set the president these tasks so that he should deal with military and patriotic upbringing. I know what the president is busy with, he has so much work and evidently it is both the Defense Ministry and you, esteemed veterans, who should be dealing with the military and patriotic upbringing. [applause]

Many people have spoken about the attention given to those who were at the front. I don't think that you will take offense if I speak the truth here, too. During the years of the Great Fatherland War, 11 million people were awarded orders and medals, state awards. After the war, 12 million people were given awards. Well, it might be said that all of this was rightly so, that it was correct. Yesterday the president signed a decree awarding the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to 22 comrades recommended during the years of the Great Fatherland War. [applause] Eight of them are alive, and the awards were made to the remainder posthumously.

As you see, there is attention in this direction, too. The law on pensions for servicemen is being reviewed. A law on pensions for all the Soviet Union's working people will be examined in the near future. Naturally everyone will receive some kind of increase. But when we speak of pensions, when we speak of living conditions, we must bear in mind that, in the end, all this is created by the people. We ourselves create and we ourselves participate in this.

Today there are many officers without apartments. We are withdrawing from the central group of forces, from the southern group of forces, a considerable part of the contingents, among them 33,000 officers and warrant officers. They also have to be settled; it is also necessary to build. The Soviet Government, in accordance with the instruction of the country's president, has developed a plan and social programs for settling in servicemen, to which [illegible] billion have been assigned. And we will apply all construction detachments and all our strength and means in order to provide for and arrange for servicemen socially.

Regarding the central military-medical directorate, we will give, without fail, orders to begin to examine, in the very near future, the groups of disabled, and in the first place those of participants in the Great Patriotic War. We understand that everything is changing here. At one time there was the second group, now there is the first group, but it almost never works the other way around, unfortunately.

Allow me, esteemed comrades, to congratulate you once more on the occasion of the great victory and invite you all to the victory parade on the 9 May. Thank you for our attention. [applause]

Gorbachev Closing Speech

PM0705221590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 90 First Edition p 2

[TASS report on closing speech by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev at 7 May Kremlin meeting with veterans: "M.S. Gorbachev's Closing Speech"]

[Text] We are concluding our meeting, he said. I hope we are mutually satisfied that it has been held on the eve of the great holiday—the 45th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany. We have heard many important ideas here. We have a feeling of what veterans' wishes and demands are. We may agree with particular words or disagree with particular remarks and assessments, but I think that the whole discussion is so important that the country ought to hear it.

We perceive the concern over the fate of the country and our state's future. And I realize that this concern is being boosted during the present days. Difficult, hard, complex days when we are carrying out colossal large-scale work to renew society and to give socialism its second wind, so to speak. So that, relying on everything that has been done by all generations of Soviet people, we can emerge onto the broad road of the development of our multinational state.

We must do this in the awareness that this is vitally important for the country itself, for our people, and for the world and that the success of perestroyka lies in the fact that we, having been through, having overcome everything we have encountered in our path and having resolved the accumulated problems, could continue to be the guarantor of peaceful perestroyka, knowing our people's character and potential and their devotion to the socialist idea and to the land on which they have worked down the centuries.

I want to say once again that we realize the extent of the responsibility of the country's leadership for ensuring that everything great and wonderful that has been done in this land, within the context of perestroyka, and along the path of perestroyka is preserved and augmented. This does not mean that we must not get rid of what has prevented us from breathing deep and striding out. We must do everything to ensure that the people, who have done so much in their own history and in the history of mankind, can calmly live and work in a democratic society where human life and humane values take precedence over everything. Now, of course, we are experiencing maybe the most difficult moment. The years of debates and of discussion of problems and of our whole history are over. As a result we know ourselves and our history better and we know better what we need to do to ensure that our mighty country continues to make its contribution to the progress of contemporary civilization. I think that we have now become wiser. And the concern over the homeland in connection with the fact that even during these years much has emerged that we cannot agree with and that we must overcome—this concern strengthens our activity and the struggle in all spheres of implementation of the policy of perestroyka.

The present moment is clearly distinguished by the fact that we are on the verge of very major real steps, including in the sphere of the economy: We are told that we were in too much of a hurry with some, and that we are too late with others. Maybe all this is true, if you take everything separately. But if you go back to 1985 and to the following years, I must say that we were forced to comprehend many things. Not only in the leadership, not only in scientific circles, but also within society.

Just two or three years ago just two enterprises switched to economic accountability and self-management. They were followed by three or five ministries, then half our economy embarked on the path of economic accountability and of assimilating new forms of economic life. We had yet to experience this back then, we had yet to understand everything! Those were completely different approaches, and I must admit that we saw that we must change a great deal. We could not have made earlier the decisions we have made now because they would have been simply rash, hasty decisions. Now we can rely on

both positive experience and, figuratively speaking, mistakes. Now that we have accumulated experience and adopted major decisions on questions of the economy—on land, leasing, the cooperative movement, taxes, and many others and so forth—we can thoroughly raise the task of a sharp turnaround in the economy.

Many problems have surfaced in interethnic relations and in the development of the multinational state. Yes, through the efforts of the generations a unique community has been created in which many dozens of peoples speaking a multitude of languages live. This society can be proud of having united millions of people of different nationalities with the same goals, the same road, the same destiny.

That is an extremely great achievement, but at the same time we know how many problems have accumulated over these years. We are now passing through a stage of serious exacerbation of interethnic relations, which is causing concern throughout our society, as the comrades from the Baltic republics in particular have mentioned here. We have embarked on the path of adopting major decisions connected with our federation's future. During these months we have to decide many things, basing ourselves now on the newly adopted laws, in order to lend new life to the Soviet federation. We are convinced we are on the correct road.

It is another matter that there are forces that would like to exploit the atmosphere of democracy, glasnost, and freedom by no means for the purposes that you and I are concerned about and that have been mentioned today. Moreover, they would like to exploit the new atmosphere of democracy [demokratichnost] that has been created in our country in order to implement their unrealized ambitious plans, including separatist plans. But these are irresponsible claims and an irresponsible policy. We speak of this bluntly because this is the road to an impasse.

I am sure that, once we have come through and even survived these serious upheavals, we will be even more convinced that we have traveled the correct road since October in traveling the path of Lenin's nationalities policy. Although not everything has turned out as Lenin intended.

Today we need to continue work in the direction of fully implementing Lenin's plans for creating a federation of free peoples. That is the essence of the policy we have proposed, and I think that the majority of peoples in our country have now clearly realized this. And the direction in which the separatists are pulling and what their policy means for many people in the republics convince us even more strongly that the party's course of renewing the federation must be maintained. That is also being resolved now and will be resolved.

We have completed the election of soviets at all levels. The soviets are now assuming functions that were previously performed by the party—the direct management of all economic and state affairs. This is a most profound turnaround. We can see that here, too, not everything is going as we would like. Here, too, a great deal could be said about the drawbacks that have been allowed to occur. Although the point of the plans is to revive the real meaning of the soviets as organs of people's power.

It is precisely via the soviets—this is our intention—that the people are to be involved in resolving all problems as the chief protagonist of perestroyka. By following this path we must also overcome the deformations that were allowed to occur during the years of Stalinism. The main loss of those years was the alienation of the people from politics. We have opened up the road for profound democratic changes. And this is not so easy to master: Not everyone finds it all that easy to live and work in conditions of democracy.

Three years ago in this auditorium it was said that we must learn to work in conditions of democracy. Many people did not attach importance to this. Life subsequently suggested now important it is. And now this is the most urgent matter.

What is maybe one of the most major debates is taking place on the eve of the 28th party congress—on the fate of the state, society, and the federation, on the fate of the party itself, on what it should be like under the present historic conditions.

All this shows what an important and crucial time we are living through. We have to do everything to ensure that problems are resolved the way we have conceived it—in the interests of the whole of society and of all peoples, so that the cause of perestroyka finds itself on a sound footing and picks up speed. We have now emerged onto a critical path in the development of perestroyka.

But this is also seen by those who would like it to be defeated. The process of the crystallization of positions is now under way. Everything is to be predetermined over the next few months or the next 12-18 months. We must be ready for this—to oppose any forces that would like to either take us back or push us into some abyss. Such a sally was undertaken in festive Red Square—after the rally and the working people's demonstration. If we are told that democrats were marching beneath the raised slogans, then I do not know at all what democracy is.

Comrades, the strength is ours. And if some people are raving, it is because they realize that the time of destructive forces is passing. People can see that nothing can be solved by demagoguery alone.

Rallies were necessary, but demagoguery is in any case only a misfortune. We will still need rallies and debates when we discuss major measures in various spheres of perestroyka. But still people are becoming convinced that what is needed now is a real policy and real practical deeds—now we have cleared up the main thing, now we know what to do. Therefore, the time of bawlers and hysterical shouters is passing. We must be consistent and

firm in what we have decided, and we must do calmly and confidently everything we have conceived.

When people say that it is necessary to use power, my understanding is that they mean that the law must operate in our society and that those who are obliged to ensure its fulfillment must operate.

I believe that both the people and all of us understand that, having embarked on the path of renewal, we will not abandon democracy and will not, contrary to the law, commit follies, as has happened before. For there are such proposals. We do not need 1937, 1938, 1939, or the subsequent years. We must be resolute in implementing the policy that we are pursuing.

In this connection I wish to say that both the president and the government, as well as the party's Central Committee, understand that our future is linked with democracy and the triumph of the law, not with a return back to the atmosphere of past times. There are no answers there. What is necessary from the past, what we must rely on—we must take all this.

I believe that the celebration of Victory Day is one opportunity to rely on past experience. We must advance along the path on which we have embarked. We draw conclusions from what happens, from the views of Soviet people. You can rest assured that we have heard everything you have said here. We fully share your anxiety.

I do not wish to speak separately now about the Army and about the victory. The report will be delivered tomorrow, and this will be spoken of there. I now wish to conclude our prefestival conversation. On both ordinary days and festivals we now speak of what is of concern to us. This is already our reality now. Once again, dear comrade veterans, I wish to congratulate you in the people's name, to say a cordial thank-you to you for what you have done in our history for the good of the country and the people, and to wish you good health. (Applause)

Yazov Presents Gold Star Awards to War Heroes

LD0705150790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] New heroes of the Great Patriotic War are being given awards. At this very moment USSR Marshal Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, USSR minister of defense, is handing Gold Stars to seven Heroes of the Soviet Union. Fifteen participants in the Great Patriotic War were presented these awards posthumously. A report on the Gold Star award ceremony is to be broadcast later in the evening, when our correspondent has returned. One should add to the above, perhaps, that in the year of the 45th victory anniversary, we know that almost 1.5 million awards have not yet been presented to heroes.

Interview on Presentation

LD0705200490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Today in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin, on behalf of the country's president, Marshal of the Soviet Union Yazov, USSR defense minister, presented the Gold Stars of Heroes to veterans of the Great Patriotic War. After the solemn ceremony our correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova interviewed the defense minister:

[Begin recording] [Chemodanova] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, I know that you were a frontline soldier. Did you ever happen to meet anyone from those who received awards today? I have in mind on the front. Perhaps you have heard of someone from among them?

[Yazov] No, I did not hear about, or meet with any of these comrades here directly. All the documents were obtained from the archives.

[Chemodanova] But please tell me how were such feats appraised during the war, in those far from easy times?

[Yazov] You must understand that no one is to blame here. During the war Supreme Soviet Presidium was granted the right to award a Hero of the Soviet Union. The commander of a front could award an Order of Lenin. The commander of an army could award the Order of the Red Banner, and so forth, down to the commander of the regiment. The commander of the regiment awarded medals. You must understand that there are so many cases in the archives. We have to sort them out. It is not all that easy. Over the last few years we have been engaged specially in seeking people out.

[Chemodanova] Don't you think that our time of perestroyka could evaluate such feats?

[Yazov] Well, I would say that especially at a time of perestroyka people are working particularly actively to elucidate people's heroism, so to speak, but such cases had occurred at the 40th anniversary of the victory, and at the 90th anniversary, and the 20th anniversary of the victory, and at the 30th anniversary, and the 20th anniversary. Therefore, there is no need to relate this solely to perestroyka. But perestroyka has of itself, so to speak, provided a certain impulse to this spark of a concept, no one is forgotten, nothing has been forgotten; it provided glasnost. Everyone can ring up, make a request, make a search. They are bound to get a reply. Perestroyka provided a spark in that greater effort is being taken to seek out people who were previously nominated for awards, but who have not been presented with awards.

[Chemodanova] Best wishes to you on this holiday occasion. [end recording]

Gorbachev Attends Tchaikovsky Anniversary Night

LD0705190290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 7 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] There was a ceremonial evening dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the birth of Pyotr Ilich Tchaikovsky, that splendid and brilliant Russian composer, in the Bolshoi Theater of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic in Moscow today. [passage omitted] [video shows the orchestra on the stage of the Bolshoi theatre playing throughout this item] Yevgeniy Svetlanov, people's artiste of the USSR and chairman of the organizational committee for holding the jubilee, spoke about Tchaikovsky.

Attending the evening were Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR; members of the country's state and political leadership, figures of culture and art; and representatives of the public.

Roy Medvedev Interviewed on Gorbachev's Position

LD0605111690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0630 GMT 6 May 90

[From the "World Clock" program: telephone interview with Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, by Correspondent Gabor Izbegi; date not given—recorded; Medvedev speaks in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[Excerpts] [Unidentified program presenter] It is quite difficult to judge what conclusions Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership were obliged to draw from the very free 1 May, when alternative forces also were allowed to hold processions, and indeed they did not spare the nomenklatura in their slogans. [passage omitted: Lenin quote] The world is ever more anxiously pondering what would be the consequences if Gorbachev were to go, or if he were to stay, would he be the initiator of a roll-back. How secure is the head of state's situation? This was the question Gabor Izbegi put to Soviet historian Roy Medvedev, who neither camp can accuse of partiality. [passage omitted: the situation has deteriorated over the past year both economically and politically, and the prestige of political leaders has declined; this is not because Gorbachev's reform concept has faltered, but there is a conflict between the economist's attempts to implement rational plans and the continued fall in the living standards of significant social strata]

[Izbegi] According to Roy Medvedev, there is no question of a change of system in the Soviet Union. Here the revolutionary renewal of a socialist society can be realized.

[Medvedev] In Gorbachev's interpretation, radical renewal means the revolutionary reform of socialism. According to his concept, society can be fundamentally transformed and democratized with these large-scale reforms without, on the other hand, undermining its socialist foundation. He does not want to follow the line taken by Hungary, where as I understand it, they have renounced socialist objectives, just as in the other countries, except perhaps Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. You know, in these East European countries socialism was forced on the peoples from outside. The internal conditions for it did not exist there. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, this social formation was the result of an internal development. For this reason, it is such a dominant force in people's awareness that to break away from it, to depart from this path is virtually impossible. For this reason, it is a question of having to fundamentally renew socialism; and this new socialism of course, will not in any resemble what has existed until now.

[Izbegi] In this case, what in your view do they want, these people who demonstrated in February, first of all on Red Square and then on Cadovaya Koltso [Moscow beltway], and who now have processed with their anti-Gorbachev slogans before the [Lenin] Mausoleum on 1 May?

[Medvedev] In these places, the most varied kinds of political groups assembled. Among them were antisocialists, as well. But the majority of them belong to the radicals, who believe that the reforms must be accelerated, that socialism can be much more speedily transformed, and that Gorbachev wants to do it. However, this—that is to say, the acceleration is not possible in my view. In today's heightened situation, when conservative pressure also is strong, the most rational is Gorbachev's reform line.

What happened on 1 May at Red Square I do not consider to have been some kind of fantastic, surprisingly bewildering thing. It is the logical consequence of developments up to now. There is nothing surprising about it. It is just that the outside world simply has not yet become used to the pluralism that has already developed. They think that Gorbachev was just putting on democracy, when in fact he wished to create real democratic conditions. In this field, too, there has been development.

[Izbegi] According to Roy Medvedev, the Western powers are acting correctly by not playing the anti-Soviet card in connection with Lithuania, but supporting the Soviet changes and Gorbachev himself.

[Medvedev] It is in the interest of the Western powers to support Gorbachev, since his policy has opened the way to the fundamental modernization of the entire international system of relations. Gorbachev rejected the Brezhnev doctrine, and in East Europe there developed right away a fundamentally different social and international situation. On the other hand, the anti-Gorbachev pressure, eventually the promoting of Gorbachev's removal, would have the result of bringing to power in today's situation a leader who would be more conservative than he, after which it would not be possible to continue the transformation of international relations. If the Western states were to stand exclusively on the side of Lithuania, this could be the start of a new Cold War.

In his view, the Lithuanians sooner or later will accept Moscow's proposals because that is the only realistic way out of this impasse. [Passage omitted: Medvedev says that though the pursuit of reform is made more and more difficult by the domestic problems, it can be realized in the; he reit rates that there is no question of a change of system in the Soviet Union]

Ligachev Interviewed on Perestroyka

LD0705212190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1742 GMT 7 May 90

[Interview with Yegor K. Ligachev by Aleksandr Krutov; place and date of interview not given—live or recorded; from the "Topical Interview" program]

[Text] [Krutov] Yegor Kuzmich, you think that society has approached the threshold, beyond which a political and economic chaos is possible. This is what you said at the plenum. Who is to blame for that, who should be held responsible, who is to answer for that?

[Ligachev] Indeed, the country is on the brink and has become really unsettled. Briefly speaking, this is manifested by a huge shortage of food and industrial goods, a very complex ecological situation, especially in big towns; it is also reflected in the growth of the agitation by antisocialist and nationalist forces, and also in the national strife which has become exacerbated in particular regions. In general, from my point of view, the most worrisome fact is perhaps that people have started losing confidence and calm.

[Krutov] Yegor Kuzmich, tell me please, when the country's political leadership started perestroyka in 1985, did they anticipate the consequences we see now?

[Ligachev] I can only speak for myself. When we started perestroyka and the renewal of our society we, of course, did not expect that such a very complex economic and social situtions would arise or that serious crises would become prominent. On the one hand, this can be explained, no doubt, by the problems that have accumulated over many years, by their complex nature, and by the large scale and newness of the changes in the economic, political, ethical, and ideological spheres. But this is one side and, as the saying goes, pertains more to the preceding period. On the other hand, I think—and this has already been mentioned—that the current leadership, of which I am a member, has no doubt made a whole range of serious mistakes in the process of developing and implementing important economic and political reforms.

But, at the same time, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, I would like to stress that the country is advancing along the path of economic and social transformations. To put it in a nutshell, this is demonstrated by the following, from my point of view, we see—and this is a fact, too—that the working masses are beginning to really take part in running the state, that a broad process of democratization of the soviets at all levels is underway. And I draw attention to yet another circumstance. For the first time in many years we have the chance now to gradually switch a considerable part of means from the defense budget to the civilian sphere. This is an extremely important factor. I'll put it straight: That with such a big defense budget—it amounts to 18-20 percent of the national income—of course, we are unable to carry out restructuring and renewal of socialism and large-scale social programs in full.

[Krutov] One has the impression that our state is like a ship without rudder or sails. Just look at how many times in these past five years of perestroyka we have changed directions. First it was acceleration, then technical re-equipment in machine-building industries, then in agriculture. We have been dashing from side to side, and now there is a new turn, a sharp turn; once again we have approached a new sharp turn, and you know, people get the impression... [changes thought] will there be an end to all that experimenting?

[Ligachev] Well, I think that this is natural, to a certain degree, a search is absolutely inevitable and obligatory, in my view, given the large scale of the economic and social transformations we are conducting. This is the first factor. At the same time, I would like to say that I do not share this pessimistic view, about our ship being without rudder or sails. We now have the main guidelnes following which we can succeed, but on one condition which I would like to particularly emphasize. This policy should be implemented consistently, gradually, and unswervingly because.... [changes thought] I would like to stress that gradually does not mean slow.

It means step by step, from stage to stage. In this case, perhaps it seems too slow for some, but on the other hand it will be stable, certain, and reliable, and I should say effective.

What should the main, principal measure be now? In the first place, we must seriously prepare for new, very major measures in the system of the whole economic reform. What does this mean? First and foremost, we have to complete the preparation of all the legal documents. After all, it is embarrassing to say that we started the economic reform without having a legal basis: the law on property, on the land—you understand—on leasing, and so on and so forth, although all this business was proclaimed. So this is an extraordinary situation.

Second, we have to proceed very consistently—I repeat again—step by step, but without wavering. What does this mean? Well, when we started to set about the economic reforms, we immediately ditched up to 20 percent of the whole state order for machine building. Just imagine, for all those years we had planned everything down to every mechanism and machine, and then we immediately ditched tens of percentage points of the state order. And very intensive contractual relations started. And contractual relations are in essence market relations, because they are based on supply and demand. Because in our country the structure of the national

economy is so strictly monopolized, then in this context many enterprises, being monopolists, started to live on nothing more nor less than what? They started to live by raising prices.

The pay fund has increased; the volume of money in the market has increased. The production of consumer goods does not keep up with them. You get an enormous scissors effect which gives rise to the mood and state of society and so on, and the complete disruption of the consumer market.

We have to devise economic regulations: legal, economic, and organzational; this is the extraordinary... the first. Second, we have to conduct very intelligently and cleverly, consulting with the people, the whole price reform: wholesale, procurement, and retail prices; this is exceptionally important. Third, I, for example, am in favor of replacing banknotes with other notes. Some people don't like the very words money reform, so let us just have the replacement of banknotes.

I think that in our country the market is so flooded with banknotes that we cannot avoid reforming this sphere, too. How and by what means is another matter.

Finally, I think this: We have to think through the whole system of credit provision and state subsidies in order to advance scientific and technological progress. As we tackled the economic reform, what we did not manage to do was to really advance scientific and technological progress. Indeed there is no interest, given such a system, given such monopolism—you understand—in tackling scientific and technological progress. That is, we already have a system now; it is being brought to completion; it will be published.

But I say it once more. I, for example, cannot agree if mass unemployment appears after this. The question is: Why to it then? Why do we have to measure people's lives only by how much one gets and how much one consumes? In my opinion, in our society this is really an achievement, not in words but in deeds. A society, which has, maybe, not given man everything that one would want, but if you remember all our history through which we have lived, then I think that we have done a lot, after all, for man, both spiritually and morally. But what is the point of having good things if he has not got work? Well, imagine yourself, me, other comrades without work.

[Krutov] Well, it's difficult to imagine, of course.

[Ligachev] Yes. [both men laugh] For this reason, I think that it is such a valuable thing, that if you throw it on the scales, it means a lot.

[Krutov] Yegor Kuzmich, in your speech at the plenum you stressed that the general path is the path of creating a planned market economy, but the market is certain unemployment.

[Ligachev] I am in favor of a planned market economy, which, from my point of view, means the utmost strengthening of planning principles and market regulation on the basis of the development of goods-money relations, which should not lead to unemployment.

I would like to tell you, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, about an incident in my life. About two years ago I spoke in Paris at the congress of French communists, and I said calmly the following sentence, or two or three sentences, that yes, people in our country will be released from social production, but they will all have work. To my suprise the whole hall—that's at least 3,000 people—stood up and wildly greeted these words.

Then I asked the French comrades, why was this in particular singled out? The fact was, it turns out, that among the delegates there were many who had been unemployed in the past, and there were quite a few who were unemployed at that time as well. For them there was no greater unhappiness than to be pulled out of social production and condemned to a life of half-starvation. I will tell you directly: It is, of course, possible to create a minimum of good things for the unemployed, but we will never restore the mental condition of a man who is unemployed. It is difficult for us to understand this, because we have not been unemployed. So I, in the end, would like to introduce the following constructive proposal: Let the one who proposes unemployment for us become the first to be unemployed in our country. Then we will see what will happen.

[Krutov] But, unfortunately, we do not have enough work in Central Asia.

[Ligachev] It is one thing when unemployment arises from social conditions, another thing when it is simply because of national customs, because of demography, or other circumstances. We cannot increase, and we are not succeeding in increasing the number of working places to bring everyone into social production. This is one circumstance. Although, of course, there is much in common here, and it is necessary to work on this question. I know that in Central Asia they are working actively on this business, although there are many complications and difficulties here, and I think that in general we need to engage more in training work. Experience shows that it is necessary to spare time for this. Then the time for implementing things is in the first place shorter and in the second place more effective. But at the same time I would also like to stress this circumstance. Now there are many conversations here about regional financial autonomy, about the sovereignty of the republics, about economic independence, and this is extremely important.

And this is extraordinarily important. But I would like to point out the fact that society is coming up against some very interesting problems in connection with this. You know, in some way it has already led recently to a situation where, yes, we will deal with our own local problems, the regional problems, if that is to our advantage, but we cannot deal with the problems of the whole

state, the problems of the whole people—I would say—the problems of the whole Union, and the internationalist problems.

I was in Tyumen Oblast recently. What is Tyumen Oblast like today? It is more than 60 percent of the oil that we produce and more than half of the gas extracted. Effectively it is the foundation of our fuel and power base, it is the backbone of our economy. I think... I do not know what would become of our country were it not for the discovery of the century: the oil and gas of Tyumen. At the time they involved all the union republics; that's natural, because this is a priority task, it is an all-Union task. Now when they are going over to regional financial autonomy they say no, we have a lot of our own problems, we are bringing the builders back, we are no longer going to provide housing, social, cultural, and everyday facilities, and non-production installations; we have our own problems. And what do one's own problems amount to in the absence of fuel and power resources? It's nothing, you understand.

I would like to say the following, therefore, to complete this thought, so to speak: The sovereignty of the republics must in no way hamper the most active involvement of all republics, towns, oblasts, krays, autonomous republics, and union republics in the resolution of problems that are those of the whole state, of the whole Union, and internationalist in character. This is extraordinarily important.

[Krutov] Yegor Kuzmich, we have just touched upon natonal and internationalist issues, and while I was preparing for this conversation, I read the speech you made in 1985 at the presentation of the Order of Lenin to the city of Yerevan. At that time you said this: In our country, a society has been created in which a genuinely harmonious combination of all-state interests and the interests of each of the republics, and the flourishing of all nations ethnic groups is guaranteed.

[Ligachev] This is how I want to put it. Of course, history has seriously corrected Ligachev, to be more precise—I would say— contemporary events have corrected him. But I do not repudiate those words. I am profoundly convinced, and this can be shown from the example not only and perhaps not so much overall of the union republics as from the example of thousands, tens of thousands of labor collectives. I think that in your Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] it can be shown that people of different ethnic groups live really in harmony, live in solidarity, live on good terms, live well. This is a tremendous achievement, basically at the very prime foundation of society. There are thousands and tens of thousands of these small units where people of different nationalities live and, more often than not, there are no problems.

[Krutov] I agree with you, but imagine....

[Ligachev, interrupting] That is the first thing I wanted to say. And the second thing, I adhere to this viewpoint: I think we underestimated this danger. We certainly made a mistake in thinking that everything was now solved and that it was a page that had been turned. That was a serious mistake. But at the same time I would also like to express my personal point of view. Up to now, I have considered that we have really, first, underestimated this danger of separatist, nationalist forces, and second we are not waging a struggle against nationalism. I would like to prove this by this argument. Indeed it is a fact that in our party there are quite a few communists who not only take part in the nationalist, separatist movements, but who lead them. And they are communists. It just doesn't fit. Here we come again to the idea that the ideological, organizational basis of our party has been slackened and to a certain degree it is here that the troubles—if you like—in the ethnic field lie. That is my point of view.

[Krutov] Currently in our country parties are sprouting like mushrooms with not a day passing without us hearing or learning or reading of the establishment of another party. In our actual party, the CPSU, there are various currents, various ferments. And the platform of the CPSU does not call on people to leave the CPSU, but the open letter from the Central Committee calls on communists to dissociate themselves....

I must tell you that we already put forward in the platform the idea of dissociation, and then this is developed in more detail in the letter itself. First, I should like to stress that, because you have already taken that from my speech; therefore, I would like to stress that in the latest plenums, in the course of about a year, and at the conference of the first secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the union republics, oblast committees, and kray committees, I have been constantly returning to the question connected with the ideological and organizational cohesion of party ranks and strengthening them with the working masses. Because I felt that this was the main problem. Now, really, the question at stake is that of dissociation, of purging the ranks of the party. But how and with whom? That is the extraordinarily important question.

What are the adherents of the so-called Democratic Platform doing? They are ascribing to the Central Committee letter what it does not contain. You will not find that even under a magnifying glass. What are they saying? They are saying that the letter of the Central Committee to all the communists of the country is directed against whom? Against dissidents. Against those whose opinion diverges from the leadership, from the generally accepted opinion in the party Central Committee, the party bodies, in the party overall. That is not correct. That is at the least not true; it is really a refined distortion. There are people who use such tricks. First you ascribe something to it, and then you cast criticism on the cause. Nothing of the sort. It says precisely and clearly that those who are wavering, people who are misled, people expressing different points of view must be convinced, must have things explained, and only by such methods, as they say, can all our force be consolidated in the party. But people who engage in actions

which undermine the foundations of the party, its ideological and organizational foundations, they of course must leave the party. The main question consists in this: What kind of party are the champions, in particular, of the Democratic Platform, and not only champions of the Democratic Platform, but also representatives of separatism, nationalism, revisionism advocating? A party of the so-called parliamentary type, a party in which there would be freedom of faction, of groups, with their internal platform, with their internal discipline. We cannot, I think our party cannot at any time permit such a thing, especially now in such a difficult time, first the time of perestroyka and second the time when we are embarking on party pluralism. How can the party survive if it has organizational and ideological disharmony? So....

[Krutov, interrupting] You are proposing, if you please, to set up another party....

[Ligachev] If you please....

[Krutov, continues]...a second, a fourth, a fifth....

[Ligachev, continues] If you please, but outside the party.

[Krutov] You mean your own party?

[Ligachev] Your own party, yes, and honestly....

[Krutov, interrupting] With like-minded people around?

[Ligachev] ...and honestly and frankly occupy your position.

[Krutov] But in the party you do not insist on like-mindedness in ideology?

[Ligachev] No. There should be different points of view. Just as you and I, you know, have different points of view, or others do. Otherwise, no doubt the members of the Politburo would not express their own points of view which fit in on the whole with the framework of the platform, but it expresses some kind of nuances, you understand, one's own position on particular questions.

[Krutov] Yegor Kuzmich, what is your attitude toward the creation of a Russian Communist Party?

[Ligachev] I will say that I did not... what I say now is something which I did not arrive at immediately, to be honest and frank. Now I take up a precise and clear position, the essence of which is that such a party should be created. It even seems to me that it should be created before the 28th party congress, so that Russian communists arrive at the congress with their own party and even with their own leading elective bodies and, together with the communists of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Central Asia, the Transcaucasus, the Baltic region, and others, would be capable of discussing in detail matters actually relating to our party's program and rules and of outlining measures to get the country out of such a difficult social and economic situation in which it finds itself and the ways to advance further: This is the point of view to which I currently adhere.

[Krutov] Our party, as the leading, guiding, vanguard force of society, naturally also bears responsibility for all the affairs of the country. If the economy is in a bad way in our country and things are not too good in other spheres of our life, then the party and the political leadership of the party, above all, should bear responsibility.

[Ligachev] There are some brilliant words of Lenin's which... the sense of which is how to evaluate one time or another or different people from the position of what was needed. He felt and I think that this is the only correct dialectical approach to evaluating this or that period or this or that leader; not from the position of the requirements of the current day, but from the position of what that time or these leaders produced by comparison with those which came before. I said at the very start, it is very important... perhaps these formulations were very short, but they are very weighty. That this period, a period which contains a great many economic and social difficulties, has already provided the opportunity for our people to acquire things which our people have not had for all the preceding decades.

So from these positions, from the position, so to speak, of comparison with the preceding generation, we have acquired a great deal. This is the first circumstance.

The second circumstance, I agree... well you stressed a very important thought, and I would like to say one or two words about the fact that once there is a ruling party, once it plays a leading role, once it is a vanguard force, then that party should not leave a single sphere of social life. I recall a very interesting Chekhov story which describes an incident which took place in a sort of impoverished settlement in connection with a solar eclipse. The sun disappeared, the people poured out onto the street, their eyes fell upon a policeman and they asked him: What's happening, why is there such disorder? Without thinking long about it, the policeman replied: The sun isn't on my beat.

Now we cannot reply that this is not on our beat, or something else is not. As soon as that party—I repeat again—is a ruling party, as soon as it is a leading, vanguard party, it is responsible for everything. It is extremely difficult, it is complex, but it is completely inescapable and completely unavoidable. And this is a very important situation.

[Krutov] Then let's take the food program and food problem. This year, it is 10 years since the widely proclaimed food program was adopted. During that time, with the help of scientists, specialists, politicians, and us journalists, we were talking about feeding the country within 10 years. But 10 years have gone by. It's time, as they say, to add up the results of the program: The shelves are empty.

[Ligachev] I do not know who it was who talked then about feeding the people. Even now, I will tell you quite frankly, in response to the question you have asked, that if our attitude to the development of the agro-industrial complex is going to be the same as it is now, even after the March plenum, then we will not feed the people—in the full meaning of the word—within either five years or within 10 years. What is the reason for this? You know that some very heated arguments are taking place in our society about the forms of economic management, about the forms of property, and this is not without foundation, because these are very important considerations; ultimately what type of ownership and what forms of economic management determine the way of life and the sociopolitical system.

But these are not the only considerations. Previously, we put all our trust in public sector ownership, considering that this was the front-ranking form of ownership and that it would of itself carry us to progress, as they say. Nothing of the kind! Lenin has some wonderful words: In addition to that, one needs splendid organization and the best machines. In our country, unfortunately, since the March plenum, there has been no improvement, in the first place, in the material and technical provision for agriculture. There has been no serious increase in capital investment in this agro-industrial complex. In connection with this, no reform of prices has been carried out, particularly of procurement prices, but this is also linked with retail prices to a certain extent, and this circumstance does not make it possible for every worker in this agrarian sector to obtain maximum output. The fact is that one can have the front-ranking form of ownership, the front-ranking form of economic management, but if we do not equip the peasant fully with the essential modern tools and if we do not create the conditions in which he can live, then he is incapable of feeding the country. So we all have to understand that the agro-industrial complex requires colossal investment and that ultimately society has to find the best machines and put them in here, it has to provide the best materials and provide the peasant with the best possible facilities. For the time being the peasant in our country is losing out on all counts, as they say, by comparison with the town dweller, where social amenities are concerned.

[Krutov] Yegor Kuzmich, if one looks at our life after the war, you will remember how many Central Committee plenums there were about uplifting agriculture, how much was said about this at congress. We also talked about it having to be technically equipped, about the need for the social conditions and the life of the peasant to be improved, so that he wouldn't run away, so that he would have promising villages, so that people would not stage experiments with him but would allow him to manage his own affairs. But each time in our country it hasn't worked. The March plenum has taken place now, and it seems that even now, at the time of perestroyka, when we all understand that the country has to be fed, that conditions have to be created, that foodstuffs have to be provided, that once again it isn't working. So that perhaps there is something in our country....

[Ligachev, Interrupting] You know, you have asked a very interesting question. I could give you a mass of arguments in this connection, but because our time is limited, I would like to say literally a few words. In the first place you must not forget our history. In order to make an assessment of the present, one always has to know the past. And we created our industrial might, and we created it in the 1930's, over a period of 10-12 years, predominantly at the expense of agriculture. No one then gave us a single ruble or a single dollar. We used only our own resources. The country was obliged to seek military and strategic parity. Colossal resources had to be invested. And once again from whom? Once again at the expense of agriculture. They paid kopecks for agricultural output, you understand, but sold machines for rubles, so to speak, for hundreds and thousands of rubles and so on. These are the scissors that are always there between industrial and agricultural output, and they make it impossible to conduct agriculture in a profitable way. Of course, there are subjective factors, too, which depend upon those who work in agriculture. But I want to say with absolute responsibility—and I'm not saying this because I want to flatter the peasantry—but taking into consideration the conditions in which they work, the extent to which they are provided with tools and equipment, and their lack of provision with social facilities, then one has to make a bow to our peasant.

[Krutov] You are in agreement with the fact that we need equal forms of economic management on the land. We have now adopted some decrees, the law on land, the decree on the land, and when it's possible we tell the person to go out and manage, take possession of the land, produce output. But unfortunately not everyone, not many people are doing so. No doubt, they do not believe that this is going to last for a long time. Whatever we have said, nevertheless the person has been alienated from the land, from his own specific labor. Even the collective farmers, everything they produced was taken from them and later once again redistributed.

[Ligachev] Well, I think that you are absolutely right, because there was a time when we virtually destroyed personal holdings, or at any rate made them subject to such a narrow framework and placed such fetters on them that the enterprise simply withered. This is an indisputable fact. But the second thing is this: That no matter how many progressive laws there are, the fulfillment of them still has to be organized; material and technical provision has to be made for them.

If we now want to have peasant farms, then we have to create a whole industry. The United States of America, in creating farms run by farmers, spent decades if not centuries setting up a whole infrastructure for servicing farms of this type. We have done everything in order to service major farms, major land areas, major expanses of land, so to speak. We therefore have to have mechanisms and machinery that is new in principle, and of course a large amount of time goes on that. But I want to stress the following: We are in favor of equality of rights, naturally, in favor of a variety of forms of ownership and

of forms of economic management, but nevertheless I think—and this is my personal point of view—I think that one must nevertheless, amid all the variety, always choose key positions; there must be priorities. From my point of view public ownership, in the forms of state and cooperative ownership, in combination with the personal holding or the family farm, as we also call it, is the priority form in the agro-industrial complex.

[Krutov] Yegor Kuzmich, our conversation is taking place on the eve of our great festival, Victory Day.

[Ligachev] We must draw one most important lesson from that war, the lesson about the rallying of the nationalities, the consolidation of all of our healthy forces is needed now as never before upon a position of principle, because we were victorious because then we were all together and all united. In my point of view that has the importance of principle.

[Krutov] Thank you for the conversation, Yegor Kuzmich. My best wishes on the occasion of the holiday.

[Ligachev] My sincerest thanks.

Prosecutors Office Issues Corruption Warning

LD0705191290 Moscow TASS in English 1856 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 7 TASS—The Soviet Procurator-General's Office issued a warning today, saying that USSR People's Deputies Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, former leaders of a procuracy investigation group, as well as Russian Federation People's Deputy Tatyana Koriagina, are liable before the law for conducting a campaign of ungrounded accusations against the Soviet president.

Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, the statement notes, have lately "stepped up a campaign of slander against a number of politicians and statesmen, including the Soviet president," in defiance of warnings by the USSR Procurator-General's Office and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

On April 18, a commission of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, which studied the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair, reported to the parliament that it had found no evidence to substantiate the charges of complicity in coruption cases, levelled by Gdlyan and Ivanov against a number of top Soviet leaders.

Nevertheless, the statement stresses, at various rallies and in the press they continue making unsubstantiated statements, with openly provocative aims, about Mikhail Gorbachev's involvement in selfish abuses and in patronizing the mafia.

This dangerous political ploy has been joined by some likely-minded people. Particular vigour has been displayed by RSFSR People's Deputy Tatyana Koriagina.

Upon completing a thorough and comprehensive inspection of the cases now in production at procuracy offices, the Interior Ministry and the State Security Committee, the USSR Procurator-General's Office "states with full responsibility that none of them contains any information or date that could show the Soviet president in a bad light".

The statement stresses that the activity by Gdlyan, Ivanov and Koriagina is not only incompatible with a people's deputy ethical norms and status but is punishable by law, which fact the USSR Procurator-General's Office deems it necessary to bring to the notice of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Yakovlev Stresses No Cabinet Resignation

LD0705134890 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Some public activists and journalists have lately been calling for the resignation of the government since the radical economic reform issues now being discussed are the recognition of the failure of the government program adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies. On this assumption they stress the need for cabinet dismissal. At a news conference sponsored by the INTERFAX news agency, the Presidential Council member Aleksandr Yakovlev outlined his view of this matter:

[Begin Yakovlev recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] I think, Aleksandr Yakovlev said, the government should have a chance to cope with the program it itself offered. Besides, the time given to it by the congress has not run out yet. More than that the implementation of the government program is closely linked to the issues being debated in the country today—transition to a market economy. It's simply impossible to separate these two processes. By a Presidential Council decision, the cabinet is now busy resolving these issues to provide vital support for a transition to a market, (?work) anti-inflationary measures and anti-[word indistinct] legislation, guarantee social insurance and settle many other issues.

There have been speculations in society about the possibility of a sharp unemployment rise, living standards decline and so on. My personal view is that with reasonable management there can be no unemployment at all. The sphere of services in this country can absorb not only the 10 million would-be jobless referred to in the press but a far greater number. The same applies to agriculture. My personal view is that a market economy is being introduced to make the working people better off rather than worse off, otherwise what's the sense of all this?

Of course, Aleksandr Yakovlev continued, neither the Presidential Council nor the government will resort to the so-called shock therapy that has been so much talked about in recent times. This would be politically unwise. A transition to a market will proceed, as the cabinet

offers, in stages. The government has been drafting priority measures to be gradually applied, carefully bearing in mind the deadline of a transition to a market economy. So the cabinet's resignation would make this transition harder in many ways. [end recording]

That was Presidential Council member Aleksandr Yakovlev at a news conference sponsored by the INTERFAX news agency.

Writer Salutskiy Assails Yakovlev

90UN1598A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 13, 30 Mar 90 pp 7-8

[Article by writer Anatoliy Salutskiy]

[Text] A weird course of events has led us to the brink of a schism. Everything and anything is being subjected to a durability test: the state, society, and the party. Cracks are ready to run through every particle of life.

One can put it a different way. Using a monstrous analogy, one could recall the device of the atom bomb equipped with various charges. A small powder explosion is enough to fuse the charges into the critical mass for a nuclear explosion.

Let me say at the outset that I am not fond of apocalyptic thinking. Although the face of the country has become darker and although free market enthusiasts have undertaken an unprecedented reapportionment of Russian wealth, I believe that popular wisdom in combination with the perspicacity of the state will help to avoid smashing the country to smithereens, replacing this process with a process of separation which makes it possible to compare viewpoints democratically—without forfeiting principles. But it is impossible to steer the locomotive of our unique history onto a safe track unless we are aware of why we have arrived at the brink of a schism. What kind of navigator has laid out such a dangerous route?

Everyone agrees that the processes among the intelligentsia are now playing a special role. They can be likened to the powder charge which is capable of triggering the diabolical mechanism of an uncontrolled social explosion—this scenario has been used in certain East European countries. What has led our intelligentsia to a state of spontaneous combustion fraught with unpredictability for the entire country?

You have probably noticed that I have used a phrase which for two years has been regarded as a synonym for something against perestroyka—"without forfeiting principles." I used it deliberately because the accumulated facts make it possible to give a new interpretation to the propaganda boom related to Nina Andreyeva's article which is unprecedented in the history of perestroyka.

One can take various attitudes toward the article itself. One can accept it or reject it—fully or partially. I personally agree with much that is in it although I think that there was a good deal of juggling of facts in the article. But the main thing lies elsewhere. In the press at that time there were many articles whose authors, independent of Andreyeva, shared or rejected her position, and in a more extreme form. During that period a beneficial pluralism of opinions had begun to appear.

Why was such a strong propaganda campaign undertaken, which declared the entire article to be a manifesto for anti-perestroyka forces and set as its goal to make an anti-Christ out of Andreyeva? New circumstances in life provide an answer to that question.

It was the final stage of preparations for the 19th Party Conference in which the various views within the party were to be revealed for the first time. This exchange of opinions could have established a new tradition of political discussions. But apparently some people found advantage in scandal, confrontation, and dissension. The terrible weapon of the mass media which had been prepared in advance was really used for the first time in the struggle that had developed for influence in the party and influence on the general secretary—in order to evoke a peak of tension in society and in order for the new enemies of perestroyka to frighten to death both experienced politicians and innocent citizens and the foreign resident. At the same time—to remove opponents from the political scene.

Recall that it was then on the pages of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI that the terrifying phantom of Stalinist repressions flickered past—the brand of "enemy of perestroyka." This was already too much. Even Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev immediately, at the next conference of editors, had to condemn the attempt to introduce into political currency this brand which could become a terrible precursor of another round of our suffering.

This is when the image of the enemy first appeared on the perestroyka horizon. And today's concerns on the part of the authors of this invention to shift the blame from the guilty to the innocent are nothing more than immoral pharisaism, a kind of Gratsianskyism. Remember the "specialist in the root of evil," the average intellectual from the "Russian forest?" It is very, very important to recall the figure of Gratsianskiy today. There are many people like that today. The campaign against the Andreyeva article was extremely useful for creating the image of the enemy. The formula was simple and fully in the spirit of Vyshinskiy's distortion-enlightenment: Anyone who condemns Andreyeva is himself an enemy of perestroyka. As the USSR Union of Writers were disgraced because Karpov did not sign the letter of the creative unions!

Incidentally, we should not liken ourselves today to those who heaped shame on Karpov in their time. In my opinion, this is not useful.

But that loud propaganda campaign had another objective: to approve in full force the new mechanism of spiritual coercion which, alas, our mass media, created

anew by Aleksandr Yakovlev, was to become in our society which has not been geared up for democracy.

The attempt succeeded, and before the elections of USSR people's deputies and their first congress the mass media created another peak of tension—this time the main figure was Gdlyan. The country was engulfed in scandalous arguments that tore society apart, strongly influenced the outcome of the elections, and forced into the background even the burning flames of the Karabakh issue.

And the recent elections? Another scandal, blown up for the whole world by the mass media—the lamentable incident in the Central House of People of Letters, whose roots have not yet been exposed. Taking advantage of this extremely particular incident which was of questionable origin, political forces directly surrounding Politburo member Yakovlev led society into an overwrought condition, at the culmination of which were the events of 25 February, which also affected the outcome of the elections. The alarming news from Lithuania was drowned in the general hysteria.

Again the same signature, familiar from the campaign against the Andreyeva article.

I would not like my article to be perceived as a polemic with those who participated actively in the aforementioned campaigns. Our main concern now is not to judge anybody. It is time to conscientiously figure out the causes of the all-encompassing crisis that spread over our great country. This is the only way we shall be able to discover the extent of the abyss. This is even more important now that presidential power has created conditions for regrouping social forces in the search for national harmony. This is precisely the time to think about the disastrous perestroyka distortions and to get rid of extreme forms of confrontation and all claims from anyone wanting a forceful takeover of power.

In this connection it is with deep regret, quite without enthusiasm but with a clear awareness of the inevitability of this conclusion, that I wish to express my own personal view based on an analysis of the past three years: Politburo member Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev largely contributed to the growth of antagonism among the intelligentsia and in society as a whole, which is corroborated by the events in Lithuania.

Why do I speak of this with great regret?

Because during the first years of perestroyka Yakovlev's political finesse and his desire to elevate the role of the intelligentsia could not but attract sympathy. But it gradually became clear that he was not speaking about the intelligentsia as such, whose basis in Russia has always been comprised of teachers, physicians, and the engineering corps, but about the elite layer of the so-called intellectuals. People even became aware of such personal qualities of Yakovlev as his inability to take criticism and his extremely fragile self-esteem, which are unacceptable for a politician. In our day, when people harshly criticize Gorbachev from the podium of the congress, only the small MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR dared to offend Yakovlev slightly. And there was an immediate response in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and in terms causing uneasiness because a word was taken from the old lexicon—"denunciation." Bushin did an excellent job of analyzing this interview, which was certainly more Calvinist than Lutheran in tone, showing that Aleksandr Nikolayevich did not have enough courage to respond to criticism in a worthy manner.

When he was criticized at the Central Committee plenum for pandering to Lithuanian extremists, in response again we heard nothing but disavowals and curses. But the sudden half-day illness that prevented Aleksandr Nikolayevich from attending the Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies during the discussion of the Lithuanian question is sad. For a brief report from Falin fully canceled out Yakovlev's communication—which had been called vitriolic but I would add grandiose as well—concerning the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Falin's statement caused us to recall the bitter warnings heard after the report, which Yakovlev ignored.

At this time I am not setting myself the task of analyzing Aleksandr Nikolayevich's role in the aggravation of the Lithuanian events, but the political situation shows that it is quite impossible to avoid considering this question.

Just as it is impossible not to interpret the situation that arose in connection with the extremely strong pressure on the authorities and the party at rallies. The rally on 25 February with its ferocious protest against the introduction of presidential power was organized by those same political forces that actively support Yakovlev. But Aleksandr Nikolayevich twice from the deputy podium—and not at all grandiosely but rather, as they say, gnashing his teeth—proved better than the rest the need for a president. Something does not mesh here; you end up with some kind of political game.

The same thing is true in the party—with the Democratic Platform which is directed toward regeneration of the CPSU. At the last Central Committee Plenum one of the leaders of the Democratic Platform was not given the floor but was asked to submit his speech to the presidium. Did he go to the presidium and give someone the text? Of course, to Aleksandr Nikolayevich, the natural father of the Democratic Platform. I wrote this in PRAVDA about the intentions of the Democratic Platform to take over power in the party: "Are we not speaking about some new market conditions, about some new reliance on some new leader who is just appearing and not yet recognized by everyone?" It would seem that this is indeed what is happening: Members of the Democratic Platform are clearly grooming Yakovlev for the post of party chairman—to judge from the questions he was asked at the Higher Party School where the Democratic Platform is consolidated.

And another thing. I ran as a candidate deputy in Gdlyan's Zelenograd and I can say that the small group

of extremists who have gained power over the minds of the residents of Zelenograd are completely routing all leaders, including the leader of perestroyka. But not a critical word is said about Yakovlev, since they regard him as an idol.

Again I emphasize that we are not speaking about searching for an enemy. But it is absolutely clear that the special, I would say fervent, inclination of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev to a large political game in the sphere of power has diverted the attention of the entire society and the leadership of the country away from the painful issues that are tormenting the homeland. And the distance from practical, earthly concerns of grass-roots Russia has contributed to the establishment of doctrinaire behavior and the priority of theoretical truths. Today, thanks to the president, it has become possible to get rid of the political games that have shaken the society and which accompany the continuous, initially overt and then camouflaged, rise of Yakovlev to the heights of party power. This will contribute to defusing the confrontation and searching for national harmony.

I expect that my article will evoke a stormy reaction from Yakovlev himself and from the numerous representatives of the mass media who support him so ardently. I will be sincerely sorry if this is exactly what happens. Would it not be better for Aleksandr Nikolayevich to enter into an open, honest discussion with his opponents instead of hiding from it and setting the obedient press against his followers who have fallen out of favor? Yes, it will be a real pity if the same old thing is repeated again this time. For it is high time to start making peace. Conditions have been created to begin a new stage in politics and national life. Five years happens to be the amount of time which in Russian history finally determines the path of power, as I discussed long ago at one of the secretariat meetings.

Enough shouting until we are hoarse, the time has come for serious dialogue. We do not need to say "Down with!" any more, but some people should step aside of their own accord, for the good of the homeland. We have had enough of chasing the past and inflaming passions of any kind, but nobody has the right to claim a monopoly on public opinion now. We must not forego principles, but for the sake of civil peace we must divide up the mass media in a new way among the various sociopolitical groups, which will immediately ease the situation in the society. For Yakovlev's redistribution of newspapers and magazines in 1986 was purely administrative and arbitrary and it violated the balance in society. It gave the odds to some at the expense of others. The ridiculous election, unprecedented in the history of the civilized world, of the three leaders of the television program "Vzglyad" and half the editors of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY as people's deputies finally revealed the grimaces and unhappiness of our young democracy which has been taken hostage by those who have gained a monopoly on the press and television.

But we can see with our own eyes, including from the example of Lithuania, that the victories won by this monopoly are false victories which lead to trouble and a situation where the paths of power and the paths of the people diverge more and more. If we do not put a stop to this destructive process, this succession of pyrrhic victories, which are extremely improvident in the large historical picture, we shall end up with neither winners nor losers.

And the last thing. I wish to raise for your judgment a question that is quite within the powers of the plenum. I suggest voting for having Vladimir Bushin's article in MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR reprinted in full for broad consideration in LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA.

May Day Slogans Still Leave Many Questions

PM0705114990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 90 p 1

[V. Kislov commentary: "Long Live Common Sense!"]

[Text] What we shall be discussing is the serious document pegged to festival which has taken pride of place in newspapers—the May Day Slogans. It seems that the years of perestroyka have already managed to expunge hypocritical enthusiasm and pointlessly addressed slogans from the lexicon. We are resurrecting the normal human need to listen to words attentively and to seek sense in them. And that is why any cliche or sentence uttered "for form's sake" grates.

The changes have even affected the country's principal slogans. They have become fewer—from 60 in 1984 to a mere 18 now. We are no longer exhorted—verbally—to boost livestock raising productivity and increase oil and gas extraction. The influence of the quantity of slogans on raising labor productivity is, to put it mildly, negligible.

Although there is an exclamation mark after every thought, a lot of questions still remain. For example, how much the economy would progress if you appealed to young men and women to take up the call: "Participate energetically in work!"

For decades slogans were the constant companion of our festive mood. In the main squares of hundreds of the country's cities the red-letter days were celebrated by an identical, rather bald chatechism: from the platform—"Long live...!" and from the columns a unanimous "Hurrah!"

A topical slogan of the day is, of course, essential. Society's political life is simply unthinkable without it. Many await such a slogan from the Communist Party, from its Central Committee. But, it seems, we remain at the mercy of stereotypes, when such slogans are proclaimed only on festive occasions. The time when newspapers were read like prayers has passed, but we are still afraid to express our own opinion and attitude to what is obsolete. Many will possibly not agree with me, only we

must not be in a hurry to apply labels. Believe me, the doubts are sincerely held. I am sure that even slogan writers have them.

The tradition on this occasion will be broken for the first time in Leningrad. Instead of a demonstration in Palace Square there will be a mass rally devoted, as the special commission's decision says, "to the themes of friendship, internationalism, and political pluralism." And slogans may be proclaimed, as they say, from the heart, without fearing whether you have included the required formulation of "active participation...."

But for all that, it is a pity that the spring procession along the city's streets was abolished too hastily and that the tradition was broken. And it would certainly have been preserved, but for the banal invocatory exclamations sent down from on high, which as a rule are uttered by some faceless emcee. Only to do this it would have been necessary at all costs to keep up with the times, which have consigned unanimous sloganeering to the museum of archaisms. For instance, by giving the platform to well-known actors as well as unknown workers and political leaders, from party figures to "ecologists," for brief addresses. But before this it is imperative to agree on a holiday "cease-fire" with one's opponents. Perhaps there would then be one more chance to give real substance to the thought expressed in formal slogans: "The consolidation of all the healthy forces of perestroyka—a guarantee of the irreversibility of democratic processes!" [The following slogans appear in boxes at intervals throught the text]

29 April 1950: Soviet young men and women! Tirelessly master advanced science, technology, and culture! Be steadfast and courageous and prepared to overcome any difficulties!

29 April 1960: Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members, Soviet youth! Learn to live and work as communists! Develop high moral qualities within yourselves!

1 May 1970: We hope, our young comrade, that this May Day will enhance your confidence and strengths in all your best endeavors and undertakings, and will help you realize still more fully your duty as a fighter of a united international front.

29 April 1980: Workers of the Soviet Union! Accelerate the development of the productive forces of Siberia and the Far East!

Expedite the construction of the Baykal-Amur Railroady!

Lukyanov Eulogizes Patriarch Pimen

LD0605123490 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 6 May 90

[Text] At the patriarchal Epiphany Cathedral in Moscow today there was a memorial service for the Pariarch Pimen, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church who died at the age of 79 on Thursday. Many people came to pay the last respects to the Patriarch Pimen. Members of the Holy Synod supervised the liturgy and prayed for the patriarch. Among those who attended the service were the Supreme Soviet chairman, Anatoliy Lukyanov; the prime minister of the Russian Federation, the country's largest republic, Aleksandr Vlasov; members of parliament, and public activists.

Anatoliy Lukyanov in his eulogy praised the Patriarch Pimen as a peacemaker who championed human rights and worked hard for charity and more international friendship. Speaking in reply, the metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, Filaret, who is acting patriarch, voiced gratitude for the condolences and high evaluation of the church and patriarch activities and assured that the church would further work along this path.

After the final formalities were completed, the coffin with the patriarch's body was taken away to the Sergey Trinity monastery, 60 km. away from Moscow, for burial there.

Official Discusses Compensation for Refugees

PM0305144190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with P. Rudev, chief of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems Administration for Population Migration and Resettlement, by own correspondent G. Alimov under the rubric "From Competent Sources"; date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction: "Once Again About the Fate of Refugees"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution on measures to assist families which have been forced to leave Azerbaijan and Armenia. This is the first government document which provides for a full mechanism of compensation for the damages suffered by refugees. An IZVESTIYA correspondent talks to P. Rudev, chief of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems Administration for Population Migration and Resettlement.

[Alimov] The resolution does not mention the word "refugee"—the official status of these people is designated as "those who have been forced to leave their permanent places of residence." Petr Sergeyevich, does this mean that the government does not recognize these people as refugees?

[Rudev] If it did not recognize them, this resolution would not exist. The point is that, alas, there is no law in our country, no precise legal definition of what constitutes a refugee. Hence the use of synonyms. But in any case the government recognizes those who were forced to leave their homes as de facto refugees. Recently I was invited to attend a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals. After the debate everyone came to the conclusion that it is necessary to prepare proposals

for drafting a Law on Forced Migration within the USSR. Many people recognize that it is necessary to define a uniform procedure in the country for tackling these extremely serious questions. At the moment the aforementioned Council of Ministers resolution is extremely vulnerable from the legal viewpoint. Certain of its provisions directly contravene existing or newly adopted laws. The government is meddling within the sphere of competence of either local organs or economic organizations....

[Alimov] Is this why there are so many provisos on the lines of "by way of an exception?"

[Rudev] Of course. But the problem must be resolved. It is a question of the fate of people who have lost the roof over their heads.

[Alimov] How many refugees are there in the country today?

[Rudev] Some 600,000. All those who have been forced to leave their permanent places of residence in recent years. Merely as a result of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia some 500,000 people have lost their homes. Some 230,000 of them are in Armenia, and 200,000 in Azerbaijan. Tens of thousands of people have left for other union republics, mainly Russia, and many have settled temporarily in Moscow City and Oblast. The problem of refugees has become unionwide, statewide. Suffice it to say that eight union republics and more than half of the territory of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] have been sucked into this maelstrom. In many respects this process has become irreversible. This is a further indication that a legislative settlement of this problem is absolutely necessary and it cannot be resolved by individual government resolutions. There is no point in deluding oneself that everything will come right somehow.

[Alimov] What other republics apart from the RSFSR are accepting refugees?

[Rudev] The Ukraine and Belorussia. However, the most complicated situation at present has taken shape in the south of the RSFSR, in Stavropol and Krasnodar Krays and Rostov Oblast. Tens of thousands of refugees from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus have gathered there. Apart from that, there are the Crimean Tatars, the Germans.... To put it bluntly, the situation is explosive.

Why? The local infrastructure cannot cope. Prices have risen sharply. The cost of everything, including housing and land, has risen astronomically.... Soviet sessions in the aforementioned regions have adopted the decision not to accept any more refugees.

[Alimov] What is the situation like in Moscow?

[Rudev] It is this: Some 41,000 citizens are registered in the capital—these are the latest figures. This does not include members of servicemen's families. Of these some 6,500 are accommodated at departmental rest homes and boardinghouses in Moscow Oblast, some 2,000 are in hotels, the rest are staying with relatives or friends, as a rule. Another problem is the 200 people who are sheltering at the Armenian permanent mission.

[Alimov] As far as I know, none of the latest wave of refugees has managed to settle in Moscow. Is this right?

[Rudev] Yes, your information is correct. There are still many people in Moscow who, by force of circumstances, have been here since November 1988. In this sense they are "old residents" and they will not consider settling anywhere apart from Moscow City and Oblast. And no matter what they say, this is a fact and we can prove it.

[Alimov] Many rumors are circulating about the "Moscow refugees." It is said that they obtain housing and registration by bribing officials....

[Rudev] It is true that there more than enough rumors. I cannot say that they are all unfounded. There is a large group of refugees—some 8,000—who were offered resettlement in other areas as long as a year or 18 months ago. But they are refusing these offers. Everyone is hoping that something better will turn up: What if? I believe that the Moscow City Soviet must state its position on this subject precisely and clearly. This issue has been included on the session agenda.

[Alimov] What if, by way of an exception, these refugees were nonetheless allowed to stay in Moscow?

[Rudev] Let us think about the consequences. What will happen if we resettle even one single family here? After all, the problem is not that someone is refusing to resolve something. The resolution which has been adopted by the government provides those who are prepared to take their fate into their own hands with every opportunity.

[Alimov] Let us return to the document. What benefits does it offer?

[Rudev] Its main feature is that it incorporates a real mechanism for compensation for damages. There is only one condition: It is to be paid out at the new place of residence or the former place of residence, provided it is a permanent residence. Obviously, this compensation will not be paid out to those who are currently in Moscow, nor can it be. In order to qualify for it, it is necessary to give up claims to former possessions.

[Alimov] Let's see: A family chooses a new place of residence. For what compensation does it qualify?

[Rudev] Let us work it out. For instance, a family consisting of four people had an apartment with a total floor space of 60 square meters. The compensation per "square meter" is R210. Consequently, approximately R13,000-14,000 for the apartment. Plus R3,000 for belongings. If in addition there were some outbuildings, a summerhouse, for instance, a plot of land, and fruit trees or bushes, and so forth, compensation is provided for these, too. On average a family can receive payments of R20,000-25,000.

[Alimov] Not a vast sum in current conditions....

[Rudev] You are right. But you must not forget the state credits for the construction of individual or cooperative housing and the purchase of household furniture and equipment to which they have a priority claim. Additional stocks of construction materials and goods have also been set aside....

[Alimov] How are job placement questions being resolved?

[Rudev] We deal directly with this together with ministries and departments. We believe that the solution of the refugees' problems hinges on their job placement. They are offered various options as regards places of residence and jobs. The choice is theirs. If some options are unsuitable, we try to find others. Over the past two months some 2,000 families have been permanently resettled in the European part of Russia. They are mostly going to the cities. Around 200 families have chosen the countryside.

Naturally, the main problem is housing. Unfortunately, the housing provided at present is temporary. But, as I said earlier, families can build their own housing and begin by joining a housing construction cooperative. At the current stage the state is offering them a job and temporary housing and providing all kinds of assistance to ensure that they settle down in the new area as quickly as possible.

[Alimov] There are cases where people return to their former residences. Do they retain their rights?

[Rudev] Of course. All of them. The return to them of their housing and other property is guaranteed. Their return journey and baggage conveyance is paid for....

[Alimov] From what sources is all this financed?

[Rudev] The resolution will "cost" R1 billion. All the expenditure has to be funded by the republics from which the refugees fled.

[Alimov] What have the migration processes that are under way cost the state? Has anyone calculated this?

[Rudev] All this can be worked out. If you take the expenditure on the evacuation and resettlement of all refugees and consider that direct compensation payments per person total around R8,000, it turns out that the state has already lost R3.6 billion.

Letters Highlight Assault on Civil Rights

PM0705144990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 May 90 Second Edition p 1

[Own correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin report under the rubric "Reading April's Mail": "The Lessons of Democracy"]

[Text] A reader from Moscow, engineer G. Korobkov, relates the following episode in his letter: A certain radical tried to get people to chant on Krymskyy Bridge 26 February. He shouted to the convoy of demonstrators: "One, two.... We are free people! We are free people! Hey, do not push forward! Get behind the line immediately. So, one, two...." And the people, not going "beyond the line," repeated the desired slogan. Maybe some people in this crowd already felt free, independent, and proud. In any case, the shouting into the megaphone and the demand "not to push" did not upset anyone, and did not damage anyone's "unconscious need."

You will agree that this is a curious episode. I will just say that judging by the letters, other readers who are enthusiastic about a multiplicity of civil liberties are ready, figuratively speaking, to put their head in a noose if their favorite deputy or a popular rally tribune demands it. On the other hand, the simplest appeal from the custodians of law and order, for instance, to observe the rules of conduct in public places, is seen as a infringement of human rights by that category of people.

There have recently been events in the country, which are a litmus test of the degree of our readiness to live in a freer world than the one we lived in yesterday. Of all the diversity of events of this kind, the readers themselves single out two in particular: the elections to republican and local soviets, and the events taking place in Lithuania. Although, of course, all interethnic conflicts fall into this category.

So, first of all, something about the elections. A large proportion of the letters are complaints. "We were not given the opportunity to meet with the electorate.... We were not registered in time.... Methods used in the election campaign were crude.... The meeting with the electorate was wrecked....

We are looking into every complaint, but we are not rushing into immediate denunciations, which is what the authors of the letters are demanding. Everything must be verified. But there is a trend that can already be mentioned: The more a person uses words such as "democracy," "the interests of the people," "glasnost," and "pluralism," the more intolerant he is of the opinion of others, and the more insistently he demands that people be "suppressed," "punished," and "made mincemeat of."

Let us return once again to the interesting letter from the Muscovite G. Korobkov. He tells of how he once tried to declare his stance in the street: "A group of propagandists from the "Democratic Platform" were at work on the eve of the elections in the trade center of the 9th microrayon in Zelenograd. Sheets of drawing paper (the size of a man) graphically depicted who must be crossed off the ballot paper and who should stay. An old lady addressed the noisiest "democrat": "My dear, write down whom I should cross out." He writes it down. I could not stand it, and so I also wrote down some names on the sheet of paper, but of course, they were names of the other candidates. I held the paper out to the old

lady.... But it was not to be. Fist clenched, the "democrat" practically threw himself at me, shouting "Get out of here! This is our place!"

Unfortunately, similar things were happening not just in Moscow. And, far from the capital, a vigorous struggle was going on against candidates deemed not to some people's liking; leaflets that could only be called public denunciations were being pasted up (M. Krasnikova from Minsk wrote in about a leaflet concerning Major V. Gribanov; Lieutenant Colonel A. Fedotov from Mirnyy in Arkhangelsk Oblast wrote about a whole campaign to compromise Lieutenant Colonel A. Piskynov; Captain Third Rank A. Ivanov from Leningrad Oblast wrote about pressure on Captain Third Rank V. Prozorov; and so on). It is no accident that these are names of military men. It was often military candidates who were nominated by the population as an alternative to the local authorities on the one hand and the scandalous and aggressive informal organizations on the other. And everywhere, the side exerting the pressure spoke on behalf of the people under slogans of a struggle for democratic freedoms. The candidates I have mentioned obtained their posts despite everything, and Captain Third Rank V. Prozorov even became the city's mayor. But how many worthy candidates withdrew, and only because the teams of their rivals were not embarrassed to virtually literally take the voters by the throat and shake them till their teeth rattled suggesting at the same time that they make a "free choice?" Alas, this question comes from readers' letters. Maybe this is a sign of the times, which we still have to interpret, but the electoral campaign that has just finished, left in its wake a mass of offended, dissatisfied, confused, and angry people. To which, I repeat, the letters testify. (Ye. Senchenko from Summy, K. Nikandrov from Leningrad, Kh. Galiullin from Kazan, O. Katkova from Krasnodar, a group of conscripted servicemen from Bryansk Oblast, and many others)

"Our elections somehow did not go very well," N. Kalugin, war and labor veteran from Perm, writes. "Many people saw the freedom to chose their own candidate as the freedom to run down all and sundry, and the freedom to tear a strip off people who do not agree with you.... I fear that among the new 'representatives of the people' there will now be those who, during the election campaign, acquired the taste of achieving their ends by any means. It will be hard for them to stop." It seems that there is reason for other people's deputies to think over what he says.

The events in Lithuania, in their turn, speak of the fact that there are "servants of the people" in this republic, too, who want to make the people "happy" at any price. Even if this means making thousands, or hundreds of thousands of individuals unhappy. History is full of examples of the truest democrats and liberals, once they have gotten to power, treating the citizens' rights and freedoms a hundred times more carelessly than any dictator or tyrant. The March events in this republic are, it seems, yet another confirmation of this. This is what N. Pastushenko from Mariupol, Lieutenant Colonel V. Novik from the Moscow area, V. Khorobriy from Vologda, L. Khudzik from Brest, and others, believe. This is the objective view, as the saying goes. But authors of letters from Lithuania are no longer suggesting, but instead are categorically affirming that "it is necessary to urgently implement a mechanism for the protection of USSR citizens in the republic." (I. Marenich from Vilnius] That is, the first days of the "declaration" of independence have provoked the mistrust of thousands of people in an elementary area—personal safety. The logic here is simple: The Government, which is ignoring the Basic Law—the USSR Constitution—with extraordinary ease, can do everything it likes to the citizens with the same ease.

The following general worry can be easily traced in letters from Lithuania: Today, human rights are being violated in the name of independence—the right to work, the right to political convictions, the right to housing, electoral law.... People are worried about their future and the future of their children. Whatever the new leaders of the republic may say, there are grounds for such attitudes.

Leningrad professor A. Nikitin, who wrote to us on behalf of his colleagues at the university, mentions in particular that a government that starts off by negating laws, will lead the people to bloodshed and serious tragedies. The professor hopes that the Lithuanian leaders' responsibility for their people's fate will force them to remember the simple truth: You cannot become free by restricting the freedom of others.

A typical detail: Many collective letters are sent in from Lithuania. In these complex conditions, people prefer to feel that they are standing side by side. I cannot hide the fact that there are very sharp condemnations and extreme assessments. We can forgive the Lithuanian citizens, worn out by tension that has lasted many months, their excessively emotional state. But it is letters like this that make you realize what bounds people will reach if they are reminded every day that they are occupiers. On the one hand. On the other hand, the opposing side, too, starts to boil with rage. For instance, I. Mkasal, an inhabitant of Panevezhis, brands the Soviet Government and the USSR Armed Forces, ascribing evil intentions and criminal actions to them. It is quite understandable that henceforth, for him (and for others like him, brought to boiling point by "Sajudis") every attempt on the part of the Soviet Government or the Army to support the operation of legislative norms on the republic's territory, will be seen as the most irksome ill-doing. Conversely, however grossly V. Landsbergis's government may violate international legal norms, and that includes personal freedom in the republic, it will seem to him that this is a display of the highest democracy.

...I do not want to preach, knowing that there is no such thing as absolute freedom. Scarcely anyone would argue with that. But unfortunately, today there are many

examples of people trying to play the card of "absolute freedom" in political games. Admittedly, it is enough for this to be the winning card for the victor to take a megaphone into his hands and shout: "Hey! Don't push! Don't lean forward! Get behind the line!" That is what we must not forget.

Liberal-Democratic Chairman Interviewed

PM0205151690 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 17, 6-13 May 90 p 7

[Interview with Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy by Natalya Izyumova: "LDP Set To Hold Congress in Kremlin"—date, place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union is determined to hold its next congress in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. The LDP is the first nationwide opposition party as was proclaimed at the founding congress March 31 in Moscow at which the party's Programme and Rules were adopted. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, 44, a lawyer, never before a member of any party, was elected chairman. We asked him to comment.

[Izyumova] "Pravda" (April 1) ran its report about this new party on the front page. How do you explain such behaviour vis-a-vis an opposition party from the central organ of the Communist Party?

[Zhirinovskiy] I think our party is popular with the press because we have made it clear that we do not seek confrontation and favour cooperation with all parties. We are ready for any dialogue and recognize all Soviet parties. Our work is (and will always be) in compliance with the law. The LDP advocates a moderate centrist stand. Our policy is neutrality.

[Izyumova] Some claim that the LDP has the indirect sponsorship of the KGB, or at least support.

[Zhirinovskiy] Neither I nor the other LDP leaders have ever had any contact with the KGB. Yet, our party is one of the few whose principles have met with understanding from the current institutions of power. For example, we don't want to generate anti-communist hysteria, or abolish the Communist Party. We do not support the call, "Down with the KGB", or the like. Given that KGB officials are all Communists, it's obvious why they sympathize with our policies.

[Izyumova] According to liberal democrats, state administration and citizens' protection should be outside any party's influence. Should the President or members of Presidential Council, in your view, belong to any party?

[Zhirinovskiy] No. They should be independent of any party. Let the US president retain his position as a party leader, but for us this is inadmissible. We do not have deep-rooted democratic traditions.

[Izyumova] In 1988, you took part in the 1st Congress of the Democratic Union, but you did not join its ranks. What don't you like about that party and what made you set up the LDP?

[Zhirinovskiy] In criticizing Communists, the Democratic Union is actually trying to do what the Bolsheviks did in 1917: to destroy everything that existed before and start from scratch. The DU is a group of fanatics and extremists and I have nothing to do with them. As for the LDP, I've nurtured this idea a long time. In the postwar period, power in most developed countries (Japan, West Germany, Italy) long belonged to liberal-democratic parties. I believe that only a moderate centrist trend has a future and excludes the possibility of dictatorial regimes, left-wing or right-wing.

[Izyumova] Does the LDP uphold the traditions of pre-revolutionary democratic parties in Russia, such as the party of People's Freedom led by Russian liberal Pavel Milyukov?

[Zhirinovskiy] Yes, we uphold the liberal traditions of the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats), the Octobrists (the League of October Seventeenth) and the Trudoviks. Yet, we do not copy them. In our view, Milyukov's party (the Cadets) always pursued a halfway policy, that's why it failed.

[Izyumova] What are the major aims of your party?

[Zhirinovskiy] A law-governed state with a presidential form of government, a market economy and a multiparty system. We are against all "isms" and ideologies, including Marxist-Leninist, in state policy. We don't want to build either communism or socialism. We want to be a European, industrial society. A priority today is to ensure a healthy economy. Though we consider that part of the economy should be state-run, we favour private ownership, a free market and free enterprise. Any regulation should be carried out through taxation.

[Izyumova] What's your approach to the nationalities question?

[Zhirinovskiy] In dealing with this problem, we should proceed from three principles of state structure: a unitary state, a federation and a confederacy. In Russia, the principle of a unitary state should be applied, while in the Baltic Republics and parts of Transcaucasia, the principle of a confederacy should be applied, meaning maximum independence and freedom, but within the Union.

[Izyumova] Are you against a Republic's constitutional right to secede from the Union?

[Zhirinovskiy] The LDP is against the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But we do not think that the Union should be preserved by means of force. The Lithuanian question must be resolved by means of the laws and normative acts. We must not act rashly. Why didn't Lithuanians apply to the USR Supreme Soviet concerning their desire to secede from the Union? That would have prompted

the central bodies to start working out the secession procedure. I think the Lithuanians made a mistake by skipping that stage.

[Izyumova] Do you see the LDP as a ruling party in future?

[Zhirinovskiy] We aim to become the country's most influential party. It's our wish that some day the newspapers will report that out of ten parties that participated in the elections, the LDP won a majority vote and its leader is to form the new government.

[Izyumova] What is the social composition of the LDP? Whose interests do you defend?

[Zhirinovskiy] So far, we are a party of intellectuals. Most LDP members are office workers, students and pensioners. Very few are involved in production. We prefer intellectuals, but we admit everybody, without exception.

[Izyumova] How many members are there in the party now? Has it been registered?

[Zhirinovskiy] As of today, the party numbers about 4,000, but it's growing very fast. By the end of the year, membership is expected to reach half a million.

We are just about to be registered I've sent all the necessary documents to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Soviet and the Moscow City Soviet. Not a single party has yet been registered, including the Communist Party, which came to power by violent means.

I recently wrote to President Gorbachev on behalf of the LDP and proposed that, given the current political situation and inevitable staff reductions among Communist Party functionaries, the CPSU give up some of its buildings to other parties. That would be a move worthy of praise. If it comes to that, we'll ask for a building currently occupied by the All-Union Young Pioneers' Organization. We don't think children should be involved in politics.

[Izyumova] What's your short-range programme of action?

[Zhirinovskiy] We'll take part in May Day demonstration. For the first time ever, a political party other than the Communist Party will march through Red Square. We've also set a date for a ntionwide LDP conference (October 6) and a 2nd LDP congress (April 6, 1991), which is expected to be held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. Are you surprised? But who said that the Palace was meant for Communist congresses only?

[Izyumova] You say that the LDP's style is open and that you as chairman will answer any question. What is your salary as chairman?

[Zhirinovskiy] When we have party funds, I'll fix my salary at 500 roubles a month through the next conference, at which the delegates will have the final say. I believe that the chairman of a new party should get as much as the leaders of the Communist Party. If a Politburo member has a maximum salary of 1,200 roubles, the chairman of another party should have the same. As far as privileges are concerned, our party will decide which of them the chairman should have whether I'll drive a Chayka or a Mercedes.

[Izyumova] And a final question? Why aren't there any big names among LDP members?

[Zhirinovskiy] We are afraid of famous people in the party. Today, there are many who join politics because they've suffered under the previous regimes and may want to use the party as a tool of revenge. What's bad about our parties is that they are tailored to a particular "person", be it Yeltsin, Travkin or Yakunin. I fear such parties. Those who the LDP, are nopt joining Zhirinovskiy's party. What attracts them, are our views and goals. We want the atmosphere to be free and easy. We don't have to carry the heavy burden of the past and think only of the future.

Journalist Examines Destiny of Komsomol

90US0788A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by Inga Prelovskaya: "The Komsomol Seeks a Path to Renewal"]

[Text] On the eve of the 21st Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress which will open on Wednesday, I glanced over KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA from past years when I worked there. "The Effect of Romanticism," "The Flag in My Heart," "The Search at Dawn," "Three Hours of Burning...." It is impossible even to imagine such an array of headlines in today's youth newspaper. I am not recalling them, of course, out of nostalgia for the past, nor in order to cast doubt on their sincerity at the time. At the beginning of the sixties we still believed that having put an end to the Stalin era, we would return to the short path to that bright future about which the "commissars in dusty helmets" dreamed. It seemed that all we would have to do would be to give it our all, without sparing ourselves, and we would rush forward.

And the heroes of the Komsomol were those who did not think about themselves—the boys who began to extract ore in Talnakh near Norilsk, the volunteers who cultivated the virgin land and built the Siberian hydroelectric power plants. Tents, hard work, roughing it. Yes, it was all there: youthful enthusiasm, faith, and self-sacrifice. The people donated not months but years. But you cannot be a hero all your life. You cannot eternally raise the battle cry, call people to arms, and lead the attack. But the Komsomol still continued to speak with youth in this military language even though it was already clear that illusions were fading and the society was seeing them as ideological catch words. Through the stern

question, "What have you given the Komsomol?", one could hear the simple and natural, "What has it given me?"

But all the bitter words about the Komsomol have already been spoken. And in the discussion center at the congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Komsomol organizations in February they discussed the following question: "Will the still unborn Russian Komsomol be left without a future?" And the March report from the congress of the Georgian Komsomol in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ended with a question mark: "The Last Congress?"

There is cause for concern about the fate of the Komsomol. In five years its membership has decreased by 10 million. To be sure, the number of members is not a decisive indicator: The number of members in the Komsomol is almost unmeasurable. One is alarmed not so much by the drop in membership as by the alienation of youth from the Komsomol. The word "crisis" has already been heard at plenums of the Komsomol Central Committee. But crisis is a transitional condition. To what? To improvement or ... But still I think that Viktor Mironenko, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, was right when he recently began his speech with a joke: "The rumors about the death of the Komsomol are somewhat exaggerated."

The withdrawal of youth from the union certainly does not mean that they do not need the organization. New associations already exist and are being formed, and even more of them will appear. This is a normal thing in a society that recognizes a multiparty system. There are about a dozen and a half youth organizations in the United States. And there are more than 20 in tiny Finland.

What should the Komsomol be when it loses its monopoly? There are those who advocate deeper politicization of it and closer ties with the party. A quite realistic path. There are those who propose transforming the Komsomol into a likeness of the trade union engaged in social protection of youth. There are those in favor of transforming it into a broader movement which includes organizations with a wide range of various ideas and views. The group of delegates of the congress of Komsomol organizations of the RSFSR proclaimed itself to be a part of the Komsomol of the Russian Democratic Socialist Association (RDSA), advocating the creation of just such a broad organization which includes youth of socialist, democratic, and humanistic orientations.

It is known that unions that are like youth fronts with the whole spectrum of ideological trends as a rule do not last long. But the Komsomol has an important task. Today it is necessary to rally all democratic forces, including youth, in order to accelerate perestroyka.

The social instability is now being sharply reflected in the life and attitudes of young people. The average wages of young workers and employees are less than the average for the country by a factor of 1.5, and about 2.5 million young families are on waiting lists for housing without prospects for obtaining it in the next few years. Can an organization that aspires to express the interests of youth not try to help them? This was precisely the purpose of the initiative of the Komsomol and the Committee for Youth Affairs of the USSR Supreme Soviet to adopt a law on the fundamentals of the state youth policy of the USSR which has finally been accepted for a first reading.

There are 600 centers for scientific and technical creativity of youth, 700 youth housing cooperatives, a commercial bank for youth, and 17,000 youth cooperatives—all this with Komsomol support brings youth into the mainstream of the restructuring of the economy. In two years 4,000 youth centers have sprung up and the number of political clubs is growing. These not unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Komsomol to enlist youth, of course, could still produce results, but still a good deal of time has been lost.

Striving for democratic renewal of the organization, the Komsomol Central Committee brought up for discussion a draft of the new regulations and the program goals of the Komsomol. Briefly, the union is prepared to express these goals in three words: "Participation. Development. Peace." Participation in the activity of democratic organs from the USSR Congress of People's Deputies to the council of the labor collective. Development of the broadest socioeconomic and cultural possibilities and guarantees for youth. Peace—"not only as the absence of war," but also as civil peace in the society. The political position of the Komsomol is thus dictated by its real concern for today's youth.

When reading the precongress documents one gets the feeling that the organization is indeed trying to accomplish a "Copernican revolution"—not man for the organization but the organization for man. And it would be good for the congress, from which we are expecting far-sighted decisions and bold steps, not to be bogged down in procedural debates, but actually to be able to judge soberly the strategy for renewal of the union on which its further destiny actually depends.

When he met with delegates to the congress, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev called for them at this crucial juncture to devote themselves to the Leninist art of dialectics, especially the understanding of Lenin's last works in which he discusses the "change of our entire view of socialism." When determining what the Komsomol should be it is important not to make a mistake in the selection and to catch the dominant attitudes of the time.

Report on Komsomol Central Committee Plenum

LD0405220990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text][Announcer] The first plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee was held in Moscow today.

[Correspondent Igor Minayev] As is well known, at its congress the Komsomol, while preserving its name, was transformed into a federation of communist youth unions. Naturally, the new leaders of the central bodies must correspond to the new and more democratic structure of the organization. The main task of the Komsomol Central Committee plenum was formulated by Vladimir Zyukin, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee. A structure is necessary which guarantees the self-development of the organization and does not damage the rights of the federation's members. A decision was adopted on the principles for forming the basic functions of the Komsomol Central Committee's permanent commissions and councils. It is in these that the Komsomol's strategy will be developed by collective efforts. The main aim in its activities is the regulation of internal union relations, international cooperation, interethnic relations, and support for youth initiatives. In this way the plenum has organizationally strengthened the attempt made at the Komsomol congress to concentrate efforts on solving priority tasks without dissipating themselves on trivialities. The Buro has been chosen, made up of representatives of all republican unions and Komsomol Central Committee secretaries. The editor-in-chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has been confirmed. [video shows plenum in progress]

[Minayev] What are the priorities now, in your view? What is the most important thing for the Komsomol?

[S. Zhuravlev, Komsomol Central Committee secretary, identified by caption] Well, probably the Komsomol's most important priority at the moment is to find itself in the pluralism which is arising and in the youth movement in the country. And it is not by chance that at the first plenum we discussed the question of creating a coordination committee for links with youth—other youth—organizations in the USSR. The Komsomol's most important priority, nevertheless, must remain international activities. Here there are a mass of priorities. But I think that the most important thing which we must speak about is the reorientation of the Komsomol's international links away from the export of our ideology and the export of our model of development, to the solving of the internal problems of the organization itself. [video shows Minayev interviewing Zhuravlev in foyer]

[Minayev] Students, the komsomol, and the defense of the fatherland, the development of the young's economic initiatives—these are just a few of the draft resolutions of the Komsomol's 21st congress which were adopted today at the plenum. [video shows drafts in printed booklets and then more scenes from the plenum]

Consequences of Arms Plant Thefts Viewed

90UN1574A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Single Edition p 6

[Article by TASS correspondent B. Rudenko: "A Pilferer With a Five-shot Gun: Arms Thieves Escape Legal Punishment"]

[Text] Nobody gets surprised any more at the theft of weapons from military ammunition depots and stores, so distressingly frequent is the information about it in press. At the risk of distressing readers even more I want to say that it is not much harder to steal weapons from the plant where they are made.

The Tula Weapons Plant association for instance has tens of thousands of rifles and smoothbore weapons in production every day. The plant employs over 8,000 people in the production chain—from stamping of separate parts to assembly and tests of the finished product. As for control, here is how it goes: It is not the dashing soldiers of regular units that keep watch by the gates of the plant, but paramilitary security guards. Men are not anxious to apply for the job because the pay is low; so the responsible job of fighting thefts is mostly done by women who are often rather old.

"Their job is hard—they spend 24 hours on their feet and all that time they are under constant pressure," says the assistant general manager of the association, M. Sebyakin. "Several years ago two weapons were stolen and then "surfaced" in connection with a crime. After that the preventive measures at the plant were radically revised and brought into order. There is stricter control of the passage of each part through production stages; access to finished products is restricted. We are also carrying out additional measures to prevent any possibility of a disappearance of either assembled weapons or their parts. However, attempts to carry them out of the grounds of the plant do take place. Last year alone we stopped 11 cases of theft. Legal action has been taken against the offenders."

"Is that a criminal offense?"

"No, basically, they will be punished through administrative measures. It is a paradox, but our criminal code considers only the cost of the stolen goods. It does not consider the degree of danger that such thefts carry."

The 12-caliber five-shot hunting rifle which was stolen from the plant by the worker T. fired more than one round while T. was testing it before the police came to investigate the cause of the sounds of shots. When arrested, he admitted at once where the rifle had come from. Legal suit was brought against the thief and the judge sentenced him to a year and a half of correction labor. T. would have received the same sentence had he stolen a bunch of brooms of the same cost—over R500.

The punishment for the theft of separate parts of weapons does not amount to anything more than an official reprimand or suspension of the 13th salary and

bonuses. An offense becomes criminal if the cost of the stolen goods exceeds R50, but normally nobody steals that much in weapons parts.

In the compressor room of the plant cafeteria the guards found two well-wrapped custom-made hunting rifles. They had engraved and chased ornaments on them; there also was a spare barrel for them—to the total cost of over R2,000. They were hidden in the power plant cabinet, and the only person to have access to the cabinet was the compressor operator S. He explained that he had assembled the rifles from defective parts and that he planned to purchase them legitimately later. But when S. was asked to put together the barrel and the rifle butt he did not know how to. The experts proved that the decoration of the gun and its assembly had been done by highly qualified masters. According to the plant inventory both guns had disappeared from a guarded storeroom. The case was handed over to law enforcement officials but they refused to bring criminal action against the thief under the pretext that the guns had not left the grounds of the plant.

"It is very difficult to explain why S. escaped legal punishment," continues Mikhail Nikolayevich. "We always try to emphasize that our products are special. Theft of a part or, even more so, of an assembled gun surely leads to either a crime or, at the least, to poaching. But the legal responsibility for such theft has been diminished."

The plant worker M. displayed his possession of a hunting rifle when he started shooting at the door of his neighbor who displeased him for some reason. When detained he admitted that he had taken the gun at the plant and, naturally, did not register it with the police. Next day M. retracted his confession and offered another version of the event: He had bought the gun from a stranger. As a result he was not accused of theft, but of disorderly conduct, for which he was sentenced to two years correction labor.

It is true that an offender cannot be accused of an unproven crime. But is it not against the law to have in your possession and, what is more, to use unregistered guns? It is not, as I discovered. According to Article 218 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Penal Code it is against the law to carry, possess, purchase, manufacture, or sell firearms—with the exception of smoothbore hunting rifles—or ammunition, or explosives without a special permit. A small legal stipulation—with the exception of smoothbore hunting rifles—changes the shooting done by S. from being a criminal action to an action punishable only by administrative measures.

In December of 1989 the association leadership again raised the problem of people storing and even using unregistered hunting rifles with impunity. They wrote to the RSFSR Procuracy: "Due to the complex sociopolitical situation in the country, to the increased interest of certain groups and parts of the society in firearms, to the sharp increase of crimes involving firearms, and also to the fact that criminally used smoothbore guns are just as lethal as rifled guns at regular distances, we request a proposal be introduced to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet concerning deleting the proviso "with the exception of smoothbore hunting rifles" from Article 218 of the RSFSR Penal Code."

Acting RSFSR Procurator N. Trubin sent an immediate response: "Your letter concerning the problem of establishing criminal punishment for those who illegally carry, store, purchase, manufacture, or sell smoothbore hunting rifles has been considered by the RSFSR Procuracy. In our opinion, the establishment of such punishment will not prevent cases of criminal use of hunting rifles. Such prevention will be aided more by strict observance of the existing rules for the purchase, registration, and storage of such guns as well as by unconditional execution of administrative regulations in cases of those who violate them. For its part the RSFSR Procuracy is taking measures to strengthen the procurator's control in this respect."

Of course, it is necessary to make the law more humane. But is it reasonable to forget about our reality when thinking about the future? And our reality is such that the administrative regulations prove inefficient most of the time.

"Given modern types of gunpowder, a bullet from a standard Tula Weapons Plant rifle of small, 12th caliber passes clean through a 10-centimeter thick board," comments M. Sebyakin. "A hunting five-shot rifle is just as quick-firing as a carbine. Our guns are a degree better in their shooting range and fire effect and accuracy than homemade guns and sawn-off rifled guns. However, legal punishment for a rifled homemade gun comes automatically but the most you can get for a smoothbore weapon is a fine. Racketeers, by the way, use this legal incongruity quite successfully."

At some time a wholesale and retail trade association of a southern republic where the situation has been tense for a long time asked the Tula Weapons Plant administration to supply them with "200 Simonov carbines and 200,000 ammunition rounds to destroy stray dogs and wild nimals." Sometimes plain criminals try to bribe, or blackmail, or threaten employees into stealing weapons, or try to place their own people at the plant.

At the core of Tula Weapons Plant there are over a hundred workers' dynasties, for whom the good reputation of the plant is not just an empty word. Against the background of such people one can see with the naked eye whether somebody came to the plant to do some honest work, just to make some money, or with a malicious intent. It is not all that hard to discover such a person, it is a lot harder to get rid of them. The abovementioned T. was sentenced to carry out his term at the place of work. The sentence caused certain bewilderment at the plant, to put it mildly, as the people did not want to risk losing another rifle. They asked that T.

be transferred to another enterprise, but their request was denied because a court sentence should be executed to the letter. But the obvious lack of trust in T. interfered with his own performance, and after tolerating the situation for several months he left the plant. And here is an interesting point: The official letters of the administration about his transfer were not successful, but when T. himself started to pursue it the court sentence ceased to be an obstacle to his leaving the plant.

Given the current complex crime-bearing situation in the country it becomes obvious that the "legal status" of smoothbore weapons has to be changed. Let us hope that this will be recognized by our legislators who are completing their work on the new criminal code.

Economic

Prices for Foreign Automobiles Viewed

PM0405130590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by V. Remizov under the rubric "Problems and Arguments": "Foreign Brand at Three Times the Price"]

[Text] On our bad road there have appeared good automobiles that are not ours. And if initially in some places in Irkutsk or Chelyabinsk they were viewed with the same curiosity as a flying saucer, now the interest is acquiring a commercial nature: How much do they cost? Where and how can we buy them?

I hasten to make you happy—they can be bought. And not only abroad. For this you have to work at an enterprise with an outlet onto the world market. These are joint ventures, strong cooperatives, and state enterprises with competitive output. The first two are simpler, they are considered free. For instance, cooperatives, buying an automobile for their own hard currency, pay customs duty abroad (the coefficient is 4:0!), which means approximately R20,000 for an automobile costing $5,000.

Matters are more complex with regard to state enterprises. No so long ago they were allowed to leave a proportion of their currency profit for the acquisition of consumer goods abroad. A good thing, it would seem.

The Chelyabinsk tractor plant, whose output is in demand on the world market, bought 40 new Volvos for its workers. It paid $8,000 for each. What do you think happened next? Were they allocated at a working people's general meeting? No. They went to Moscow, to the State Committee for Prices, and asked... that prices be set for these automobiles so that they could finally acquire drivers. And the price was set—R20,000! They say the Chelyabinsk workers were very upset by this way of putting the question. And you can understand them: They had worked themselves, created the currency profit with their own hands, and "transformed" it themselves into automobiles... Why should we pay again? And why so much? Why has the state apparently stopped taking absolutely everything with one hand but is continuing to take everything with the other? After all, with each foreign automobile the state budget receives a sum (tax? duty?) no less than if a new Soviet automobile had been sold.

Specialists from the State Committee for Prices explain the matter like this: The currency left for enterprises belongs to them only hypothetically, after all the enterprise itself and its fixed and working capital, with which the output sold for hard currency was produced, are state property. The aim of the work of the State Committee for Prices is "to ensure equal conditions for all categories of the population on the domestic market" and to ensure the principle of social equality.

It is also curious that before citing a definitive sum, the economists from the State Committee for Prices produce complex accounts, compare the consumer properties of the foreign automobile with Soviet automobiles, and consider demand for them. That is they try to usurp with their work the work of the market which does not exist in our country, with its simple and clear logical. But no matter how you turn the price they set will always be economically speculative and explicable at best by political considerations.

Several pieces of advice for enterprises intending to purchase automobiles abroad would be better.

Before making a purchase, consult with the State Committee for Prices. They will explain which brand it is most advantageous to purchase from the viewpoint of the ruble payment. Then the automobiles should be purchased by specialists (not the director or the deputy director however eager they are to travel abroad). And one last point. Without knowing the level of world prices for automobiles many of our buyers make fools of themselves. Thus, one Soviet organization bought 40 Zhiguli automobiles (allegedly export models, in fact rejects!) at a cost of 3,800 foreign currency rubles. The world price for this model of Zhiguli (the real export model) is a maximum of 1,500 currency rubles.

In conclusion I shall cite an instance which, it seems to me, is a case of the best of both worlds. "Zarubezhstroy" bought 400 foreign automobiles (of nearly 50 brands) at the same time, for which it received a 20 percent discount. None of the vehicles are new (they were manufactured in 1983-1985) so with a complete set of spare parts they cost no more than 1,000 foreign currency rubles each. (Here it should be noted that under the conditions of a saturated market a vehicle rapidly becomes morally but not physically obsolete). Two birds were thus killed with one stone: Nearly all the workers were provided with good vehicles and, taking account of the wear and tear, for quite moderate sums.

Cost of Animal Husbandry Products Assessed

904D0108A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by L. Vashchukov: "The Market: How Much for What?"]

[Text] I am tired of this phrase, but again I must begin this survey with it: The situation with animal husbandry products on the consumer market remains unsatisfactory. In the first quarter of this year as compared to the same period of last year the quantity of meat products in state trade has increased by only one percent, and deliveries of dairy products did not increase at all. Moreover, there was one percent less butter and cheese.

Are you interested in knowing why this happened? Certain Union republics are not fulfilling their commitments for deliveries to the Union fund. For example they failed to deliver 34,000 tons of meat products.

Hence the rise in prices on the kolkhoz [collective farm] market. During the year prices of meat products rose by 16 percent, milk products by 11 percent, and eggs by two percent. Beef prices increased by 20 percent.

The average price of beef in the country as a whole is now R6.44 per kg. It is sold at R7.5 to 8.5 in the markets of Vladimir, Kostroma, Vologda, Kirov, Saransk, Tambov, Syzran, Ulyanovsk, Krasnodar, Nizhnyy Tagil, Zlatoust, Ufa, Izhevsk, Tomsk, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk-na-Amur, Kaliningrad, Lvov, Odessa, Kutaisi, Sukhumi, Yerevan, Yaroslavl, Gorkiy, Batumi, Kalinin, Tula, Arkhangelsk, Sverdlovsk, Tbilisi, Kishinev, and Riga; and at R9 to 10 in the markets of Chapayev, Vladivostok, Perm, and Berezniki.

The lowest prices—R3.5 to 3.9 per kg—are still in Omsk, Starobelsk, Buturlinovka, Chernigov, Belgorod, Kursk, and Taldy-Kurgan.

In the markets of Moscow the average price for beef was R10.64 per kg, and in Leningrad R10.5.

On an average for the country, pork prices increased by 20 percent as compared to the same period of last year. And in the markets of Latvia, the Far East, Belorussia, the Central, Northern Caucasus, and Northwestern regions, and in Lithuania prices rose by 23-41 percent. Prices dropped somewhat in the markets of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan: On the average a kilogram of pork now costs R5.81.

But there are also corners of the country where pork can be bought more cheaply. For example, it is sold at R3 to 3.5 in the markets of Shadrinsk, Kustanay, Taldy-Kurgan, Omsk, Buturlinovka, Kursk, Elista, Maykop, Taganrog, Kokchetav, Petropavlovsk, and Tselinograd.

In the markets of Moscow and Leningrad the average price of pork has remained high. In Moscow it is R10.5 and in Leningrad, R10.56 per kg.

The prices of veal exceeded last year's level by 32 percent, and mutton by 15 percent.

Poultry was also sold in the markets at prices six to eight percent higher than those in the spring of 1989.

Now about milk and dairy products.

The average price in the country as a whole for fresh milk was 84 kopeks per liter. Of the 174 cities where prices were registered, in 57 milk was sold at R1 and higher per liter. The highest prices—R1.2 to 3 per liter—were registered for the markets of Kaluga, Groznyy, Komsomolsk-na-Amur, Perm, Kutaisi, Sukhumi, and Tbilisi.

A low price level—30 to 40 kopeks per liter—was found in the markets of Bukhara, Kokand, Minusinsk, Vladimir-Volynsk, Borislav, and Termez.

In the markets of Moscow the average price of milk was R1.71 per liter.

The average price of butter in the country as a whole reached R8.18 per kilogram. But in Ryazan, Gorkiy, Tambov, Syzran, Penza, Ulyanovsk, Krasnodar, Ufa, Novosibirsk, Melitopol, Odessa, Saratov, Simferepol, and a number of other cities, butter was sold at R10-12 per kg.

Dear readers, you are sending SELSKAYA ZHIZN letters asking: When will prices begin to drop? I do not know this because you are asking the wrong person: Statisticians only register prices and have no influence on them.

Goskomstat Criticized for Useless Information

PM0205210190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Sociologist V. Deynekin commentary: "Information Inflation" carried under "Statistics and Our Commentary" rubric]

[Text] The USSR State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat] News and Publications Center has sent out to subscribers an economic survey entitled "The Social and Economic Development of the Union Republics in 1989." The print run of the brochure, which is a little over 40 pages long, amounts to 900 copies. The price of the brochure is twice as much as the state valuation for similar publications.

It seems that the USSR Goskomstat feels that inflation is in any case at least twice as great as the 7.5 percent declared for 1989 and has also fixed the price of its creation taking into account the realities of the economic situation—at the subscribers' expense, of course.

From the very first lines, the reader learns that "comsumer goods—including alcoholic beverages—were produced to the value of R426 million, or 7 percent more than in 1988." But what if one excludes the beverages? But there is no answer to that in the survey.

A meticulous person finds everything interesting. For example, how was the total value of the consumer goods produced calculated? By their prime cost, from wholesale prices, or retail prices? After all, the production, let us say, of a liter of vodka costs the state, according to unverified data, just three kopeks, but tens of millions of rubles' worth of this "comsumer good" is sold at a price hundreds of times greater. Therefore the question arises: Is this seven percent not a "dizzy" figure?

The government and the consumers are concerned about the overt increase in prices of comsumer goods. One would therefore like to know how many billions of rubles from the increase in output of nonfood goods which has been achieved (assessed at R16.4 billion) are indeed accounted for by an increase in the quantity of goods and how much comes from the increased price of those goods.

A multitude of such questions arise.

Here is an example. On the same third page we read: "...in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] the output of refrigerators and freezers was not ensured (the target was fulfilled 99.4 percent), likewise of washing machines (99.8 percent), electric vacuum cleaners (93 percent), electric kettles (96 percent), electric irons (86 percent)...." Let us not weary the reader with a further enumeration of what "has not been produced" here. To be quite honest none of this is to the point. Today everyone is interested not in the percentage fulfillment of a plan that has been defined no one knows how and calculated no one knows by whom, but rather they are interested in to what degree the demand for various consumer goods has been met. The purchaser, and that means all of us, is concerned about the list of the scarcest goods and how the demand for them is being satisfied.

There is nothing of the kind in the brochure. Should such information as the average monthly wage of workers and employees for each republic, or the average annual imcome of a member of a collective farm find its way into this kind of economic survey? Of course it should. They why does USSR Goskomstat not venture to include such information?

Much else that is of interest to us all is not to be found in the survey: data on size and turnover of the "shadow economies" in the republics, the scale of inflation within the republics and in the union in 1989, the cost of the standard "food shopping basket" in each region, and the sum which will ensure a bare subsistence in Lithuania, Moldavia, Armenia, and the RSFSR.

What is foisted upon us once again is something amorphous and undefined like "the average size of depoit in establishments of the USSR Savings Bank" and other unintelligible and otiose data.

For instance, in Armenia the average deposit as at 1 January 1990 amounted to R2,701, while in Tajikistan it was R1,294. What does this signify? Perhaps that the people in Armenia live almost twice as well as in Tajikistan or that there are more goods in Tajikistan and hence smaller savings deposits, while in Armenia there is nothing to buy? Alas. The infomation provided is akin to the kind of data about which people say "you can't get your teeth into it." The magnitude of an individual deposit has no direct dependence neither upon the level of our prosperity nor our income. In the Soviet Baltic republics for instance, men, women, and even children have deposits, while in Central Asia is is the men, the heads of households who by tradition, especially in rural localities, make the deposits. Moreover, in the majority of cases, one and the same individual may frequently have not one, but several deposits.

As a result it transpires that we are offered merely the average size of deposit accounted for by not one depositor which would at least still have some meaning, but per deposit book. An interesting figure of course but from which it is impossible to form even an oblique judgment about our life.

There is a footnote in the brochure : "If reproduced please mention USSR Goskomstat." The attributions have been made but the dissatisfaction remains. Therefore let me address myself to the workers of the USSR Goskomstat News and Publications Center who have moved over to economic accountability. Your work is good for nothing. It is difficult to make use of the information included in the economic survey. It is unsystematic, does not take account of the needs of the present day, and therefore it is impossible to find out the balance in trade and industrial relations between the republics, between the republics and the center, what proportion is accounted for by the cooperative sector and the mixed enterprises in the overall production of consumer goods, which republics are able to feed themselves, which have to be subsidized, who is in debt to whom for what and to what extent. Restructure yourselves, study the needs of the "information market" and then your publication will be beyond price. In the meantime you are setting the value of your labor in ruble terms above what it is worth.

Postponement of Market Will Worsen Problems

PM0405104790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 90 p 1

[Nikita Kirichenko article under the rubric "Front Page News": "Read in the Weekly KOMMERSANT"]

[Text] One of the main results of the discussion of the cardinal economic reform in the Presidential Council, on which Presidential Press Secretary A. Maslennikov has reported, is the decision not to expedite the transition to a market economy before the start of 1991.

This was also confirmed by President Gorbachev, who stated in one of his Urals speeches that it will take six-eight months "to study all the questions of radicalizing the economic reform."

Thus the implementation of the government program adopted in December last year formally continues.

It should be noted that it remains open to question whether it is at all possible to make the transition to the market by an administrative decision, which may be canceled or postponed, in conditions where commercial activity is developing rapidly in the country. In experts' opinion, a situation has arisen in the USSR today whereby the market is not yet taking shape but the economy has emerged from planned control. In this situation the postponement of the implementation of radical market reform measures may create additional difficulties in carrying out the reform and may also lead to an even greater deterioration of the country's economic situation.

In the first quarter of 1990 compared with the same period in 1989, the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] recorded for the first time in many years not simply a drop in production growth rates, but also a decline in the absolute amounts. Specifically, national income declined by two percent and the total volume of industrial output by 1.2 percent, and out of 164 basic types of output, the plan was fulfilled for only 56.

Results for 1989 and the first quarter of 1990 have shown the greatest divergence in recent years between plan indicators and actual output volumes. In conditions even of incomplete economic autonomy on the part of enterprises, both the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] and Ministry of Finance are beginning to lose the ability to really manage them, therefore no organization can now offer and implement a mechanism guaranteeing fulfillment of the plan.

The tax on wage increases, proposed by the government as one of its anti-inflation measures, in practice applied to barely one-fifth of the enterprises for which it was intended. The sale of five-percent treasury bonds tied up only 0.5 percent of the population's incomes.

Consequently Goskomstat noted an acceleration in the inflation rate. According to its statistics, in the first quarter of 1990 compared with the first quarter of 1989 the scale of cash emission grew by more than one-quarter. Taking into account that in 1989 the annual emission total was six times greater than the level in the first quarter (R18.3 billion as against R3 billion in the first quarter), then if the prevailing trend persists there will be at least 23 percent inflation by the end of 1990.

According to expert assessments, such a level of inflation accompanying the transition to free price-formation will inevitably lead to severalfold price increases, though its present level makes it possible to carry out a transition to the market accompanied by consumer price increases of 30-50 percent (50-100 percent, according to other assessments).

The point is that while the rate of inflation is relatively low, the consumer has an interest in getting rid of money quickly, so the producer raises prices in step with increased demand and confidently increases his profits. In conditions of high inflation, besides sharply growing clamorous consumer demand, an effect called "seller's hysteria" starts to operate. Every seller, when the purchasing power of money melts away before his very eyes, thinks that the very fact that he is selling goods when the state of the market is so bad is an exceptional phenomenon, and in this context he sharply hikes the price over the demand price in order to compensate for the losses in profit resulting from inflation. The sharply increased monetary emission in this case—needed to sustain purchasing power—leads to even greater inflation.

World experience shows that countries with a rapidly weakening currency automatically fall into a credit-boycott situation, and imports become more expensive by the day for these countries because of the falling currency exchange rate.

Thus by the start of next year the market economy will inherit from the planned economy worse inflation than exists now, which can only exacerbate the problems of the transitional period.

Even today the curbing of state prices is leading on the one hand to unprecedented growth in shortages, and on the other to a 20 percent rise in kolkhoz market prices (USSR Goskomstat press release No. 161 of 20 April 1990) and to a 150 percent rise in speculators' income (USSR Goskomstat press release No. 152 of 16 April).

According to All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion data, 34 percent of the population are forced to buy food products at kolkhoz [collective farm] markets in these conditions of shortages. According to USSR Goskomstat data, the average family lost R60 from its annual income as a result of dealings with speculators. (This is quite a lot when you consider that far from every family is able to buy goods at speculative prices.) In these conditions the population favors the introduction of ration cards and coupons. Today five percent of foodstuffs and seven percent of manufactured goods are sold through closed trade, and ration cards for meat and butter have been introduced in one city in five (out of 445).

The six-month postponement of the radical market reform also complicates the sociopolitical conditions for implementing it. Whereas at the end of 1988 around 40 percent of the population was in favor of introducing ration cards, at the start of 1990 the figure was already 58 percent. And although one cannot equate supporters of introducing cards with opponents of a market economy, all the same after a year over 50 million people were even further from understanding what kind of measures and means can improve the country's situation. Opposition to the economic reform is growing, and in this instance time is working against it.

Scientific

'Cosmos-2077' Satellite Launched 7 May

LD0805074190 Moscow TASS in English 0736 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 8 TASS—The artificial space satellite "Cosmos-2077," next in the series, was launched by the Soyuz booster-rocket in the Soviet Union on Monday.

The satellite carries scientific equipment designed to continue space exploration.

Apart from the scientific equipment, the satellite carries a radio system for the precise measurement of the orbit's elements and a radio-teiemetric system to transmit to the earth data about the operation of instruments and scientific equipment.

The equipment installed in the satellite operates normally.

The coordinating-computer center is processing the incoming information.

Progress 42 Docks With 'Mir' Complex

LD0805010190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0006 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 8 May (TASS)—The docking of the Progress-42 cargo craft with the "Mir" manned complex was accomplished at 0245 Moscow time on 8 May [2245 GMT 7 May].

The mutual search, rapprochement, approach, and docking were carried out with the aid of on-board automatic equipment. These processes were monitored by the Flight Control Center and also by cosmonauts Solovyev and Balandin.

The Progress-42 craft was docked to the complex via the Kvant module. Fuel for the station's combined power plant, foodstuffs, water, equipment, apparatus, and mail were delivered into orbit.

According to data from telemetric information and to the crew's reports, the on-board systems of the "Mir" manned complex are working normally. Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin feel well.

Cosmonauts Preparing for 1 Jun Module Lift-Off

LD0805082390 Moscow TASS in English 0803 GMT 8 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Rena Kuznetsova]

[Text] Moscow May 8 TASS—Soviet cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovev and Aleksandr Balandin, who have been working aboard the orbital complex "Mir" for almost three months now, have launched a new technological experiment at the gallar plant. The purpose of the experiment is to obtain zinc oxide in zero-gravity conditions.

Prior to this, they completed a lengthy experiment to grow gallium arsenide monocrystals. This experiment was begun by the fifth resident crew—Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov, who were replaced by Solovev and Balandin. In all, 297 grammes of gallium arsenide were obtained at the gallar plant, TASS was told at the USSR chief space administration (glavkosmos).

Specialists at the Nauchnyi Tsentr science and production association in the city of Zelenograd near Moscow are currently conducting the analysis of this valuable composite material needed by the radioelectronic industry.

According to tentative estimates of foreign scientists, these materials obtained in zero gravity conditions may cost 3.5 million dollars per kilogramme on the world market.

When the Kristall technological module is launched, possibilities for space technology will be appreciably boosted. The Kristall module is scheduled for lift-off on June 1, 1990. This module, a kind of a microplant to obtain crystals in space conditions, will operate as part of the "Mir" orbital complex.

Military

Zaykov Visits Western Group Forces

LD0605123890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1140 GMT 6 May 90

[Text] Berlin, 6 May (TASS)—The visit by L.N. Zaykov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the Western Group of Forces ended today. During his four-day visit he met the officers and men of units and detachments belonging to the group. He also met workers and office staff, and members of the families of servicemen. Questions connected with the further improvement of combat training, the life and leisure of servicemen, and their social welfare were discussed during the meetings. The course of perestroyka within the Armed Forces and ways of increasing the role of military councils and of all army communists in stepping up the combat readiness of troops, tightening discipline, and intensifying educational work were also reviewed.

At group headquarters there was a meeting with the military council. Army General B.V. Snetkov, commander in chief of the group of forces, and Colonel General A.N. Kolinichenko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate, reported on the military-political situation in the region and the results of the forces' winter training. They noted that the forces' level of operational-tactical training, weapons and technical equipment reliably guarantees the fulfilment of all set tasks.

L.N. Zaykov took part in the party conference of one of the formations within the group and delivered an address. He spoke in detail about the party's internal and external policy at the present stage of perestroyka, singling out the tasks of preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress, stemming from the platform of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Central Committee secretary visited places where fighting took place during the Berlin operation. He toured the Karlshorst museum of the history of the capitulation of fascist Germany, as well as the museums and rooms of combat glory maintained by formations and units. Flowers were laid at the memorial to the liberating Soviet soldiers at Berlin's Treptow Park.

Prosecutor Confirms No Change in Spring Draft

PM0605171390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 May 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Draft Not Being Postponed"]

[Text] A session of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office Collegium was held the other day to discuss the state of supervision of compliance with the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service." The collegium session would have appeared to be a routine event, but for two days now the telephones have not stopped ringing in the offices of prosecutor's office and military commissariat officials.

What is the problem? On 4 May KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reported that the regular draft for active military service had been postponed for a month and that this information was obtained by the newspaper at the collegium session. Draftees and those who are about to be transferred to the reserve immediately rushed to their telephones....

Your TASS correspondent was informed in the Main Military Prosecutor's Office that the draft, like the transfer to the reserve, will be carried out as usual in April through June this year. In other words, within the time frame indicated in USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 305 of 29 March 1990. No changes, not even temporary changes, have been made to this.

General Assails Lack of Perestroyka in Army Body

PM0405092790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 2

["Viewpoint" article by General L. Shershnev: "Generals, Prove Your Worth!—General Leonid Shershnev Invites His Colleagues"]

[Text] For a long time the problem of the relations between servicemen and society appeared to be of no concern to us. The army's prestige seemed indisputable. However, perestroyka suddenly exposed many things. With amazement and dissatisfaction society learned about the many serious ailments of our army.

The army proved unready for such a turn of events. One of the reasons for this was that the mechanism which is called upon to be the connecting link and a regulator of relations between the army and society—that is, the political organs—was unable to restructure itself and did not work. It emerged that many political officers do not see this as their role.

I will go on to express my personal point of view, with which many people will disagree, but I am deliberately raising this controversial issue in the hope that my colleages will continue this discussion.

The breakdown in the work of top-level political organs at a crucial stage of social development is no accident. Perestroyka has essentially had no impact on the Main Political Directorate and the entire system of political organs. The "commissar staff" has no precise concept of perestroyka, nor have any mechanisms for the conduct of party political and political education work been elaborated. Despite the need to change the structure and content of this work, the only change is the introduction into currency of the vocabulary of perestroyka.

Political organs have demonstrated their inability effectively to combat negative phenomena in the army, especially bullying. Incidentally, it was journalists rather than political officers who exposed this problem and pointed out its sociopolitical dangers. The formalism geared to window dressing that has become established in the Army and the criteria for the assessment of labor force political officers to gloss over reality. And the picture is the same everywhere. This applies especially to problems of the social protection of cadres of servicemen and reservists and members of their families. The feeling of a lack of social protection and of injustice is one of the main reasons for the departure from the army of young, talented officers able to think along unorthodox lines, and this, incidentally, directly undermines the troops' combat capability.

And finally, about the key issue today—the problem of the army and society in conditions of the exacerbation of interethnic relations, social tension, and instability.

In July of last year I submitted a memorandum-report to the chief of the Main Political Directorate which was devoted to new approaches toward organizing the army's work among the population and to bringing its intellectual potential into play with a view to forestalling and resolving conflicts by political, peaceful means. The memorandum proposed in particular the establishment of "rapid response" ideological formations, officers for liaison with the public, sociologists, ethnographers, psychologists, and cultural and other specialists, and the training of cadres for this kind of peacemaking and constructive work. The response to my proposals was excuses: "If the Central Committee tells us to, we will do it... they know better, the army has no internal function..." Furthermore, permission was not given to discuss the proposals in the collective, and the author of the memorandum was removed from his post. I want you to

understand me correctly: I am acting out of a sense of grievance or ambition—there is a job to be done, we have to learn from our mistakes. Otherwise....

One of the problems of the Main Political Directorate is the lack of a system of political forecasting. It seems to me that the Main Political Directorate should have forecast the political consequences for the Armed Forces, society, and the country of the decisions to use troops and of the nature of their actions in Afghanistan, the Transcaucasus republics, and elsewhere, and on this basis submitted proposals to the top political leadership. After all, these were not situations where without thinking, you click your heels and reply "Yes, sir!" with a blank look in your eyes.

All this leads to the question: "Do we need political organs, especially in view of the amendment of Article 6 of the Constitution?"

The need for the existence of a special sociopolitical institution in the Armed Forces to ensure the army's constant readiness to protect national and state interests, irrespective of what this institution is called, is beyond question. At the same time I am convinced that the political organs in their present shape have outlived their usefulness.

The experience of Warsaw Pact member states' armies is interesting in this context. In Bulgaria the transformed political organs are referred to as educational work organs; in Hungary as organs of educational and social policy; in the GDR as organs for civic work; in Poland as educational work organs; in Romania as organs for patriotic education and culture; and in Czechoslovakia as organs for education and culture. Officers for educational work have been instituted in the troops. The activities of party organizations have been suspended in the allied armies, although servicemen are allowed to take part in the work of any party organization at their place of residence.

Where should the perestroyka of the political organs in our army begin? It should begin in the most difficult and sensitive area—with the top echelon of political officers, with us generals. Many of us were shaped during the period of stagnation, we have lost touch with life and gotten too used to honors and adulation, we have forgotten how to communicate with soldiers, and have succumbed to "star mania." Each one of us must make a choice at this very crucial moment: To take his leave, or "having recovered," start working in the new fashion. We must tackle recertification with the participation of the Party Control Committee, the relevant Supreme Soviet commission, and the public, through a process of certification, secret ballot, and so forth. Subsequently those who pass the recertification and remain in the service will help to carry out the process at the intermediate and grassroots level of the political organs. If the reorganization is started from below, without carrying out changes at the top, the leadership will nonetheless form a structure from people who most resemble it and suit it, and everything will come to nothing, as so often before.

Officers Cited on Problems of Demobilization

AU0405093790 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 4 May 90 p 3

[Pierre Simonitsch dispatch from Moscow: "Red Army in Crisis: The Old Ones Must Go, the Young Ones Want to Go"]

[Text] The Soviet military granted DER STANDARD insight into their problems with surprising frankness. A meeting in the Defense Ministry, which took almost four hours, was attended by Colonel General Aleksey Mironov, Major General Igor Malakhov, and Colonel Viktor Samnelov—the heads of the Cadre Organization Main Department of the Soviet Armed Forces. Colonel Boris Belanin translated excellently into French.

Strong Distrust

Three-star General Mironov says that he joined the army in Voronesh in 1942 when he was 16. He has held his current post for 10 years. Obviously, for him it is not easy to deal with the new situation. He calls the disarmament negotiations a "noble undertaking," which should not involve any haggling. The U.S. demands seem to be excessive to him, since the Soviet Union had to make so many sacrifices to achieve the strategic balance. He thinks that German reunification is "unavoidable," even though it fills him with some mistrust. "If mankind permits aggression to emanage again from Germany in the future, it will deserve it," he says bitterly.

General Malakhov speaks about the problems caused by the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men, including 100,000 officers, which Gorbachev has ordered. He refers to the mentality of the military, who have grown accustomed to a certain rhythm of life. Therefore, one starts by demobilizing those officers who have already reached retirement age.

A captain is entitled to retirement at the age of 40, a lieutenant colonel at 45, and a colonel at 50. They must have served for 20 to 25 years. In order to make it easier for them to lay down their arms, pensions were raised from 30 percent of the last salary to 40 percent. Now a draft law is being prepared, which is to fix pensions of the military at 75 percent of their active salary.

Breaking of Contracts

In the past the army and the arms industry paid considerably higher wages than the civilian sector. This advantage has largely been lost. Officers point out that a lieutenant earns R300 per month, while the Moscow Transport Authority offers a bus driver R400. The generals complain that young officers are increasingly breaking their contracts to work in one of the mushrooming private cooperatives.

The army is now providing new material incentives to keep the young officers. The Defense Ministry leases real estate (one to two hectares in villages; 0.8 hectares in urban areas) to career soldiers and provides them with a building loan of R25,000. If they stay in the army for 15 years, they need repay only half of the loan. Those who prefer a rented apartment, receive half of the rent from the Ministry after 20 years of service. Other privileges are special shops in the garrisons, vacation homes, and medical treatment in military hospitals.

According to the generals, 70 percent of the officers who quit service retire regularly and 15 percent have asked for early retirement. The other 15 percent break their contracts or the army itself wants to get rid of them. Most former officers are looking for new jobs to improve their pension. Of the 73,000 officers who were looking for a job in an enterprise via the registry office of the Defense Ministry last year about 70,000 have found new jobs, Colonel Samnelov says.

Wanted Specialists

Generally, the demobilized military men do not have any problems with finding a suitable job, because in the army they were trained as specialists in one field or the other. The integration of the officers' wives is more difficult. Most of them have interrupted their professional lives for decades because they were transferred to remote garrisons with their husbands. As a result, their pension claims have been reduced.

The greatest problem for the active and retired soldiers is housing. At the moment, the Defense Ministry is building 85,000 apartments per year, but the demand already exceeds 115,000. In principle, the city administrations are obligated to provide the officers with housing. In practice, however, they just show their empty pockets.

Coveted Kiev

According to the army newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20,000 families of Soviet military men are currently without housing in Kiev. The situation is expected to escalate as a result of the return of further soldiers from abroad. General Mironov said that these figures are grossly exaggerated. Furthermore, the situation in Kiev is something special, because all demobilized military men want to spend their retirement in the capital city of sunny Ukraine. In contrast, Mironov thinks that information according to which about 10,000 soldiers who returned from abroad have been accommodated in tent cities on the Crimea is plausible.

The military is concerned about the decline of its reputation among the population. In the past an officer was a person enjoying respect, to whom one turned for help in times of need. Today it may happen that persons in uniform are accosted in the streets. An older officer relates with dismay that in the subway a woman had rudely demanded that he relinquish his seat to her. The military thinks that the press is partly responsible for the loss in prestige, because it does not report objectively. One can constantly read about drug abuse, violence, and denigrating treatment of recruits. However, the examples always come from the motley engineering units, while the exemplary elite units are not considered worth a story by the newspapers.

The war in Afghanistan, the actions of the military during the unrest in Azerbaijan, and the use of poison gas in Tbilisi have not covered the Soviet Army with glory. Criticism from the inside is difficult, because trade unions are not permitted. Even though a group called "Shchit" (Shield) has formed, it is headed by retired officers, who are not permitted to engage in political activities in the barracks. The only permitted bodies for discussion are the officers' assemblies, which are chaired by the respective unit commander.

The recruits of 1990 are less humble than their predecessors. Already now a widespread discussion has started about whether the Soviet Armed Forces are to be turned into a professional army. Many of the younger officers are for such a transformation. However, they are also aware of the fact that there is no money for this. A professional army would cost three times as much as the current Soviet Army. As a rule, the generals are in favor of retaining general compulsory military service. Apart from basic considerations, they do not see any reason to pay a real salary for menial work for which an ordinary soldier receives a monthly salary of R7.50 during his two years of service.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Discusses Lithuanian Situation

LD0805114190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 8 May 90

[Address by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council; venue, date not available due to initial indistinct passage—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage indistinct] You, our electors, have not authorized us to rescind independence, to give in to the government of another state which would then become a legitimate government in Lithuania, although it was up to now not legitimate. We cannot and will not do this. But that government, which should be called the Kremlin's government, wishes to bring Lithuania to its knees without thinking what this means to people, without thinking about its responsibility for the fate of the peoples, for everything that can happen in that Soviet Union itself, in Russia, what consequences the devastation of Lithuania's economy will have in other places, to the economy of Russia and the Russian people. [passage omitted]

And now we encounter a new attack, the economic blockade. [passage omitted] Here, it seems, the Kremlin leaders hope that some unrest would be created in Lithuania. There economic war against Lithuania is at the same time a political, psychological, and propaganda war. It may be that the Kremlin government has obtained an unsigned agreement from the Western states [words indistinct] strangle Lithuania. We will see; it may happen that they will calmly continue their policy. They also endeavor to isolate Lithuania politically, to explain to the world that the Lithuanians are themselves to blame that they did not wish to live in slavery, that they started rebelling, and therefore they must be punished.

But not many people in the world think like this. We have many supporters. But the governments of these states behave very ambiguously, allowing the Kremlin leaders to treat Lithuania as they do now. These leaders wish to convince us that the world has given us up, that it does not pay attention, that we are alone and will be forced to obey.

Maybe they do not sufficiently realize how the Lithuanians are; they do not know our nation.

What means are at our disposal to oppose this economic war and spiritual pressure? We have established a commission of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers for the struggle against the consequences of the blockade. Some decisions have been made to ration consumption and help us to survive for a longer period while looking for other sources of supply. [passage omitted] These efforts are hampered by the order to the railways not to carry goods to Lithuania. To carry them from Lithuania, yes, but to carry into Lithuania, no. They who wish to obtain our goods start worrying, wish to arrange a different transport, or will start protesting against this self-will of the central government.

From other countries, fro the West, we are receiving medical assistance. We wish also to arrange trade in oil or oil products and expand Lithuania's ties. But time is needed for this purpose; we must survive. Our potentialities are based, above all, on the understanding of the people. Our tasks are thrift, [words indistinct]. The prices of bicycles have subtantially increased [words indistinct]. We must learn better to collect waste paper and other secondary raw materials, if we wish to survive, if we wish to be masters of our life. In many places people demonstrate examples of such thrift and care. Let this movement spread to the whole of Lithuania and we will survive and win this battle. [passage omitted]

Some enterprises manage rather well, some experience difficulties. In some places people do not do much, just complain and accuse each other. A control is needed—in some stores the goods are present, but they are not for sale, or they find their way from the stores to the market, where they are sold at increased prices. Why is there a shortage of bread in some place, although bakeries are working? People worry. Maybe transport should be improved. Because transport for the distribution of food has sufficient quantities of fuel, the state does not restrict it. Maybe there are misunderstandings, or maybe somebody does it intentionally. [passage omitted] All organizations should express themselves very firmly against those gentlemen in the Kremlin who wish to create unemployment in Lithuania. International workers' organizations, too, should lodge their protests, defend Lithuanian workers. The Lithuanian workers must also take care of this, they must be in solidarity with the workers in the Soviet Union and other countries. [passage omitted]

I would like to say a few words about today. Today is the 45th anniversary of the capituation of fascist Germany. [passage omitted] That war and its end were very strange. Western democracies, wishing to defend themselves against Western fascism, had to establish alliance with Stalin's fascism. [passage omitted] That war has not yet ended. There are still occupied countries, peace treaties have not been signed. But great strides, especially in recent years, have been made. The whole of Eastern Europe is becoming free, the Baltic states are also becoming free. Germany is uniting, a peace treaty will be signed with it. We will have to take part in everything, and we will fight so that we are not left out of these agreements.

And about 9 May, I wish to repeat that this is a day of rest established by law. [passage omitted] This year the Estonian enterprises and institutions, and also in Latvia, will be working on that day for the benefit of Lithuania; the income of that day will go to the Lithuanian antiblockade fund. We in Lithuania should think whether we can have a rest on this day. [passage omitted] We have decided not to change the law and not abolish

the day of rest, and the workers' collectives must themselves decide whether they will rest or work. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Volunteer Detachments Assessed

90UN1720A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent S. Bykhun—special to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA: "'Savanoriai.' What Is It?"]

[Text] **After the decision of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet on the secession of Lithuania from the USSR and the adoption of other acts contravening the USSR Constitution, commercially printed announcements by "Sajudis" appeared on the streets of the cities and settlements of the republic calling on males between the ages of 19 and 40 to enlist in the volunteer detachments of "Savanoriai" ("Volunteers"). Almost at the same time, the Commission for the Defense of the Land and Internal Affairs of the republic was set up at the Lithuania Supreme Soviet.**

The response of the people of the republic to these actions by "Sajudis" was mixed. Some began to consider them "commandos," members of the storm troops of "Sajudis" while others believe them to be the true patriots of the Lithuanian people and their protectors. Looking for an answer to this question, TASS first approached A. Butkiavicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian parliament's Commission for the Defense of the Land and Internal Affairs of the Republic and deputy of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Bykhun] Perhaps, you have heard contradictory opinions concerning the new organization "Savanoriai." Could you outline briefly its goals and tasks?

[Butkiavicius] First of all, I would not refer to "Savanoriai" as an organization as such because for now it has neither its own structure nor documents which regulate its activities. Nonetheless, "Savanoriai" headquarters, which act independently based on the emerging situation, indeed exist in our republic at the bodies of local self-government.

Secondly, these volunteers work in close contact with representatives of the internal affairs organs of the republic. In other words, they are just like public-order squads [druzhinniki].

[Bykhun] However, as is known, the representatives of "Savanoriai" also guard many buildings and facilities which generally is not the responsibility of public-order squads.

[Butkiavicius] Indeed, this is so. However, times are changing. At present, the situation in Lithuania is complex. The militia alone cannot cope with all the violators of law.

[Bykhun] For example, what equipment do they have access to and what transportation vehicles may be issued to the volunteers when they go on duty to guard a particular facility?

[Butkiavicius] As a rule, they go on duty together with the militia rather than alone. Therefore, there is no need to take care of any equipment or provide transportation vehicles for them.

[Bykhun] Are they paid for being on duty?

[Butkiavicius] In most cases, they are not.

[Bykhun] Can you say how many volunteers there are in Vilnius and in the republic as a whole?

[Butkiavicius] In Vilnius, there are 350 people. As far as all of Lithuania is concerned, I cannot say precisely, but it is somewhere around 2,000. However, this work is in progress.

[Bykhun] Who can join "Savanoriai"?

[Butkiavicius] Any citizen of the republic of Lithuania regardless of his nationality, party affiliation, or religion. The main point is for him to recognize the independence of Lithuania and observe its laws.

[Bykhun] As is known, "Savanoriai" also existed in 1918 and 1919, when Soviet power was established in the republic. At the time, members of this organization dealt cruelly with Red Army men, including those of Lithuanian nationality, the soldiers of the former tsarist army, and the troops of the Kaiser. To your mind, is there some kind of continuity and tradition in restoring the name of this organization?

[Butkiavicius] We should keep in mind the fact that the organization at that time was a military one whereas this one, which incidentally is still being formed, is utterly civilian. Therefore, any analogy is out of the question.

We have asked a prominent lawyer of the republic, Doctor of Legal Sciences Professor I. Kucherov to comment on this interview. This is what he said:

"At a congress of USSR people's deputies, it was stated publicly that national commando formations are being created in the Baltic republics. At the time, some USSR people's deputies from Lithuania and Latvia put on airs of insulted virtue. Refutations, statements, and charges of insulting national dignity came in a stream. Attacks against those who refute the 'justifiers' are a characteristic feature of the style of the Lithuanian 'Sajudis' movement. The same kind of 'diplomacy'—ambiguity, reticence, and half-truths—is present in the responses of A. Butkiavicius. 'Squad members,' 'volunteers,' 'protectors'—all of these are synonyms for "Sajudis" commandos.

"Individual leaders of 'Sajudis,' especially V. Landsbergis, the current chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania whose father was a member of "Savanoriai" in

the past and in 1941 signed a message of greetings to Hitler, 'the liberator of Lithuania and savior of European culture,' stress the continuity of the 1918 volunteers and the current ones. Lithuanian security battalions which carried out punitive operations in Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Smolensk area were also recruited from among such volunteers during the Hitlerite occupation of Lithuania. After the liberation of Lithuania by the Soviet Army, the remnants of volunteers from the security battalions made up the backbone of the so-called rezistencija (resistance) of 'the forest brothers'—bandit formations involved in an armed struggle against Soviet power....

"At present, the leaders of 'Sajudis' refer to the volunteers of the past as Lithuanian partisans. Streets are renamed in their honor. Thus, Red Army Avenue in Vilnius has been renamed "Savanoriai" Avenue. In a suburb of Kaunas, Komsomolskaya [Youth Communist League] Street has been named after one of the bloodthirsty thugs of the rezistencija, an agent of Hitler's intelligence.

"The Supreme Soviet of Lithuania is discussing the issue of rehabilitating 'the forest brothers,' paying them compensation, and establishing servicemen's retirement benefits for them. Therefore, A. Butkiavicius was not being straight when he maintained that 'any analogy is out of the question....'

"At present, the 'Savanoriai' detachments are recruited from young people fooled by the "Sajudis" nationalist propaganda. They fill out special questionnaires which, along with the usual particulars, include questions aimed at, so to say, determining loyalty to 'the independent Lithuanian state.' The commandos are led by military specialists, retired officers. There are many athletes among the instructors, who mainly offer training in methods of unarmed hand-to-hand combat. In a word, 'Savanoriai' is not at all an innocuous game of public-order squads, as A. Butkiavicius tried to represent it. This is the foundation of Lithuanian armed formations of which the functionaries of 'Sajudis' have long been dreaming. Besides, something like storm troops, special units of the militia, are also being staffed with them. In the local press, they have even discussed their uniforms, and pictures have been published. According to available data, members of the special units of these 'public-order squads' guarding the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania are paid a salary of R400 a month.

"Finally, on the legality of setting up 'Savanoriai' detachments. It is known that the issues of armed protection of the country and providing security for the populace belong in the jurisdiction of the USSR. However, on the night of 10-11 March, the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania under the "Sajudis" baton rescinded the USSR Constitution, the Lithuanian SSR Constitution, and the laws of the USSR on the territory of Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania found itself formally in a legal vacuum though a majority of the people of the republic continues to live according to Soviet laws, despite the efforts of the republic's current leadership. This vacuum situation creates the background for violations of law and for willfulness."

IZVESTIYA Reports on Effect of Rationing

PM0805120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Dispatch from Vilnius by Leonid Kapelyushniy under the rubric "Direct Link. IZVESTIYA correspondents report": "Lithuania Transfers to Rationing"]

[Text] Lithuanian trade is transferring to rationing for the population: flour—2 kg per person per month, cereals—2 kg, butter—2 kg, sugar—2 kg....

How spacious, it turns out, are the premises of Lithuanian stores! Even a couple of weeks back, complaining that there was nothing there, we wheeled the trolleys with difficulty between the rows of containers piled with all kinds of things that apparently were not needed by anyone. Alas, within two weeks, all these things have disappeared.

As a matter of fact, it should be the other way around. At the very beginning of the economic confrontation, you will recall, there was even an optimistic prediction that there would be more goods on the counters—we were going to stop feeding Moscow and Leningrad. But here we are with rationing.

There is also an innovation which has, so to say, banished workers from the IZVESTIYA correspondents' center in Lithuania into a corner. The accounts department sends us our earnings by postal order. And since the end of April, postal orders over R200 are not cashed. A total of R500 a month is paid out of savings banks. Checks and letters of credit not issued in Lithuania are not cashed. Bonds from 1982 are not bought. Admittedly when you leave Lithuania, to go on vacation, for instance, you can take a check with you. But what if tomorrow the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] meets the ban with a ban of its own?

The reason for the restrictions is that there is no money. The Gosbank has stopped supplying paper money, and a dangerous reef has formed in the shallow waters of deficit....

Despite the small rations, there are a lot of vehicles on Vilnius streets, and public transport is running regularly. The announcement that 20 Lithuanian oil wells will be worked again in May has caused optimism among the people.

It has been decided to reequip berths for oil tankers in the port of Klaipeda. In July, Lithuania will be ready to receive foreign gasoline and oil by sea. Existing capacities can handle 11,000 tonnes. If there is a switch to buying fuel for cash, this will cost the republic $5 million annually. However, oil prices are falling.... Prime Minister K. Prunskiene's trip to foreign countries promises

to secure assistance from oil companies, so Lithuanian radio and television report....

It must be said that there is no loss of spirit or optimism in Lithuania, and the propaganda machinery, which is working harder than ever, is raising spirits and keeping them up.

Does Landsbergis' government intend to accept the USSR president's condition and repeal the decisions of 10-12 March, which contradict the USSR Constitution, and start holding talks? Foreign radios broadcast reports to the effect that apparently yes, Vilnius is prepared to sit down at the negotiating table if Moscow is willing. K. Prunskiene is even quoted to that effect at a press conference in Canada.

V. Landsbergis stated at a press conference 2 May that there can be no question of repealing the act of independence or of "freezing" it. As far as the other decisions are concerned, their suspension could be discussed, but Lithuania does not intend to repeal the whole list.

Lithuanian Deputy Interviewed on Blockade

LD0505170290 Moscow Maritime Service in Russian 1200 GMT 5 May 90

[Interview with Academician Eduardas Vilkas, Lithuanian Supreme Council Deputy, by (Vladas Norgailo), special Lithuanian correspondent, in Vilnius; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [(Norgailo)] The parliament of the Lithuanian republic begins each working day with a roundup of the economic situation, and this roi ndup is like a summary of battlefield operations. Again today there were reports of a number of enterprises stopping work due to shortages of raw materials, of the very strict rationing of electricity, and of train loads that have gotten stuck somewhere, carrying goods which were not on the list of measures adopted by the president and Government of the USSR. During the break, I interviewed one of the deputies, Academician Eduardas Vilkas, for Radio Atlantika. Over to you: Some deputies are now forming the impression that the parliamentarians need only embark upon certain political concessions to Moscow and the economic sanctions will be lifted. They'll be back to trading with our neighbors. What is your own opinion?

[Vilkas] We must make political concessions of some kind. Without them, we just won't make any headway. I should, however, like to emphasize that this does not in any way mean, so to speak, that we are giving up. I intend to speak and say [words indistinct].

[(Norgailo)] I saw you, academician, on the "Vremya" program. I admit it was only for a few seconds, but what you said was left hanging in mid-air. I would like you to repeat what was not shown on secreen.

[Vilkas] The "Vremya" program. When they called, I said: I want nothing to do with you, because you'll edit out everything good and leave the bad in. Why do I need that? Well, they claimed they were the people who make "Seven Days," a program that is of course significantly better, and I agreed. They asked: What is your opinion of the blockade? I said that first of all it is an unlawful act. Its unlawfulness lies in the fact that there is a plan endorsed by the USSR Supreme Soviet along with the budget, and that plan guarantees deliveries. The president has therefore exceeded his authority by violating the decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. That is where the unlawfulness lies. It follows from this that we must immediately begin to count the losses that we shall sustain as a result of the blockade and present a bill according to the appropriate procedures. This is also needed in order for our people to know who is at fault here. Then, there was the sentence that this is, evidently, affecting the mood of some people and the behavior of certain politicians, but before that was the sentence that I do not think that the blockade will bring Lithuania to its knees, and this is something I should like to repeat. The people are capable of withstanding perhaps even a more complex blockade.

I don't know whether the USSR leadership would gain anything from a strict blockade, any political dividends. It is doomed, quite simply, to failure, and all the more so when it is not just Lithuania that is bearing the losses. If Lithuania has losses of one billion, that means losses of something like ten billion for the Soviet Union. As a result of the austerity of our economic system, all the plans, so to speak, there is nothing in reserve, so that the sudden disorder here will communicate itself to the entire Soviet Union, and that wave will grow and grow. It will be in the reigon of ten billion. Let Soviet people be aware of this, that it means not having the regular rise in pensions. One must know the price of every adventure.

[(Nogailo)] Mr. Vilkas, you are an eminent economist and academician. Now you have become an active politician. What do you think? Could the government have foreseen Moscow's harsh economic measures?

[Vilkas] Neither the government nor, even less so, parliament was ready for an economic blockade. I might remind you that even during the elections and earlier, I spoke about this and said that we should prepare ourselves for it. I would say that many people didn't listen. I am in favor of our carrying out all kinds of economic and political work to stand our ground. And I don't actually mean the blockade. If you remember the forties, the next step should be the masses, disguised or not, going into the streets to try and overthrow the legitimately elected authorities. We have to work toward neutralizing that next step. My own view is that the people are prepared to endure and bear everything to gain what they want. We are too defenseless in every sense, economically, military, whatever, and only a political solution can save us. It is that political solution that we must look for, and there is no doubt that this cannot be done without taking into account the interests and opinions of the other side.

Oil Supplies Redistributed After Blockade

LD2804100290 Moscow TASS in English 0849 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 28 TASS—Soviet areas left without supplies from oil refineries in Lithuania, which has been denied crude oil deliveries pending the revokation of secession-oriented bills by its parliament, are being provided with fuel from other sources.

Following the cut-off to Lithuania, surplus crude oil supplies have been redistributed among major oil refineries in the heart of Russia, including those in Gorkiy, Yaroslavl, Ryazan and Kirishi. Deliveries were also increased to oil refineries in Bashkiriya and Belorussia (Polotsk and Mozyr). Their operational capacity enables them to cope with the increased workload easily.

Although the Mazejka oil refinery in Lithuania was left without raw materials and consequently stopped fuel deliveries to its regular clients in Russia's Kaliningrad region as well as in Latvia and Estonia, the Soviet State Supply Committee has taken measures to make up for the shortfalls.

Extra fuel is being supplied to these areas by pipe and rail.

Abandoned Oil Wells To Be Reactivated

LD2704123590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 26 Apr 90

[Text] The biggest problem for Lithuania is oil. In the past oil deposits have been prospected in our country. These deposits amount to about five million tonnes of oil. In western Lithuania, mostly in Klaipeda, Silute, and Kretinga Rayons, there are over 20 abandoned wells. At the beginning of May the first well will be operated, and later all others. According to the estimates of experts, they could produce in several months about 460 tonnes of oil per day, and in the autumn this quantity would be doubled.

Lithuania uses over 16,000 tonnes of oil per day. Lithuanian oil would be used mostly in agriculture. It contains small quantities of sulphur, therefore it pollutes the atmosphere in smaller doses. It is expected that the present oil wells will be used for several decades.

Lithuanian Free Trade Unions Begin To Organize

904F0146A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 1

[Special correspondent F. Yemchenko report on Lithuanian Free Trade Unions Congress: "Without Tackling the Main Point"]

[Text] Vilnius—"Guests from a neighboring country are present at our congress," one delegate began his speech with these words. "I therefore appeal to everyone to refrain from criticism of the practices in what is for us a foreign state."

The hall greeted this proposal with applause. In just this proper form the speaker immediately made it understood that the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] officials invited to the congress should understand their role at this forum and the fact that they were here in this hall thanks to the exceptional courtesy of the hosts.

The organizers of and many of the participants in the congress altogether, it should be noted, were very assiduous in emphasizing their independence and freedom. References to the AUCCTU or the Soviet trade unions were heard only when it was necessary to stress the utter groundlessness of a particular proposal.

"I would like to call your attention, dear colleagues," it was heard from the rostrum in such cases, "to the fact that we could once again descend to the practice that has become firmly established in the Soviet trade unions."

Such a passage would be entirely sufficient to "demolish" a proposal or reject infelicitous wording. And the very concept of the Lithuanian Confederation of Free Trade Unions delivered by L. Radzyavichyus, present chairman of the republic's trade union center, was arranged very distinctively. Almost all its propositions were based on a rejection of past experience: All that is recorded in the USSR Trade Unions Charter and AUCCTU program documents is bad and worthless, but all that the Confederation of Free Trade Unions will exhibit will be fine. The speaker did not once mention here the changes that are taking place today in our country's trade union movement. The constant references to "yesterday" were necessary for L. Radzyavichyus, I believe, so that those present could evaluate how far the present Lithuanian trade union leaders have gone in their theoretical searchings.

"The practice of foreign trade unions is very rich," L. Radzyavichyus tried to convince his audience, "we will find therein all that we need. It is no accident that we use the term 'free trade unions.' We see our place as being in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions."

We shall not dispute this viewpoint, the more so in that any experience is the property of mankind. Studying it and adopting it is always useful. We are talking about something else. Is the present structure of the Lithuanian trade unions really capable of more effectively defending the working people's rights and social interests? This cannot be said as yet, alas, despite all my respect for the active supporters of perestroyka. And declarations, even the most promising, cannot serve as reliable protection.

USSR People's Deputy Y. Visakavichyus, operator at the "Azotas" Ionava Production Association, spoke well in this connection, incidentally:

"All our lives we have been hearing from trade union activists nothing but promises that they would defend our interests. But in practice, nothing. What have our new leaders done? As yet just one thing—they have done

away with the Council of Trade Unions, which could at least somewhat influence the departments and enterprise management."

Y. Visakavichyus' speech enunciated, in our view, what is currently troubling the workforce. The working people fear, not without reason, for their future. Some political leaders are not concealing their intention to restore the bourgeois system and switch the economy onto a capitalist track. The cohesion and consolidation of the trade union forces are essential in this situation. And it is at this time that leaders of the trade union movement have quickly embarked upon a "game" in which it is not difficult to detect an aspiration to sort out their portfolios as quickly as possible. It is difficult, you will agree, to justify by a desire "to speed up perestroyka in Lithuania's trade unions" the fact that the draft documents submitted to the congress were not preliminarily discussed in the primary organizations and did not earn the working people's approval.

As a result representatives of the Fishermen's, Airmen's and Medical Workers unions refused to join the new organization.

"We believe that the new trade unions should be created not from above but in the work force," S. Golyatskene, chairman of the Medical Workers Trade Union, shared her thoughts with us. "This is why we support the organization of a union of physicians, nurses, and pharmacists. Workers should unite on a professional basis. It would then be easier for them to defend their interests. Having formed such unions, we could arrive naturally at the formation of a confederation or federation. Attempts are being made now, however, to impose on us a structure with, in my view, the sole aim of seating new leaders in the vacant chairs."

One is also persuaded of the soundness of S. Golyatskene's words by the struggle between the leaders of the Lithuanian Workers Alliance and the leadership of the Provisional Trade Union Coordinating Committee which developed on the eve of the congress. Having spoken on television on behalf of the Workers Alliance and a whole number of public organizations, K. Uoka essentially "showed his hand." He showed quite convincingly why the leaders are in a hurry and what their true aims are. He called for a boycott of the congress.

The investigation of this matter at the congress became so emotional that some delegates forgot for a time their characteristic composure and politeness of expression. They demanded that K. Uoka be publicly censured. He was spared only by the fact that the day before he had urgently flown to Gdansk to a "Solidarity" congress.

"We cannot condemn a person," a speaker said, "who is at this moment doing useful work for Lithuania."

It is hard to say what benefit K. Uoka's visit to Gdansk will be to the Lithuanian people, but that his activity as leader of the Workers Alliance is weakening the united front of working people is beyond question. This alliance is now laying claim to leadership of the trade union movement. However, it is being hampered in conclusively securing its support by a highly "eroded" program, in which political aims neighbor tasks of the trade union movement.

Incidentally, such organizational and ideological amorphousness is characteristic of many of the currents currently emerging in the workers movement. An analysis shows that some of them are being created with the sole aim of satisfying the ambitions of leaders aspiring in this field to realize their claims to leadership of the masses. Such phenomena are evidently inevitable in a period of abrupt changes in social life.

Also highly remarkable was the composition of the delegates to the congress of free trade unions. Of the 768 representatives of various unions, 504 were activists. The nationality breakdown was distinctive too: 702 delegates of Lithuanian nationality, 32 Russians, 34 Poles. Of course, this was not even close to reflecting the national composition of the work force.

Incidentally, about freedom and democracy, which the participants in the congress recalled so often. S. Shermukshnite had only to question from the rostrum the value of the proposed conference concept for the hall to erupt in applause. Seeing that the supporters of "active perestroyka" would not allow her to speak, S. Shermukshnite was forced to remind the hall:

"You yourselves have declared that we are free people and are creating free trade unions. So give me if only eight minutes of this freedom to express my opinion."

"I looked for a long time in these documents for some new ideas," A. Laurinaytis, chairman of the Engineers Union Vilnius Council, emphasized in his speech, "and did not find them. What you are offering is like a medley. Tell me to whom in the confederation we will be able to turn for assistance and defense?"

The solution of all problems of the primary trade union organizations is entrusted to their elective authorities. Thus the intellectual headquarters of the Lithuanian unions, as a delegate called the leadership of the confederation, reserves for itself the most difficult questions: interaction with the international trade union movement, contacts with the republic government, and the formulation of strategic programs. The primary organizations, however, are completely "free."

What this "freedom" results in may be seen clearly from a speech by a representative of the Cultural Workers Association.

"At the end of March," he said, "we gathered for the constituent assembly of cultural establishment workers. We decided how to defend them against our trade unions. The point being that the reorganization in the unions had hit those working in cultural centers. The new trade unions had switched these establishments to financial autonomy. Our clubs and cultural centers have

hereby to become entertainment institutions with a profit-making program. Money merely for the club workers' wage fund has been allocated for the second quarter. Why are the unions, which created these cultural centers, now abandoning them to the whim of fate?"

Unfortunately, this speech did not evoke the hall's serious concern. Was this a matter of concern to the delegates when ahead lay such prospects as close cooperation with the unions of the Brussels confederation, the sharing out of property accumulated in the long years of "occupation" and, what is most important, the allocation of executive positions among the leaders. Perestroyka in the republic is accelerating increasingly, and we must not miss out but occupy a worthy place.

And in the meeting hall words from the program of the Confederation of Free Trade Unions were being heard at this time: "The unions maintain that general prosperity emanating from free labor, economic democracy, and social justice and safeguards is the basis of realization of the rights and interests of citizens of the republic of Lithuania."

It has a fine ring, there's no denying. How will it go down in the work force?

Military Unable To Prosecute Lithuanian Deserters

PM0205152690 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev report from Vilnius under the rubric "Direct Line": "Crime Without Punishment"]

[Text] Vilnius—The total number of deserters in Lithuania on 26 April was 717. Realizing that they had been the victims of deceit and provocations, 236 soldiers have returned to their units. There are still 481 on the run or in hiding.

What are those whom the "Sajudists" are calling to their colors up to?

"As a rule, they get drunk, disrupt public order, and steal cars," says Colonel K. Golubev, chief of the Political Section of the republic's military commissariat. "Unfortunately, the militia zealously covers up not only their antisocial actions, but sometimes even their crimes."

Private R. Krompaltsas was drafted 25 October 1989 from the village of Kaltinenai in Shilalskiy Rayon. He served in the Air Defense Troops. He tried more than once to abandon his unit without leave. He effected his escape 12 April. He hid, it later emerged, at home. Lieutenant Colonel V. Mosendz, rayon military commissar, asked the soldier's mother more than once about her son. But she only smiled, saying that she did not understand Russian.

On 21 April, at a dance in the House of Culture, Krompaltsas, in a drunken frenzy, brutally beat up S. Bateykis, a boy of the same age, who died of the wounds he received.

However, the military prosecutor's office is for the time being unable to prosecute either Krompaltsas or other fugitives. The Union laws do not function here, and the operation of the USSR Constitution has been suspended. "Consultation posts" continue to function at the gorispolkoms [city soviet executive committees], where learned old-timers "educate" youths in the art of evading military service.

In Kaunas, lawyer B. Dadzhdetris heads one of these posts; in Kedainiai, the post is run by an entire deputies' group; in Plunge, the "Sajudists" are even on duty in the approaches to the military commissariat, intimidating youths who manifest the desire to join up. And what about the city fathers? In Marijampole, Gorispolkom Chairman A. Boyarkyavichus said in reply to the military commissariat's appeal for help with the draft that there would be no draft, and that they should not expect any help. It is not surprising that such confusion leads to mass disturbances and to a growth in the number of crimes. Already robberies and rape have been laid at the door of the deserters.

Naturally, ordinary people are unwilling to tolerate such lawlessness; at times, they themselves seek a way out of the situation that has arisen. A. Velshukene lives in Vilnius. She tried more than once to speak at "Sajudis" rallies, in order to put her point of view on young men's army service, but she was not given the floor. Then she spoke at a rally held by "the opposite side." At once, this 63-year-old woman was showered with threats. But this did not break her will. I want my grandson Andryus to serve in the Army, she said, and serve he will.

The sons of A. Kubelene and O. Puodzhyunene, two mothers from Kupishkskiy Rayon, are already serving. They serve in the Western Group of Forces. But after the "Sajudists"' incitement to desert, the women became sick at heart. Who should they believe? They made a request to visit their sons to the Military Commissariat, and to A. Petronis, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party rayon committee. The latter in his turn telephoned the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU). He was connected to the Ground Forces Political Directorate. And this was the news: The mothers' request for a trip to the GDR will be approved.

"Let them come and tell everyone that military service is a man's sacred duty," Ya. Prokhorov, a Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee worker, told me. "As far as this rayon is concerned, about 7,000 inhabitants live here, and there isn't a single deserter."

Congress of Pro-Soviet Citizens Groups Held

LD2804163390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] A constituent congress of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Citizens' Committees opened today at 1000 at the Railwaymen's Palace in Vilnius. According to its organizers, it is attended by over 500 delegates from various towns and rayons in the republic.

Those who did not approve of the 11 March act on the restoration of independence, assembled at the famous meeting at the Sports Hall on 18 March and were urged to set up such committees in the whole republic. More than a month has gone by, today a congress is taking place. It is intended to set up a republican committee and elect its leading organ.

During the first part of the congress, the participants in yesterday's action of blocking traffic in Vilnius were praised. A declaration adopted at the congress, which will be submitted to the Lithuanian Supreme Council, categorically states that if a single participant in yesterday's action suffers, all citizens' committees will react. As always, there were many accusations addressed to television and radio.

A report on the political situation was made by Vladislovas Shved, the second secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party CPSU. He stated that the only way is to rescind the 11 March act, remain in the Union [passage indistinct]. According to the organizers of the congress, in the future these committees will become local government bodies. It was stressed that the committees can be joined by people irrespective of their party membership, religion, but whose vision is socialist Lithuania within the Soviet Union. But the Lithuanian Communist Party - CPSU organization in Lithuania should be the ideological nucleus of these committees.

Formation of Opposition to Landsbergis Viewed

LD2704154090 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 16, 20-26 Apr 90 p 3

[Commentary by Rimvydas Valatka (assistant to GK chief editor), in Savaite (Week) Section.]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Moscow's logic is based on the premise that Lithuania will not survive without big brother for more than 30-60 days.

This type of logic is a hard nut to crack for healthy-thinking individuals, since the Kremlin does not recognize the existence of the Lithuanian republic and the ensuing conclusion would point to a blockade enforced against its own self. [passage omitted]

Figuratively speaking, Lithuania will have to pass through [tests] of fire, water and copper pipes. Fire—military intervention in civilian affairs, seizures of individuals and buildings, which it would appear we have withstood initially. The second stage—an economic blockade [water] is aimed at breaking Lithuania's backbone. If that fails to overpower us, there remain diplomacy or the copper pipes—border questions, various "autonomies" and perhaps, added military defilation. [passage omitted]

According to LIETUVOS RYTAS reviewer, V. Rachlevicius, gasoline lines on Easter morning were marked by politeness and consideration for one another. If such single-mindedness is yet to be upheld by the quickening maturity of the Lithuanian parliament and its leadership, we can be expected to wade through the water also. [passage omitted]

Tuesday marked the hottest day in the parliament since the very inception of its work. Speeches by Professor K. Antanavicius and Academician E. Vilkas furnished a prognosis of serious improvements in the Supreme Council's activity. In guessing that many opponents will "scalp" the academician for one of his phrases, I would like to remind you of the following words of Christ: "Who among you, in attempting to construct a tower, first does not sit down to calculate the expenses it will involve, in order to make sure he has sufficient funds to complete it. In order that, after having laid the foundation and not having completed the rest, people may not ridicule him at times, and say: 'this man started to build and is unable to complete it.'" (Gospel, according to Luke)

How should the forming opposition against Landsbergis, be viewed? It seems the time has already passed, when one of divergent opinions had to quickly exonerate himself by stating, he also, was in favor of independence. Opposition to it [independence] is already impossible, since it has become an accomplished fact. Yet, opposition is simply vital to solidification of independence. Otherwise, we shall wander about in romanticized spaces and besides, what sort of unity can be accomplished if some green [immature] decision is adopted in haste? For those of us, who have endured 50 years of bolshevik unity, constructive opposition is more vital than for Western democracies. I wish to recall the idea, set forth by the West German Social Democrats' Leader Vogel, which claims, government is not a goal of his party. The fact that SDP [Social Democrats Party], by its very existence, exerts an influence upon the government is most important.

Ministry Official Discusses Lithuanian Supplies

LD0105213990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1805 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Interview with V.M. Kostyunin, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, Gossnab, by political observer V. Dvinin; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Dvinin] The situation in Lithuania is continuing to attract attention, both in our country and abroad. The decisions taken by the Supreme Soviet of the republic, often very hastily, have led to the creation of a tense

situation in the republic itself and in its relations with the center and with other regions of the country. During a recent business trip to Lithuania, for example, I witnessed the adoption of a whole series of legislative acts in parliament which violate the Constitution of the country and the rights of citizens; for example, the law on identity cards [udostovereniye] for citizens of the Lithuanian republic; identity cards which in order to receive one essentially has to sign a pledge agreeing with illegal legislative acts. Other laws, too, adopted by the Supreme Soviet are also illegal. For instance, in connection with the spring recruitment to the army, with the call-up, and a whole series of other legislative acts.

Our country's leadership has repeatedly addressed the present leadership of Lithuania, however, unsuccessfully. As you obviously know, the leadership of our country—Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, head of the government—were obliged to take influencing measures, measures which I am going to talk about now with Vadim Nikolayevich Kostyunin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply [Gossnab].

Vadim Nikolayevich, the restrictions on the supply to Lithuania of a number of types of products which can be sold on the external market for freely convertible hard currency have already been in force for two weeks now. So that our television viewers have a clearer understanding of what these measures are, I ask you to briefly explain what sort of products Lithuania receives generally from other Union republics. Go ahead please.

[Kostyunin] From the other Union republics Lithuania receives metal, timber, chemical products, cable products, and the lion's share of course, is fuel and energy resources—that is gasoline, that's to say fuel, fuel oil, oil, and a number of other products without which, of course, the national economy of the republic cannot exist—natural gas, and coal.

[Dvinin] Well, tell us please, after all, Lithuania does not only receive, it also gives something to the all-Union coffers, as it were.

[Kostyunin] Absolutely. There are many enterprises of Union significance on the territory of the republic which cooperate with other enterprises in the country. If one takes the republic's sales, as a whole, then it supplies around R6 billion to the Union fund, but we, the country, supply around R8 billion.

[Dvinin] So, Lithuania, in fact, receives more than it returns.

[Kostyunin] Absolutely, and that's how it should be because the republic itself is poor in raw material resources. This concerns mainly fuel, as I have already said, and naturally, metal products, and other types of products.

[Dvinin] However, if one singles out in that general volume what may be sold for hard currency, what sort of produce is that?

[Kostyunin] Well, if one leaves the other types of product aside and takes only fuel, then, on the whole, all types of fuel can be sold for freely convertible hard currency. So oil, as a secondary raw material for refining at the Mazheikiai oil refinery which is situated in Lithuania and all petroleum products which we obtain at that plant, are all sold on the world market.

[Dvinin] Vadim Nikolayevich, tell us please, the address from the president and the head of the government to the present Lithuanan leadership pointed out that the other Union republics are asking why they should deliver to the republic those types of products which they can sell on the external market when Lithuania, the leadership of Lithuania, is ignoring the interests of our country's national economic complex and citizens' rights. Well, I think that many of our television viewers are interested in why they think it is being done to their detriment? On what conditions did Lithuania receive, let's say, the same petroleum products?

[Kostyunin] On equal conditions, like all republics in our country. If refined oil costs around R30 per tonne, then, on the world market it costs $80-100 per tonne. It is only natural that a similar situation is connected with, and also affects gasoline and diesel fuel. The prices at which they are sold on the internal market and the external market are incompatible.

[Dvinin] What about the total volume of oil supplies?

[Kostyunin] If one takes the total volume of oil supplies at the oil refinery, then that is 12 million [not further specified] annually. However, that is not connected with the volume of the consumption of all that quantity of oil for the republic of Lithuania alone since the plant was called upon to supply the whole Baltic, including Kaliningrad Oblast. However, Lithuania itself receives over 1 million tonnes of gas, 1.2 million tonnes of diesel fuel, 3.9...around 4 million tonnes it can be said of fuel oil from the account of Union consumers. These figures are impressive.

[Dvinin] Was everything proceeding normally before the adoption of measures to restrict supplies?

[Kostyunin] On the whole, there were no questions. Delivery by our enterprises, that is, of Union significance, was guaranteed in this quarter, in particular, in the past first quarter, by almost 100 percent. Well, it should be said that Lithuania was provided with its supply similarly, too. However, if one takes fuel, then I can say that last year we were obliged to help Latvia, Estonia and the Kaliningrad Oblast at the expense of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and at the expense of Russia. Why? Because the plan practically did not work. It did not produce gas or diesel fuel in the amounts required by these republics, while Lithuania took for itself as much as it needed.

[Dvinin] Vadmim Nikolayevich, you say the restrictions on supplies concern, you say fuel, and this applies to natural gas too.

[Kostyunin] Thirty percent of the republic's gas requirement is being supplied. That is around 7-8 million cubic metres daily, which should fully supply municipal and household consumers.

[Dvinin] That is why I asked you the question because, as far as I know, not only the overwhelming majority of urban appartments, but many houses in rural places in Lithuania too are supplied with gas. Dosen't that affect domestic requirements?

[Kostyunin] It should not affect domestic requirements if the republican government directs the remaining amounts of gas to the municipal and domestic consumer, rather than to industrial and other needs. However, it should be noted at the same time that many people in the republic also use coal, especially in the domestic sector. As for the stocks of this coal, which we receive from Poland, incidentally, it is high-grade Silesian coal, which is coal in very short supply for the population in the country as a whole. There are big reserves of this coal stocked up in the republic and the republic still has not settled up with the Ministry of the Coal Industry, the supplier of that coal, and it owes it about R1 million to date. In connection with this, the supply of coal has been discontinued under the conditions of special, under conditions of special supplies.

[Dvinin] Tell us please, the supplies of fuel for aviation, for the needs of aviation, for the life of road transport, how are things here? After all, the transport arteries are all-Union.

[Kostyunin] Well, all questions connected with supplying fuel to all-Union consumers, such as civil aviation and railroad transport are not giving rise to any questions. All such questions have been resolved.

(Dvinin] Tell us please, what are guaranteed?

[Kostyunin] Supplies, well, measures have been taken to guarantee all the necessary supplies in enough quantity to guarantee regular flights and the operation of the railroads.

[Dvinin] Thus, Kaliningrad Oblast, whose communications pass through Lithuania, is also being supplied normally?

[Kostyunin] Today, it is being supplied normally.

[Dvinin] You say today, that's to say, if such a situation continues, is there a danger that it will not be supplied normally?

[Kostyunin] We are taking all possible measures, to ensure that all-union consumers, I mean transport has prime significance here, is supplied regularly with all types of fuel.

[Dvinin] Well, now for this question. It is understandable that the difficulties which the republican economy is experiencing now are ultimately the result of the decisions by the Lithuanian parliament, by the present leadership of Lithuania. Well, if the reasons whch gave rise to the discontinuence or to the restriction of supplies were to fade now, in your opinion, how much time would be needed for the situation to return to normal?

[Kostyunin] Valentin (?Aleksandrovich], I can say that the faster the better. I think that for all of us, the question is a very painful one. We are worried about the Lithuanian people, and about the state of affairs in Lithuania. The sooner the government takes measures to normalize the situation, the quicker all those enterprises which today have been forced to have their fuel restricted reach their planned capacity.

[Dvinin] Tell me pleaese, in your opinion, how much time would be needed for the situation to return to normal?

[Kostyunin] I think it would still take just a few days for the situation to return to normal again.

[Dvinin] That's to say that the situation has not yet assumed an irreversible character.

[Kostyunin] It has by no means assumed an irreversible character. That is unequivocal and Lithuania, as I have already said, will only need a few more days to return to normal. However, that is if it happens within a few days. Any longer and the question will be much more complex.

[Dvinin] Well, then, let's hope that common sense will triumph nevertheless, and the Supreme Soviet and the government of the republic will find in themselves the strength to adopt the decisions to make it possible to begin a constructive dialogue, a constructive discussion of all problems in the interests both of the republic itself and of the Union as a whole. Thank you for the interview.

Review of Readers' Letters Concerning Lithuania

PM0305140390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Review of readers' letters prepared by Yuriy Orlik, IZVESTIYA Letters Department editor, under the "Reading the Mailbag" rubric: "Lithuania: Expectation"]

[Text] There are very many letters about Lithuania. They voice disquiet and concern at the growing tension between Vilnius and Moscow. Everyone—both those who consider the Lithuanian parliament's 11 March decision unconstitutional and demand its abrogation, and those who justify Lithuania's actions—realizes the dramatic nature of the situation.

The editorial mailbag is not an adequate reflection of public opinion. It is generally more conservative. It is particularly curious that almost half our readers (I took

300 letters for the survey) treat events in Lithuania with understanding and compassion. Often, however, this represents not so much support for Lithuania as dissatisfaction with the center, weariness and irritation brought about by the overall disorder in our life which is getting worse with each passing day.

There are not many letters from Lithuanians themselves in the mailbag. Not because we have already become a foreign country for them. They did not write to us often before. Thus the survey does not fully represent the opinion of the "indigenous population."

People who live in Lithuania are given the floor first.

V. Novikov, a construction engineer from Vilnius. "I am 47 years old," he says of himself. "I was invited to Lithuania in 1969 to construct plants. I was involved in the construction of most of the republic's major enterprises." V. Novikov believes that the current situation in Lithuania was determined by three factors: "The still prevailing belief by the overwhelming majority of Lithuanians that the Soviet Union is living at their expense; the memory of the lawlessness of the past and, consequently, a reserved (to put it mildly) attitude toward everything in the East (from people to the social system); and disappointment both in the country's sociopolitical system and at the pace of Gorbachev's perestroyka." "Memories of the victims of the repressions, trips to the North and meetings with Lithuanians living there," the writer goes on, "the transfer of the remains of the dead to Lithuania, and many, many others things were presented one-sidedly, with a clear tendency to provoke a greater sense of grievance in Lithuanians against 'foreigners.' Utmost efforts were made to suppress the fact that there were millions of people of other nationalities in the camps with the Lithuanians.... At the same time, ordinary people were given the impression that Smetona's Lithuania was a ready-made heaven on earth. Sajudis' agitators skillfully turned nostalgia for the past into nostalgia for the bourgeois past.... People whose eyes grow misty at any shade of red came to power in this atmosphere."

I am quoting V. Novikov's letter in such detail because his views and his interpretation of the reasons for Sajudis' coming to power are quite typical of Russians in Lithuania. "The words 'Soviet' and 'Leninist' are disappearing everywhere," N. Kochetkova from Klaypeda says. "Newspapers are being renamed. They were called SOVETSKAYA KLAYPEDA and SOVETSKAYA LITVA, and are now called KLAIPEDA and EKHO LITVY. Sajudis screamed quite recently about people not being allowed to hold rallies and voice their opinions. Where is democracy and freedom? Sajudis is in power and is itself banning rallies."

A letter from 73 Moscow City Soviet people's deputies, approving the Lithuanian parliament's 11 March decision, provoked vehement criticism by Russians living in Lithuania. "I suggest that any of these 73 deputies swap apartments with me," B. Kolinko (a former servicemen aged 49) from Panevezhis writes. "Let him come here, register, find himself work, and sense the attitude toward the 'migrants' and 'occupiers' in all spheres of life—and sign his statement after that."

Some readers—not only those living in Lithuania—are convinced that there has been a "coup d'etat in Lithuania as a result of which people have ended up under capitalism" (A. Sazhin, Livny, Orel Oblast) and are demanding that the unfortunates be rescued from their misfortune. A group of candidate deputies to the Klaipeda City Soviet and their agents announced the "coming to power in Lithuania of a national bourgeoisie." Sajudis' chosen path will, in their opinion, bring instability, irrepressible price increases, unemployment, a fall in the standard of living, and billion-dollar debts to Western "benefactors."

But if that is the case, if "there has been a counterrevolution in Lithuania, what are we waiting for?" (L. Shamenkov, Vilnius). Mushkin and a "group of comrades" from Kokchetav advise "carting these bosses and the forest brothers off to Kolyma—then there will be peace and quiet." On behalf of a group of war invalids S. Cheshuykin from Omsk suggests that M.S. Gorbachev "slam his fist on the table like a peasant and put an end to the Makhno movement in the Baltic." As if predicting the introduction of economic sanctions, retired miner I. Timokhin from Tula wrote the following: "It is easy to bring Lithuanians to the point of absurdity. You only have to press three buttons and shut down the three arteries carrying gas, gasoline, and electricity for domestic requirements." "Why is the United States allowed to invade Panama and spread death there, while we cannot put our own house in order?" (A. Nikitin, labor veteran, Ivanovo).

God forbid that the country's leadership heeds this advice. "There are people who would like to provoke the center to use force," Muscovite A. Anuchkin-Timofeyev reckons in this context. "Then goodbye perestroyka and all the hopes it has generated." Here is what V. Baranauskas from Vilnius writes on this subject: "During his visit to Lithuania the CPSU Central Committee general secretary—now USSR president—repeatedly urged people to think. It would be very good if as many people as possible began to think. They would realize that independence is not an object to be bought and sold. The price of independence cannot be compared with the price of oil. The sense of power sometimes, unfortunately, prevents people from thinking..."

F. Marchenko, a participant in the events of 1956 and 1968 from Kharkov, compares the "news situation" then and now: "At that time all our press, television, and radio trumpeted about a handful of extremists allegedly yearning to restore capitalism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, saying that this must be prevented, without balking at the use of force. This did indeed happen. But now we know that there was no threat to these countries' peoples either from inside or from outside. The peoples of Hungary and the CSSR simply did not want the

system foisted on them by our country. "Once again we hear the words 'extremists,' 'handful of people yearning for power,' 'the whole people objects,' and so on. But let us face up to realities! It is not us Russians or even the union that Lithuania is leaving, but our system. Like the other countries which were once our loyal allies in Europe." "I personally understand the Lithuanians, seeing that 50 years within the USSR have failed to bring properity to either Lithuania or Russia," V. Kordyukov writes from Chekhov, Moscow Oblast. "Are they too fussy? Certainly not! They simply see the example of neighboring Sweden, Finland..."

Here we move on to a discussion of what action should be taken in the prevailing situation and how to escape from the deadlock. "I do not justify the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, but in human terms I can understand the Lithuanians' desire for sovereignty and independence," S. Kuchinskiy from Ivatsevichi, Brest Oblast, writes. "They have certainly been hasty and have committed violations. But is it not obvious that our Union treaty is now outdated and nobody knows when there will be a new one. Can we wait? The situation is so unstable... You cannot change the situation by tough measures, pressure, decrees, and sanctions. There is only one way out—to sit around the negotiating table."

S. Dubrovin from Kaunas does not believe the "talk of a renewed federation" either. "Moscow has no intention of relinquishing the reins," he writes. In his opinion, the center is always late in adopting decisions and a high price has to be paid for that. "Lithuania could have been restrained last year had its concept been adopted..." "A pressing question must not be resolved by tanks and paratroops but through dialogue—compromise between equal partners," according to V. Zakharov from Lipovtsy Settlement in Maritime Kray. "Talks, only talks on the whole package of questions of interest," V. Gorokhovskiy from Rostov-na-Donu insists. "These talks should, among other things, establish the duration of the actual transitional period." Many readers believe that the effect of all political decisions adopted after 11 March should be suspended in order for this to happen. "Leaving the Union does not mean escaping and slamming the door"—that idea is repeated in many letters, like the idea of the need for a referendum.

Saying that Lithuania is not showing any readiness to compromise, L. Nikolayev from Grodno writes: "There was no marriage, is what we now hear Lithuanian leaders say and, consequently, no need to file for a divorce. No, there was a marriage and 50 years of living together cannot be erased by a single stroke of the pen." "While demanding independence," A. Veprikov from Orenburg develops this idea, "Lithuania must not forget that nobody has infringed the USSR's territorial integrity and interests since World War II ended."

While preparing this survey, I decided to hardly comment on the letters. Simply to juxtappose different views and try to understand the arguments put forward by each side. People's fate depends on them. We are reminded of this by V. Ponomarev, a teacher from Ryazan: "It is not only the government which does not acknowledge our power or only nationalist extremists that live in Lithuania, there are also people, including people of other nationalities, who will become the center's hostages if the situation is aggravated. We must also think of them when adopting a political decision."

Both in Moscow and in Vilnius.

Historian Inteviewed on Lithuanian Status Claims

PM0305141090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Doctor of Legal Sciences Professor V.M. Kuritsyn by TASS correspondent V. Dzhibuti in Moscow: "Civilized Approach Needed"—date of interview not stated; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] The processes taking place in Lithuania are of interest to everyone now. Attention is focused not only on contemporary events, but also on historical events. And that is only natural: Without a correct interpretation of the past, you cannot understand what is happening today. The historical aspects of the relationship between Russia, and later the USSR, and Lithuania formed the basis of a TASS correspondent's conversation with Doctor of Legal Sciences Professor V.M. Kuritsyn.

[Dzhibuti] If you listen to the Lithuanian separatists who are leading the Union republic toward breaking away from the USSR, all the troubles of present-day Lithuania can be traced back to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. But is this true?

[Kuritsyn] It is a complex question. To answer it, you need to go back into the distant past. The nationalists try to avoid reminding their people that Lithuania became part of the Russian Empire as long ago as the late 18th century, and since then we have lived together for nearly two centuries. Lithuania was fully integrated into the common Russian market and the common Russian culture.

[Dzhibuti] World War I, as I understand it, disrupted that historical balance.

[Kuritsyn] Yes, that is true. For almost the whole of World War I Lithuanian territory was occupied by the German Army. That was when the first Lithuanian self-government organs began to be set up, under the auspices of the German military administration. In September 1917 a number of national parties set up an interparty coordinating council. I emphasize particularly that this council was formed not on the basis of elections, but on the basis of interparty agreements. On 16 February 1918 the national council proclaimed Lithuanian independence.

[Dzhibuti] This document is now regarded as one of the main starting points in the formation of an independent Lithuanian state.

[Kuritsyn] But the proclaimed independence existed only in words. Lithuania was under the strict control of the German occupying powers.

Representatives of the national council had their own interpretation of "freedom" and "independence." They even put forward the idea of establishing a monarchy in the republic, to which end the German Prince Urach was invited to take the Lithuanian throne.

[Dzhibuti] Incidentally, they prefer not to remind people of that in Lithuania now, either.

[Kuritsyn] But facts are facts, and there is no escaping them.

[Dzhibuti] The question of the Brest peace treaty is also acute today.

[Kuritsyn] As you know, that treaty was predatory with regard to Russia. Under its terms we were obliged to pay a tribute to the German Empire. Another condition of the treaty was Russia's renunciation of a number of territories, including its rights to the Baltic region. Under this treaty two-thirds of Latvia and the whole of Lithuania's territory came under Germany's control.

[Dzhibuti] What difference did this treaty make to Lithuania's legal status?

[Kuritsyn] Well, none, really. After all, it still remained under the control of the German authorities. The occupation of Lithuania continued until 13 November 1918, when the Brest treaty was officially annulled by a Soviet Government declaration and by the new German Government.

[Dzhibuti] After that, apparently, the National Council received support from the Entente countries...

[Kuritsyn] They armed the military units made up of Lithuanians who were formerly servicemen in the Russian Army, and also Lithuanians who were drafted during the German occupation into the so-called "Lithuanian Workers' Battalions."

Also at that time the Lithuanian revolutionary committee was proclaimed and the Lithuanian Soviet Government formed. Thus dual power existed in Lithuania: the National Council government, bourgeois in type, and the Lithuanian Soviet Government, which also had military units at its disposal.

The struggle proceeded with varying success. And if it had not been for a series of serious mistakes made by the Lithuanian Soviet Government on national, land, and religious questions, the outcome would have been very difficult to predict. These mistakes led to a situation where, with the support of interventionist forces, this civil war was won by the National Council, which established its own bourgeois statehood.

[Dzhibuti] But did Lithuania become fully free and independent, as some people now try to make out?

[Kuritsyn] Of course not. It remained economically and therefore politically dependent on the Entente countries.

In 1926 there was a coup in Lithuania, as a result of which a profascist type of party came to power. After that, Lithuania could hardly be called a democratic state. This situation continued until 1939.

[Dzhibuti] A few words about the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. There have been demands for it to be annulled, pronounced invalid, and so forth.

[Kuritsyn] From a purely legal viewpoint there is patently a misunderstanding here. What was the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact? In form, it was a nonaggression pact. And although there was a secret appendix to it, its main content was that of a nonaggression pact. It therefore ceased to exist when the first shot was fired in the Great Patriotic War.

[Dzhibuti] And the secret appendix to the pact also ceased to exist.

[Kuritsyn] But it must be said that the secret appendix did indeed provide for a division of spheres of influence between Germany and the USSR. The Baltic and part of the territory formerly belonging to Poland fell into the USSR's sphere of state interests. This treaty was certainly immoral, and the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies gave a fair evaluation of it. But the question that arises is this. Vilnius Province, which, as you know, was formerly part of Poland, came to the USSR under this secret appendix. After that, the USSR handed it over to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

[Dzhibuti] A legal question arises here too. If the Lithuanians are now saying that all the consequences of the pact should be eliminated, what about Vilnius Province? Since it became part of the USSR and then the Lithuanian SSR precisely on the basis of this appendix?

[Kuritsyn] The present Lithuanian government has not yet answered that question.

[Dzhibuti] The following thesis put forward by the Lithuanian leadership also remains contentious: "We do not need to secede from the USSR, since we never joined it."

[Kuritsyn] The decision on Lithuania's entry into the USSR was adopted by a parliament elected prior to the republic's joining the USSR. These documents are therefore entirely valid from the legal viewpoint.

[Dzhibuti] Please say something about the legal consequences of the "occupation" thesis.

[Kuritsyn] It must be recalled that certain "Sajudis" leaders were elected USSR people's deputies on the basis of the USSR Constitution. But a population under occupation does not, as you know, elect deputies to the country's highest organs of state power. Therefore only a year ago they recognized the USSR Constitution, since they took up their deputies' seats on the basis of that Constitution.

[Dzhibuti] Another question also arises. If Lithuania was an occupied country, how would its deputies be regarded? A doubt arises—is it possible to conduct talks with them? After all, it cannot be ruled out that some more radical group will dispute their decisions, since from a legal viewpoint they could be called collaborators.

[Kuritsyn] Complex processes are taking place in Lithuania today. Trends toward the establishment of a dictatorship have emerged more clearly. And this is inevitable, because a significant proportion of people do not support the government, since they believe that their interests have been or will be flouted. Take the law on citizenship. Nowhere in the world does a provision now exist comparable to the one whereby on receiving citizenship and on receiving a passport you have to take an oath of loyalty to the present Landsbergis government.

In conclusion, a word about the Lithuanian "independence" that its present leadership seeks. The right to self-determination is the age-old right of every one of our peoples. And to object to that is to go against the law. But for this purpose there must be a legitimate constitutional system involving the definition of the rights of the Russian-speaking population and the safeguarding of the rights of those people who do not want to remain on Lithuanian territory, but move to other regions.

It is also necessary to protect the interests of all the other republics: reciprocal commitments, settling of accounts, reciprocal deliveries. The entire range of ties—after all, we have been part of the same economic market for 50 years—must be regulated. A great many other questions also arise: legal, economic, and even purely psychological. And they must be resolved.

Therefore the question is not whether you are "for" or "against" independence. This question does not arise. It is simply that everything must be resolved in the way that is usual in the civilized world.

Two Poles Arrested With Tear Gas for Lithuania

LD3004065990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1935 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 29 Apr (TAS)—Two Polish citizens travelling on the train from Bialystok to Vilnius were arrested on Saturday by staff of the Grodno customs. Thirty-five canisters containing the tear-gas "CS 5000" of FRG manufacture were seized from each of them. As a TASS correspondent was told in the Main Administration of State Customs Control, attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, it became known from the explanations of those who had been arrested that the toxic goods were intended for certain citizens in Vilnius. As ordered by them, they promised to pay R200 for each canister. An investigation is under way.

On the same day, 51 gold products worth R17,500 were seized from a female Polish citizen returning from Vilnius by car after a private trip. A gas-operated spray gun [gazovyy pistolet] and five cartridges for it were also seized.

The Vilnius inhabitant D. was planning to travel to Poland by car. On 28 April at Brest customs 31 kg of unprocessed amber were discovered in his vehicle.

Smuggling cases have been initiated in both instances. An investigation is under way.

Lithuanian Communist Party Issues New Magazine

LD0505024190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 4 May 90

[Excerpts] The first issue of the new POLITIKA magazine came out today. This is a new publication launched by the Lithuanian Communist Party to replace the former KOMUNISTAS magazine. [passage omitted] It will come out twice a month.

Estonia Congratulates Latvia on Independence

LD0805103690 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0900 GMT 8 May 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The third point on the agenda [of the Estonian Supreme Soviet session] concerned a message to the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic. The text of the message was approved; 65 were in favor, with four against and four abstaining. [passage omitted] Many deputies were not in the hall at that moment because, indeed, the end of the discussion on the second point on the agenda had become very emotional and tense. [passage omitted]

This message was sent to the Latvian Supreme Soviet: We congratulate the Supreme Soviet and the whole population of Latvia on the occasion of adopting the independence declaration of the Latvian republic. May there be sufficient wisdom for all of us also in the future to support the historical endeavors of our people. The path to our own statehood is not easy but we are convinced that here, in the Baltics, we three, acting together, will succeed in restoring our independent states more fruitfully than with each struggling on its own. Long live the republic of Latvia!

Estonian Supreme Soviet Passes Law on 'Symbols'

LD0805100190

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 0900 GMT on 8 May carries a seven-minute report by Raul Malk from this morning's Supreme Soviet session,

where the law on state symbols was adopted. Malk also interviews Tonu Anton, chairman of the legal commission of the Supreme Soviet.

Anton says, "The task of the law on symbols, newly adopted by the Supreme Soviet, is to define first and foremost through symbols the aim of restoring the independent Estonian state, and perhaps also to develop further the resolution of the Supreme Soviet which was adopted on 30 March regarding the status of Estonia as a state. Most important within the text of this law are articles 1 and 2. Article 1 recognizes as void the name "Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic" and charges everybody with the task of using "Republic of Estonia" as its official name. The idea of Article 2 is that the use of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic coat of arms, flag and anthem as state symbols is to cease."

Anton says that commenting on the law at present is difficult but adds, we have to recognize that Estonia is indeed, however, still within the state borders of the Soviet Union. And perhaps one has to also sum up by saying that we are at the beginning of a long and difficult path.

Malk says that yesterday a government proposal was made for this law, but this did not receive sufficient support as it stood. However, the final text takes some of those proposals into account. Anton confirms that that is so. He says: "Article 3 of the law carries the decision to implement some of the articles of the constitution of the republic of Estonia. They have a principled importance." Anton thinks that those government's proposals will be reconsidered under point seven of the agenda.

Malk says that the law was adopted with difficulty, with many additional amendments proposed. "On the other hand, there was also a group of deputies of most diverse persuasions who spoke against adopting such a law, which was adopted at about 1130." Malk says that the voting figures of 73 votes in favor repeats the result of the 30 March resolution, and adds that 14 voted against, with two abstaining. There were 96 deputies present today.

Statute on Transition of Estonian Party Outlined

90UN1445A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 1

["Statute of the Transition Period of the Estonian Communist Party"]

[Text] The 20th Congress of the Estonian Communist Party [CPE] considers de-Stalinization and the formation of a multiparty system a natural component of the democratic development of society.

The 20th CPE Congress has proclaimed a transition period in the Estonian Communist Party which consists of the formation of an independent membership and organizational structure of the CPE. The transition period began at the 20th CPE Congress and will end with the 21st CPE Congress in the fall of 1990 where the party's charter will be adopted and the governing organs will be elected.

1. CPE Membership

In the transition period the republic's communists will individually decide their affiliation to the Estonian Communist Party on the basis of the program documents adopted at the 20th CPE Congress. A registration card will be handed out to CPE members.

2. Structure of the CPE in the Transition Period

The activities of the party in the transition period will be based on the existing structure of the party.

Members of the independent CPE may begin the formation of party organizations on the basis of the CPE program adopted at the 20th congress.

The 21st CPE Congress will convoke the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee which was elected at the 20th congress.

3. Payment of Membership Dues and Use of the Material Goods of the Party

In the course of the transition period CPE members will pay monthly membership dues in the amount of not less than one percent of their basic monthly wage.

CPE members who maintain their status as members of the CPSU will pay membership dues in accordance with the CPSU Rules.

The CPE Central Committee will regulate the use of material goods.

City and rayon party committees will organize their own financial and economic activities using freely their portion of party budget revenues. The CPE Central Committee will approve the rules for deductions from city and rayon party organizations on the basis of joint agreement.

Riga Radio Carries 7 May Latvian Supreme Soviet Working Procedures Debated

LD0705090990

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0800 GMT on 7 May begins carrying a live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

The session is opened by Gorbunov who declares that 184 deputies have registered. Gorbunov says that he has been informed by KGB Chairman Johansons and Interior Minister Steinbriks that the last two days passed peacefully.

At 0812 GMT Gorbunov says that the resignation of the old government and the establishment of a new government is on the agenda. He goes on to describe the

working procedures. A Russian-speaking deputy appeals against the work procedure and asks for a vote. Gorbunov replies in Russian citing regulations covering working procedures. Another Russian-speaking deputy, citing the 1922 Constitution, and a Latvian deputy, also questions the procedure.

At 0829 GMT a vote on the agenda and working procedure is held, with 144 voting in favor, 18 against, with five abstentions.

At 0830 GMT Gorbunov asks for a vote on the draft resolution concerning the procedure for forming a new government. One hundred and thirty-seven vote in favor, 31 against, and four abstain.

At 0845 GMT Gorbunov proposes Ivars Godmanis as prime minister.

Economic Situation Viewed

LD0705100490

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 0847 GMT on 7 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

At this time Godmanis begins to address the Supreme Soviet. He says that Finlandization is the model that Latvia should follow with strong cooperation between the Baltic states. He stresses the importance of a legal framework to govern the limitations of government activity, the relationship between the central and local self-governments and with the Soviet Union.

Godmanis details his view of market and trade relations, of the various types of ownership, and privatization. Regarding a possible blockade, as in Lithuania, he says that cooperation should be the path to follow. Oil could be a problem if there is a blockade but the situation regarding other resources is more favorable. He says that financial sanctions were imposed on Latvia even before the declaration of independence. A Latvian bank should be established with a Latvian currency. All-Union industrial enterprises should be regarded as foreign.

Godmanis goes on to call for industrial enterprises to adapt to the new realities. Regarding agriculture, the kolkhoz, collective farm, should become a shareholder's farm. He concludes by emphasizing the need for internal security. Godmanis finishes speaking at 0920 GMT.

At 0921 GMT a deputy asks whether a Baltic bank should be established. Godmanis says that since Estonia has already proceeded with its own currency a common Baltic currency would have to be a long-term project.

At 0924 GMT, in answer to a question from a Russian-speaking deputy, Godmanis says that the problems of inflation and unemployment can be eased by Latvia having its own currency. The supply of goods will have to be strictly rationed and prices will have to correspond with reality. There is a great shortage of labor in light industry, he adds.

At 0927 GMT Deputy Agafonov asks about the resources that are available to factories and about the measures being adopted to look after the unemployed. Godmanis says that unemployment will only be created if supplies of materials are cut off. However, the problem of supplies can be solved by doing bilateral deals with other Soviet republics. Godmanis says that the process of transition to joint stock companies must be a gradual one. However, the reshaping of industry should help to mitigate the problem of unemployment.

At 0930 GMT a 30-minute recess is declared.

Possible Blockade Viewed

LD0705130390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1000 GMT on 7 May resumes its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

Deputy Alksnis, speaking in Russian, requests to read out an address. The address stresses the importance of the victory over fascism which united countries with different political systems. The address says that the Soviet Union and the allies should be praised for their contribution toward the victory. One should never forget the genocide committed against the Jews. The Latvian people will never forget the contribution of the Red Army, the resistance fighters, and the veterans. Alksnis asks if there are any objections to the address being adopted. There are no objections.

At 1005 GMT a deputy questions the decision to lay a wreath at Bretherens Cemetery rather than at the monument in Pardaugava. A decision to lay a wreath at the Bretherens Cemetery at 1700 Latvian time on 8 May is adopted with 113 votes in favor, 35 against, and 31 abstentions.

At 1015 GMT Alksnis, speaking in Russian, asks about a possible decline in agricultural production in Latvia. Godmanis says that there are problems with meat prices and with fodder supplies.

At 1019 GMT in answer to a question about how the government intends to promote its cause, Godmanis says that the government should explain its activities and have its own newspaper.

At 1021 GMT Godmanis is asked what he intends to do if Moscow decides to impose a total blockade. Godmanis talks about the treaty of 1920, although he is concerned about the negative aspects of the treaty following Lenin's death. Regarding a blockade, he thinks that all sides will be against it and the opposition will help politically.

At 1025 GMT, in answer to a question about the future defense arrangements of a Latvian republic, Godmanis says that the question would have to be resolved in Moscow, to legitimize the Army stationed in Latvia. Concerning a Latvian Army, it is order that is important in a small country, not troops. He has no plans for a Latvian Army.

At 1036 GMT Valdis Steins asks about the Foreign Ministry's functions. Godmanis says that it would coordinate its work with Soviet interests and it would create its own lobby in the West. The Lithuanian experience shows that its work would be difficult.

In answer to another question, Godmanis says that work organization in the Council of Ministers would seek to ensure that while the various ministries work separately, they would coordinate under the umbrella of the Council of Ministers.

At 1041 GMT Godmanis is asked in Russian about measures to improve the teaching of Latvian and about how he views his role as a future prime minister.

Godmanis says that he would cease to be the leader of a faction. In connection with the fact that he was active within the People's Front he says that the front was not a party. Concerning the teaching of Latvian, Godmanis says that he would expect all those completing higher education to know Latvian.

At 1047 GMT Deputy Bojars asks whether in conditions of a blockade, enterprises would give up their subordination to the Union. Godmanis says that this is a political question. In a market economy a centralized system would be out of place.

At 1053 GMT Deputy Lucans asks about the stabilization of the economic situation. Godmanis stresses the importance of ensuring the protection of the republic from an economic point of view. There would be a deficit in the trade balance and steps would be taken to ration goods. There would be cooperation with Lithuania and Estonia.

Candidates for Premier Proposed

LD0705131890

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1100 GMT on 7 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

A deputy, speaking in Russian, asks about the relationship between economics and politics in the transition to a market economy. Godmanis, replying in Latvian, says that it would be the government's job to overcome the contradictions between the economic and political aspects and to alleviate the social problems that arise. In answer to another question, Godmanis says that it is important that science be better incorporated into production.

At 1109 GMT Gorbunov says that he has received a written proposal from Alekseyev that the remaining 16 deputies who wanted to submit questions do so in writing to which Godmanis can reply in his 15-minute speech. This is put to a vote with 114 in favor, 31 against, and 15 abstentions.

At 1115 GMT Deputy Gavrilov, speaking in Russian, opens the debate on the premiership. Discussing Godmanis' qualities as a possible prime minister he says that the policy of the future prime minister can only be deemed realistic if it takes into account the economic situation. Gavrilov says he does not like what Godmanis had to say about the twin evils of unemployment and inflation.

Godmanis made it clear that he stands for a Western economic model of the 50s, advocating a hardline monetarist course. Gavrilov compares the proposed policy with that pursued by Reagan. Administrative measures will not do alone. Talking about the deficit on the state budget, he says it will be crucial in determining inflation. He says the budget is overloaded. He says there are a number of factors responsible for the budget deficit. The measures proposed by the candidate for prime minister will cause great unemployment. He says the new prime minister should be an expert on economic questions. He must know what he is talking about. He talks about the qualities which Ryzhkov has as Soviet prime minister. He says he would like to see another deputy, Bresis, as the prime minister because he has more experience in this field, and would adopt more moderate policies.

At 1121 GMT Deputy (Makharev), speaking in Russian, says he has no doubt that Godmanis will become the prime minister. Therefore, he addresses his questions to the future prime minister. He says Latvia has become, de jure, an independent republic. But he wishes to raise the question of the Russian-speaking part of the population who have their fears and do not support the program proposed by the government. He says the rights of all segments of the people must be observed. What are the Russians worried about? He talks about the problem of citizenship and the guarantee of rights. He expressed confidence that the future prime minister will remember the rights of non-Latvians and take them into account. He asks the future prime minister to seek a political solution of all problems. He asks him to guarantee the rights of all people in Latvia. He says the government should accept raw materials and such like from outside in return for granting rights to all its citizens. The deputy criticizes aspects of the government's program, namely the market economy and provisions for pensioners. He says that Godmanis' experience will help him in future.

At 1128 GMT a 90-minute recess is declared.

Agricultural Problems Viewed

LD0705151590

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1300 GMT on 7 May resumes its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga, at which time Gorbunov reopens the session.

Deputy Grube talks about the rural people, what they expect from the session, and objects to Rubiks' participation on the agricultural commission.

At 1304 GMT Deputy Dimanis speaks about economic problems, about the economic relations between Latvia and the Union, saying that a complex situation has arisen. An entirely different path than that of 4 May should be adopted. Concerning common Baltic economic proposals he talks about barter trade with Kazakhstan. He expresses scepticism about a separate money and thinks that there was not much wrong with the old government.

At 1310 GMT Deputy Stroganov says that this is probably the first time in the history of the Latvian parliament that the town represents the village. He says that there was very little in the government's program about agrarian problems. He says it is axiomatic that we cannot go on living the way we did before. But agricultural problems need attention. There needs to be a demonopolization of the agrarian sector. The land must belong to everybody who produces on the land. There can be no question of returning the land to the previous owners. Peasants need a firm law which gives them confidence in the future. Various forms of ownership must be introduced in the agrarian sector. He says the government's program shows that Godmanis does not know anything about the agrarian sector. We need somebody in charge who knows something about it. Problems will never be solved if they are handled by people who are not experts. He proposes that a special program should be worked out. Why has the prospective prime minister not found time to deal with these questions? If we do not solve agrarian problems, we will not solve other problems. Land is a priceless asset. There is social injustice in Latvia, that has existed for decades. The members of the government elected today will only be temporary. We need a clear-cut, permanent program which enables people to look to the future with confidence. He cannot vote for the prospective prime minister and calls on other agrarian representatives to follow his example.

At 1320 GMT Deputy Kurdyumov, speaking in Russian, says that all the discussions which have been taking place are backstage discussions. There are areas in which we need to have specialists. You would never think of appointing the secretary of a rayon party committee as a surgeon. By electing Godmanis as prime minister, we are making the same mistake. He is a very good man, but he does not know anything about the economy. What about Bresis? Did he not do his job properly when he was prime minister. Why do we need a buffer prime minister? He asks the Supreme Soviet to think very carefully before it hands over the destiny of the republic to the People's Front and to Godmanis.

At 1324 GMT Blazevics thanks Bresis for his work, liking some parts of Godmanis' proposals, but there were, however, some aspects on which he would like some elucidation. He wishes Godmanis success.

At 1327 GMT Deputy Lucans talks about the rather interesting situation that has developed. Too little time has been given to regulations concerning the government's work. Too little was said about how the people can trust the power. There were tanks in the streets, and they did not know what the KGB thought about all this. Economic questions have become political ones. He proposes Godmanis' confirmation as an interim prime minister.

At 1332 GMT Dinevics asks who Godmanis would be, a commissar or chairman of the Council of Ministers. Without Godmanis in this position matters would not be any better. If Reagan could manage with consultants, so can Godmanis.

At 1336 GMT Deputy (Ryshakov) talks about the Baltic Military district which covers Latvia. He says this is an objective reality which must be taken into consideration. He says that of late a large part of the population has taken quite a negative attitude toward the Armed Forces. There have been meetings in the Army in which officers and men have expressed concern about the situation in Latvia. He asks to read out an address from servicemen, from the Riga garrison, to the Latvian Supreme Soviet, complaining about the explosive situation in the republic, which has become worse since the declaration of Latvia's independence, a declaration which is not supported by a sigificant part of the population. Extremism is now holding sway, and the attitude to veterans and others is insulting. The Soviet Army's role in World War II is being belittled. If the Soviet Army had not crushed fascism, what would the position now be of the deputies who are going on about independence? Why should the difficult job of soldiers be made harder by the situation as it is now. Discrimination against soldiers is doing irreparable damage to the unity of the Army and the people. The soldiers of the garrison have great respect for Latvian culture and history. We cannot find ourselves in an irretrievable situation which cannot be repaired. We reserve the right to assess the situation. This should not be taken as a threat.

Godmanis Elected Premier

LD0705153390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1342 GMT on 7 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

An unidentified deputy asks for an explanation while another mentions extremism.

At 1344 GMT another deputy, speaking in Russian, returns to Godmanis' report and the economic situation. Is the prime minister a politician or an economist? He is more of a politician on Western lines. We have an inherited economic system and therefore a structure of power to go with it. How can the level of public ownership in the economy be reduced? How can we develop the market and bring in private property? The black market is developed in Latvia. We are not ready to answer all these questions. We must know how to go over to the market economy. Not everything is so simple. We are talking about the formation of new economic relations. There was nothing said in the report about all this.

The elected prime minister must be more of an economist than a politician. The proposed program contains a lot of wishful thinking. It is not practical.

At 1348 GMT Deputy (Freimanis) protests that already four speeches have been heard which exacerbates the tension.

At 1349 GMT Deputy Dozortsev, speaking in Russian, talks about preparations for a military parade going on "on the banks of the Daugava". He complains about blackmail by people holding lethal weapons. He has many questions to ask Godmanis. He says certain personal qualities are essential for an elected prime minister and he think that Godmanis has these qualities. Nobody else can do the job better than him. That is why he has been nominated. The deputy talks about Reaganomics and asks how much attention was paid to Reagan's personal qualities before he was elected U.S. President. He says Godmanis has two positive qualities. He works a great deal and he works very fast. He reacts fast to a developed situation. He will be able to cope with the job. He is quick on the uptake. When you talk to him, you can get a straight answer. So I call on the deputies to vote for him.

At 1356 GMT a procedural point is raised, in Russian. Gorbunova talks about the importance of having self-respect. Let us respect each other, he says.

At 1357 GMT Godmanis is given the floor for 15 minutes. The economy is the key to development. He was somewhat embittered by rural representatives and refers to Stroganov. He then replies to Dimanis, referring to Kazakhstan, about cheap raw materials and processed items sold for a high price. But this would not last forever. The situation is becoming worse, but he asks: would it not worsen if nothing was done? He had probably been misunderstood in connection with peasant's farms, that he was against them. He thinks that these farms should not be established at the expense of farms that are working well. As for the government's activity, we have to face a possible blockade and note that decentralization is taking place throughout the Union. He goes on to say that energy resources are adequate for a limited time in the republic. He continues that the government program should be drawn up by the entire government. If the government cannot achieve this then another government should be appointed. Godmanis also objects to those deputies who confuse the People's Front with a party.

Godmanis concludes his speech at 1412 GMT.

At 1413 GMT Deputy (Providenko) from constituency no. 73 says it is time to vote on Godmanis' candidacy. He proposes a secret vote. Gorbunov comments that this should be voted on.

At 1416 GMT (Provindenko) repeats his proposal. He says that Godmanis did not put forward a program worthy of the name. He calls for a vote.

At 1417 GMT (Providenko) again demands a vote. (Khvostin), another deputy, says he submitted a written question but it has not been answered. He wants Godmanis to answer the question now.

At 1419 GMT Gorbunov says that it is quite impossible for all the questions of deputies to be answered. This happens nowhere else in the world. Gorbunov asks the deputy to sit down.

At 1421 GMT a count of the deputies present is made. There are 186 present. They are to vote on annulling item 25. The deputies vote. The vote is taken. It is decided by 116 votes not to annul the item.

At 1429 GMT the vote on the election of the prime minister is conducted. At 1430 GMT Gorbunov announces that Godmanis has been elected prime miniser of Latvia with 131 votes in favor, 46 against, and six abstentions. Gorbunov then asks Godmanis to form a government.

Godmanis makes a short acceptance speech and a recess is announced until 1500 GMT.

Bisers Elected Deputy Premier

LD0705184390

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1500 GMT on 7 May resumes its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga. Gorbunov opens the proceedings after the break.

At 1501 GMT Ivars Godmanis speaks in connection with proposing a first deputy premier. He says that it requires somebody with work experience in Moscow and in the cabinet, and also juridical experience, and he proposes Ilmars Bisers.

At 1505 GMT Ilmars Bisers begins his speech. He says that he had received the proposal for this position only a couple of days ago. He promises to work with the entire government. He outlines his principle propositions, including that about security for private homes. The government, he says, would be a political one, following the outlines set by the parliament. He stressed that the improvement of the social and economic situation of the people was important, and that cooperation between the Baltic states was very important. He says he does not know why an Estonian government representative had not been present at the session; in any event this was sad, he says: there should be a better relationship. He would work, he says, in the direction of cooperation, if entrusted with the position.

At 1518 GMT Gorbunovs explains that Ryuytel has invited Lithuanians and Latvians for a joint meeting.

At 1519 GMT a Russian question is answered by Bisers, in Latvian, about the possibility of obtaining revenue from troops using Latvian territory and from other sources. This is followed by a few more Russian questions.

At 1524 GMT there is a question about the Declaration and about remaining within the USSR. Bisers explains that this would remain, for the time being, until the conclusion of treaties.

At 1528 GMT Dimanis asks, in Russian, about what Gorbunovs had said on the television. Bisers then talks about the situation of the USSR people's deputies, which was justifiable until the establishment of full independence.

At 1530 GMT Ivanov asks, in Russian, about the social situation of the working people. Bisers explains that there are many people living in poverty, but for the time being he does not know where the funds could be found to improve the situation.

At 1532 GMT Geidans asks about relations with the Citizens' Committee and other organizations.

At 1535 GMT there are several Russian questions.

At 1538 GMT Dinevics asks which party Bisers belonged to, and expresses his concern for the future. To the first part of the question Bisers replies that he had left the CPSU, but has decided not to join any party organization. He says that by insulting him, the Communist Party of Latvia (pro-Moscow) had rejected him, and he had not joined any other party.

At 1543 GMT to a question by Deputy Biezais on predicting the progress of democratization, Bisers replied that at the USSR Supreme Soviet it has ceased, while in the republics the forces of democracy have increased.

At 1545 GMT Deputy (?Abikis) asks about changes in wages policy, and Bisers replies that the financial situation would be complicated.

At 1546 GMT Deputy Berklavs says he is not satisfied with what Bisers has said about Latvia still being in the USSR. Bisers asks whether Berklavs thought that "we were already rid of the USSR." Precisely, answered Berklavs. Bisers and Berklavs agree, however to fight for full independence.

At 1548 GMT Deputy Zotov, in Russian, asks about pensions.

At 1550 GMT Gorbunov says that there are three speakers in the debate.

At 1551 GMT Aleskesyev in Russian, says that he, like Dozortsev, regards Godmanis and Bisers as good persons, but is concerned about Moscow's attitude, and about how many lats (Latvian unit of monetary value 1922-1940), rubles, and dollars it would take to pay everybody their pensions, and whether this would not be a walk into darkness.

At 1555 GMT Deputy (?Cilinskis) says he hopes that this would be the last independence declaration, he is amazed at Bisers' expressions, but hopes that Bisers could fill the Declaration with real content.

At 1557 GMT Teikmanis says that he knows Bisers, and praises him.

At 1600 GMT Gorbunov begins to conduct the election of Bisers.

At 1606 GMT Ilmars Bisers is elected first deputy premier, with 131 in favor, 48 against, and eight abstentions.

War Anniversary Noted

LD0705190590

[Editorial Report] Riga Domestic Service in Latvian at 1607 GMT on 7 May continues its live relay of the Latvian Supreme Soviet session in Riga.

The text of a message from the Supreme Soviet to the people of Latvia on the occasion of the anniversary of the victory over fascism is read, in Latvian and Russian, on behalf of the editorial commission; it includes a mention of the victims of labor camps. There is an objection that it should be signed personally by the deputies, and not adopted by the Supreme Soviet, but it is put to a vote.

At 1618 GMT it is adopted, with 140 votes for, nine against, and 29 abstentions. There is then a proposal that the victory celebrations not be spoiled with red flags; let it, be, rather, a quiet day of remembrance.

At 1620 GMT it is adopted that tommorrow's session would be relayed on the radio, with an evening review on the TV. At 1630 there is to be a news conference. One deputy is not happy with the draft letter "to his majesty Gorbachev," and submits his faction's draft.

Tomorrow's session is set to begin at 0700 GMT.

Godmanis Interviewed on Government Program

LD0705201590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1820 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Today, following the Sunday break, the session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet of the new convocation resumed its work. Our correspondent Ninel Meshkun is at the microphone:

[Meshkun] Today the parliament of the Latvian republic—such is the name that henceforth will be given to this Baltic state uniting Vidzeme, Latgale, Kuzeme and Zemgale, following the declaration of the restoration of independence—accepted the resignation of the former government and appointed a new chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers. He is Ivars Teodorovich Godmanis, a 49-year-old mathematics tutor from thue Latvian State University, deputy chairman of the Latvian People's Front. There were heated debates over the program put forward by the future head of government. I also put my question to him:

[Begin recording] [Meskhun] There will come a time not for criticizing, not for looking for faults, but for tackling oneself the issues of the sick economy. What will you begin with tomorrow?

[Godmanis] Well, of course I believe that matters need to be tackled by the whole cabinet of ministers because, it seems to me that one-man management in resolving these matters is not the best option. Naturally, the responsibilty is my own. However, I think the government will adopt decisions collectively and each minister, but also the Council of Ministers chairman in person, will be responsible for how the decisions are implemented. That is the first thing. Our government is being planned according to professional principles, after all. There is a political nuance in the government but, all the same, professionals prevail. In other words, out of 17 ministries virtually all ministers have worked in the given spheres; perhaps not in the post of minister, though some of them have been deputy ministers and some have worked in other posts, but in appropriate spheres of activity. We do not have such a sudden change in the sense that the whole cabinet is being changed. Of course, when we have formed, it will be a matter of working out two programs, a long-term and an immediate one. [end recording]

Career of New Latvian Premier Profiled

LD0705174190 Moscow TASS in English 1725 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Riga May 7 TASS—The Latvian parliament today elected Ivars Godmanis, 39, the new prime minister after accepting the resignation of the former government.

Godmanis, leader of the Popular Front faction in the Supreme Soviet, was proposed to the post by parliament chairman Anatoliy Gorbunov.

The new premier, who holds the equivalent of an MS degree in physics and mathematics, was before that a senior lecturer at Latvian University.

The Supreme Soviet will meet again on Tuesday to consider a new government, guidelines for its policies, proposals for standing parliamentary commissions, and changes in the republic's system of administration.

Faction Leader 'Worried' About Declaration

LD0705202890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 7 May 90

[Video report by correspondent N. Kasyarova; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] After a two-day rest the session of the Latvian Parliament resumed work today;

[Kasyanova] Today the Latvian republic parliament accepted the resignation of the previous government and apponted a new chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers. [video shows parliamentary session underway; three men on a rostrum] [passage omitted] [video shows Kasyanova seated in an ornate room with S.L.Dimanis, candidate of economic sciences, leader of the Ravnopraviye—equality—faction; identified by screen caption]

[Begin recording] [Kasyanova] As leader of the Ravnopraviye faction, what worries you about the decisions being adopted? Do you agree with everything?

[Dimanis] I am worried not just as a leader of a faction, but also as an economist, since the declaration on independence is not backed by any kind of economic platform. In practice the declaration is (?cluttered) with various kinds of appeals to other states, to Gorbachev, but it is not clear at all what to do after Latvia does indeed become an independent state. I am also concerned that certain debates and speeches are now being made after the declaration which mislead public opinion. For example, yesterday I heard two completely contradictory views on the declaration. Gorbunov, our Supreme Soviet chairman, said that this doesn't yet mean a break of state ties with the Union. But his second deputy, Mr. (Krastonich) said that the Soviet Union is already in the position, with regard to Latvia, of a foreign state; and it is not at all clear to me what position we are in following the adoption of this declaration. [end recording]

TASS on Threatened 'Political Strike' in Latvia

LD0805141190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1332 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Riga, 8 May (TASS)—TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina reports: The united council of labor collectives in the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] has called on all labor collectives in this Baltic republic to begin preparations for a political strike. This appeal was published today in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA.

The "Declaration on the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic" adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet on 4 May is characterized in the appeal as "anti-Soviet and an anticonstitutional coup d'etat." As the document stresses, the Supreme Soviet, proclaiming a return to the bourgoise Constitution and the secession of Latvia from the USSR, has adopted this decision despite the will of numerous labor collectives and without holding a nationwide referendum. The united council of labor collectives has appealed to the USSR president and Supreme Soviet to annul the decision by the republic's Supreme Soviet, which is "aimed at overthrowing Soviet power in Latvia and secession from the composition of the Soviet Union," and to extend talks with the republic's representatives on the development of a Union agreement.

The united council proposed to begin forming a workers' militia. The appeal notes that "the Constitution, laws, decisions, and other acts of the Latvian republic, both

those valid earlier and those which will be adopted before the Latvian SSR is restored, have no juridicial force and are not subject to enforcement." If the demands of the council are not accepted, the document says, it retains "the right to form its own bodies of Soviet power."

Latvian 'Equal Rights' Group Urges Referendum

LD0805131490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1155 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Riga, 8 May (TASS)—TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaitsev reports:

The declaration adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Latvia on restoring the republic's independence fails to take account of the will of the majority of the people of Latvia; such is the opinion of the "Equal Rights" group of Latvian parliamentary deputies.

Meanwhile, Anatoliy Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, has sent a letter to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, which affirms that the declaration corresponds to the expressed will of the absolute majority of the indigenous population of Latvia as subsequently expressed in the elections of USSR people's deputies, and the elections to local soviets of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR, in which a considerable majority of voters supported deputies who upheld the sovereignty and independence of Latvia.

The adoption of the declaration, the letter states, is the starting point for the transitional period. Its aims are: the creation by democratic parliamentary means of a power structure that it trusted by the majority of people and designed to bring about the genuine re-establishment of the independence of the republic of Latvia; and the attainment—through a process of mutually advantageous and equal talks between representatives of the USSR and the republic of Latvia—of a system of agreements to guarantee the state independence of the republic of Latvia and take account of the vital interests of both states. During the transitional period in the republic of Latvia, it goes on, the whole gamut of normative acts which were actually in operation on the territory of the Latvian SSR before 4 May 1990 is to remain in force.

The statement adopted by the "Equal Rights" deputies' faction in connection with the declaration on the re-establishment of the republic's independence is of quite a different nature. As you will know, this faction refused to vote on the document.

As the statement says, the declaration was adopted in the name of the people of the Latvian SSR without a referendum on self-determination and without any real discussion of this declaration at the session.

The writers of the statement consider it essential to hold a nationwide referendum on the self-determination of the peoples of the Latvian SSR in accordance with the constitution of the USSR and the law of the USSR of 3 April 1990 on the procedure for tackling questions connected with the secession of a Union republic from the USSR, in order to make known the expressed will of the people, in whose name this declaration has been adopted.

In essence the only basis for solving the question of self-determination can be the results of a referendum, so until it has been held the group considers the decision by the Supreme Soviet on changing the status of Latvia and its state system to be unconstitutional.

In the statement of the "Equal Rights" group, there is a request to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet of the country to refrain from any measures whatsoever against the republic, because the people cannot fully bear responsibility for the decisions, adopted by their Supreme Soviet, all the more so since the elections were held under pressure from the People's Front of Latvia, in conditions where it monopolized the mass media.

Taking into account the exceptionally strained political situation in the republic, the "Equal Rights" group of deputies proposes the immediate announcement of preparations for a nationwide referendum, and the group is ready to begin such work. Today the destiny and future of everyone of us, of our children, the parliamentarians say, is not a theoretical abstraction, but a practical choice, when this choice is passing not only through the public consciousness, but also through the heart and mind of everyone of us. They called on all the peoples of the republic to show exceptional restraint, mutual respect, tolerance and common sense, and to rise above personal and group ambitions and ethnic and social pretensions.

Latvian Deputy on Baltic-Center Dialogue

90UN1448C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by LATINFORM special correspondent S. Prokoshenko: "Janis Peters: Taking the Path of Dialogue"]

[Text] Moscow—Janis Peters, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, spoke at the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the discussion in the Soviet of Nationalities of the draft Law on Renewing the Union Treaty and Delineating the Powers of the USSR and the Union Republics. Among other things, he said:

If the so-called Baltic issue is not resolved through quiet and politically wise consultations, conferences, and dialogues, it will become an ever-present question and a festering wound.

First of all, we should come to an agreement regarding our terminology. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania should not be embraced by the mechanism of secession under preparation; I have already referred to this. We should

begin with a process which would lay the foundations for restoring the statehood of the three Baltic republics. To be sure, we will not be naive, and will not cross out the past 50 years from our biography. These were de-facto years. With reference to the future of the Baltic republics, we should introduce into our nomenclature the term "restoration of statehood" rather than the term "secession from the USSR" or even "the renewal of the Union treaty" which does not exist as far as the Baltic area is concerned. Following the scientific and party study of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, not one serious historian in the world has any doubts about exactly what happened in the Baltic area in 1940.

J. Peters went on to say that, personally, he believed for a long time in the possibility of Latvian sovereignty within the federation. However, bloody events in the south of the federation and a number of other reasons have sharply changed the attitude in Latvia by now. Legitimate demands are made to restore de-facto statehood. In conjunction with this, the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet adopted on 15 March 1990 a declaration on the state independence of Latvia which pointed out unequivocally that the Latvian SSR should be transformed into a free and independent Latvian state. The speaker went on to say that, as a Latvian, he would like to say on this occasion that the Latvian people, having lived side by side with the Slavic peoples for millennia, do not at all wish to have hostile relations with them and with the governments of all of these peoples and countries. Over the past 50 years, common human relations between the Balts and the Slavs have evolved to a new level. During this time, we fought Nazism together, were enslaved by Stalinism, were incarcerated in the same prisons, and suffered in the same hard-labor camps. We created a common, though weak, economic system together.

However, the main point is that we have ties of kinship at the level of our families. This means that we are fellow travelers. However, the shackles of Stalinism with which these fellow travelers are manacled cannot be renamed a silver bracelet in any language, be it Russian, Latvian, Lithuanian, or Estonian. All of us together should become free fellow travelers.

We talk a lot about equal rights. However, equal rights for the Russian state and other countries, including the Baltic republics, may only appear after the Soviet Union once again officially recognizes the Baltic republics as the subjects of international law. Following this recognition, qualitatively new prospects will open up for creating equal, I stress, equal relations in the economy, politics, ecology, exchange of ideas, as well as on the issues of a military nature. Will the prestige of the Soviet Union really suffer if the flag of Latvia also flies in New York in front of the United Nations building?

To be sure, the status of the Baltic republics should not disturb the security of Europe, harm relations between the USSR and other states, interfere with the East-West dialogue, threaten human rights, subject the members of a particular party to discrimination, and threaten democratic socialism and other humane ideals. I believe, said J. Peters, that the new statehood of the Baltic republics, which should be established proceeding from a synthesis of the period of independence of these republics with the Soviet period, is capable of guaranteeing the peaceful development of all peoples of the USSR and all republics.

The main point is that the policy of perestroyka and renewal set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev cannot be jeopardized in the course of restoring the democratic republics of the Baltic area. The restored Latvian republic should take over all the international legal obligations assumed by the USSR with regard to political, economic, social, ethnic, and cultural human rights. In such a state, both the people of the indigenous nationality and the citizens belonging to ethnic minorities are going to enjoy the rights envisaged by law, maintain their national and ethnic identity, use their native language, be educated in it, perfect their cultural autonomy, freely issue already existing press publications and publish new ones, maintain already existing radio and TV broadcasts and organize new ones, freely practice their religious views and observe their rituals, build their churches, celebrate national holidays, and maintain contacts with their motherland.

These specifics provide a guarantee for the mechanism which should be developed in the course of a dialogue. Loyalty to the neighboring peoples and fellow citizens of all nationalities should be the foundation of the policy of the restored Latvian state. Every citizen of the USSR who will continue to live, study, and work in Latvia should be given such guarantees. I call on all people, said J. Peters in summation, to embark quickly on a dialogue between the authorized representatives of the Baltic republics and the central authorities of the USSR. Apparently, following this dialogue, new opportunities will open up for cooperation on an equal footing, including the signing of new treaties and the formation of new associations. VM/mulnix 02/1420Z May

Rules of Latvian Citizens Committees Reviewed

PM2704100190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Correspondent Irina Litvinova report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Those Who Are to Receive Citizenship"]

[Text] Riga—The elections of delegates to the so-called citizens' congress are drawing to a close in Latvia.

One year ago the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium ruled citizens' committees unlawful and unconstitutional, but that did not stop them operating and preparing their congress (to be held at the end of April), which, according to its organizers' scheme, will be the "legal representative [predstavitelstvo] of the Latvian republic—the state proclaimed in 1918."

The draft congress documents have been published. It emerges from them that the citizens' congress is being convened in order to protect the interests of the Latvian republic and its citizens, reintroduce the Latvian republic Constitution, and form relations between the Latvian republic and the USSR on the basis of the 1920 peace treaty.

Just who are "citizens of the Latvian republic"? According to the draft submitted for discussion, which has given something of a shock to a section of the population, it is proposed to recognize as citizens of the Latvian republic people who had Latvian citizenship before 17 June 1940 and their direct descendants.

But what about the rest of the Latvian population? On their fate it says: "Citizens of other states (including the USSR) living on the Latvian republic's territory do not automatically qualify for citizenship of it." Those wishing to apply for citizenship must register, but "only the lawful government is authorized to take the final decision on the granting of citizenship after the restoration of the Latvian republic's state power." People are advised not to delay over registration, because "citizenship of the Latvian republic should be granted first to people who expressed a desire for citizenship before the convening of the citizens' congress." There is also provision for the voluntary re-emigration of Latvian republic citizens living in the USSR and USSR citizens living in the Latvian republic—"by means of talks between the authorized representatives of the Latvian republic's citizens and the USSR Government."

The draft resolution "on restoring lawful state power" points out that the "independent Latvian republic will be restored by the international recognition of its status as an occupied country, the withdrawal of the occupying troops, the elimination of the after-effects of occupation, and the transfer of state power to the Seimas." All Supreme Soviets formed in the postwar period are termed "elements of the unlawful system of Soviet power," while the present Supreme Soviet is called an "organ of self-management of the occupation regime." Further membership of the CPSU by citizens of the Latvian republic, the documents stress, "should be deemed harmful to the state's interests."

The terminology of these documents has a familiar ring reminiscent of past decades. Many inhabitants of Latvia saw nothing to do with democracy in them. Instead a harsh authoritarian tone and an unwillingness to create the civic consensus so necessary to Latvia showed through clearly.

V. Dauksis, the republic's prosecutor, sent the following ruling to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "In view of the fact that the citizens' committees are continuing their activity aimed at supplanting the constitutional organs of power, it would be expedient to envisage an outright ban on the activity of citizens' committees or similar organizations and to provide administrative and criminal penalties for such activity."

The Supreme Soviet Presidium has not yet answered the prosecutor. And as we can see, the citizens' committees are still working actively.

Latvian Procurator Opposes Citizens Committees

LD3004062390 Riga International Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] We have already informed you earlier that the Bureau of the Communist Party of Latvia, on the CPSU platform, has adopted a decision in which it turns against the activity of citizens' committees. Now the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Procurator Valentins Dauksis, who, by the way, is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia, on Moscow basis, has begun direct actions against the citizens' committees in order to discontinue their activity.

The Latvian SSR procurator has sent a message to Anatoliy Gorbunov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, in which it is stated: In connection with the fact that the citizens' committees continue their activity directed toward replacement of the constitutional organs of power, I regard as expedient to envisage a direct prohibition of their activity, and also to envisage an administrative and criminal responsibility for this kind of activity.

As it is known, the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, in July 1989, adopted a decision in accordance with which the activity of citizens' committees is not directed toward a forcible alteration of the state system, and is thereby not criminally punishable.

We remind that to date more than 800,000 persons have registered themselves as citizens of the republic of Latvia, and on 30 April and on 1 May a congress of the citizens of Latvia will take place.

Procurator Valentins Dauksis will also send with his resolution materials to the investigation administration on the activity of the Geneva-49 Committee. The procurator regards that this committee, with its appeals for boycotting the regular call up to the USSR Armed Forces, is operating against the existing legislation. The procurator notes that the committee organizes also the collection of military service certificates, and already more than 300 of them have been collected. As the procurator's power does not extend over the soviets of people's deputies, he requests Latvia's Supreme Soviet Presidium to cancel the decisions of those soviets of people's deputies which have decided in their territories for the time being to stop the activity of the Armed Forces' call-up points.

Procurator Dauksis points out also that the People's Front of Latvia has adopted an appeal for boycotting the regular call-up. For the time being, however, Dauksis has not yet initiated criminal proceedings against it.

Latvian War Veterans' Privileges Withdrawn

PM0205120190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 May 90 First Edition p 2

[Feature under the rubric "Alarming Situation": "How Is This to Be Understood?"—first paragraph is an introduction; last two paragraphs are editorial comment]

[Text] Beneath such a headline it would be natural to read a report on the way undeserved privileges are being taken away from certain leading workers. But, unfortunately, information of quite a different sort has recently been reaching the editorial office from the Baltic republics: To all appearances, people in some places there have decided to balance local budgets at the expense of veterans. We are also convinced of this by a letter addressed to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR minister of defense, whose authors asked for it to be published also in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. We fulfill their request, adding to the letter extracts from a decision by the local soviet in the city of Stuchka in the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

"To the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
"The USSR minister of defense

"The party and the USSR Government have shown concern for war veterans by publishing resolutions on benefits for war invalids and participants—No. 510 dated 14 September 1981, and on trade services—No. 320 dated 9 March 1965. But, at the insistence of the People's Front in Latvia, to which the majority of Supreme Soviet deputies—such as Comrades Biser, Ivans, Bojars, Peters, and others—belong, organs of Soviet power at rayon level have begun repealing these government resolutions. Thus, despite a decision by the rayon war veterans conference on 3 March 1990, the session of Stuchkinskiy Rayon Soviet on 7 March 1990 (the second sitting of the first session of the 11th convocation) adopted a decision to deprive war invalids and veterans of all benefits. In this connection, the rayon war veterans council declares a resolute protest and demands that the aforesaid organs repeal the Stuchkinskiy Soviet's decision, as it does not have the right to repeal resolutions by the party and the USSR Government.

"Some 240,000 of our servicemen gave their lives for Latvia's liberation during the war years. Those who survived took a very active part in restoring the republic's national economy and are now laboring as hard as they can in enterprises and working with young people. They have merited the attention and concern of party and soviet organs, for their numbers are diminishing with every passing day, and there will probably only be a few left by the 50th anniversary of the victory. Were we really needed only when it was necessary to defend the motherland against fascism, shedding blood and giving lives, while now we are all being sent to the garbage heap of history? This is what our rayon soviet executive committee thinks, and now the benefits taken away from us are being established for legionnaires. We await your decision.

"On behalf of the council:

"[Signed] Kucherskiy, chairman of the Great Patriotic War Veterans Council; Secretary Skrebnev; Members Bukin, Sidorko, Brigis, Elit, Poryadin, Medvedkov, Solovyev."

Extracts from the resolution by Stuchkinskiy Rayon Soviet, Latvian SSR, dated 7 March 1990 (second sitting of first session of 11th convocation):

"On Changes in Trade Services for an Individual Category of Persons.

"Stuchkinskiy Rayon Soviet decrees:

"1. Privileges in the supply of goods in greater demand for Great Patriotic War invalids and participants, and for persons equated with them, are to be abolished.

"2. Trade in complete sets of products of enhanced quality for Great Patriotic War invalids and participants, and for persons equated with them, is to be abolished.

"3. Privileges in trade services for Great Patriotic War participants, rendered disabled as a result of general illness, are to be abolished.

"5. In accordance with decisions by city, village, and settlement executive committees, privileges in the acquisition of foodstuffs by Great Patriotic War invalids, and persons equated with them, are to be extended to other invalids who served in the Army and were subjected to repression, to participants in the elimination of the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, and to all single Group One invalids.

"11. The Latvian SSR Council of Ministers is to be instructed to revise the hitherto existing normative acts and laws on privileges in services for Great Patriotic War invalids and participants and persons equated with them.

"[Signed] Soviet Chairman P. Ludbarzhs."

From the Editorial Office: Such practice is becoming a sign of the social changes being introduced into life by aktiv members of "Sajudis" in Lithuania and of the People's Fronts in Latvia and Estonia. As a result, war and labor veterans are finding themselves hostages of the "political situation." Some front-line soldiers living in the Baltic region will greet the 45th anniversary of the victory over fascism in the position of humiliated and offended people. Neither the existing laws nor elementary moral norms can justify the desire of certain "people's elected representatives" to infringe the rights of honored people who honestly fulfilled their civic duty to the state.

Just one conclusion can be drawn here: The state must ensure that adopted decisions are effective everywhere in the Soviet Union.

Independent Latvia Party Congress Viewed

90UN1656A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by V. Farber: "Side by Side But Not Together"]

[Text] The congress of proponents of the independent Communist Party of Latvia last Saturday was to provide answers to many questions and also to clarify a dilemma: Was the confrontation of forces in the republic party organization abating or were the paths diverging even more? Figuratively speaking, the doors of the hall through which some of the delegates left at the most heated moment of the 25th Communist Party of Latvia without waiting for it to be over were left open and waiting for all who were sincerely interested in the development and renewal of the best traditions of a unified republic communist party. But, alas...

Now the congress of workers for an independent Communist Party of Latvia is a clear reflection of the acute disagreements in the party ranks—in hindsight. Its participants dispersed to their homes and it seems that the number of new problems that appeared was just as great as the number of answers found for preceding ones. The disagreements, the centrifugal forces, and the increasing distances between the views of CPSU members remained, for which nobody seemed to be striving.

Attention was drawn to a certain disparity between the reports and the statements in the debates. While the former did not contain clear political points, giving the impression that their authors had not yet found a clear internal goal for themselves (claims to some centrist position will hardly suffice for this), the latter quickly proceeded in the direction of inflammation of passions. The range of statements here was extremely broad, beginning with tactical recommendations about the ways and means of taking over the mass media and also communist property and ending with an appeal for punishment against those who remain faithful to it.

It is sad that certain communists participated in stirring up such attitudes, some of them leaders of social movements with the title of people's deputies. In this connection one recalled the statement of one of the deputies of the 25th Communist Party of Latvia Congress concerning breaking the mirror of unity, and in continuation of his words it seemed that a piece of glass from this broken mirror had gotten in the eye, distorting, as in a certain fairy tale, his perception both of reality and of history, forcing him to see everything only in dark shades.

Certain speakers did not wish to understand that under conditions that are complicated and becoming more so it is important to stay away from extremes and not replace serious policy with political games, transforming speeches into a means of expressing personal ambitions and manipulating public opinion. The path to renewal is not simple, much is still not clear, but the continuation of verbal duels, including in absentia, abundantly peppered with various kinds of labels, many of which have appeared literally in the next hours after the end of the congress of proponents of an independent Communist Party of Latvia, cause nothing but harm to the perestroyka processes in the republic.

Both in the speeches in the hall at the University of Latvia and in subsequent commentaries one could see fairly clearly an attempt to convey the opinion that the Communist Party of Latvia with the platform of the CPSU is a party of conservatives. But this, of course, is not true. It consists of communists who consider it their duty to remain with the party and are convinced that they can help perestroyka and contribute to the acceleration of its processes in the republic. It is known that the CPSU suffered no more and no less than other structures as a result of the total deformation of the political system that occurred. It is difficult to restore something that is deformed. This requires a great deal of effort and, the main thing, unity.

Many swords were broken over the name the new party would bear. Judging from everything, the word "communist" will not remain in the name for long. The entire course of the congress points to the idea that there will be a change to the position of social democrats in the near future, and the clearly expressed desire to establish itself "in the center" of the real alignment of forces in the republic political arena seems quite problematical at the present time.

The view of the role of the mass media is also inconsistent if one bears in mind the discussions that have taken place recently. There are many delegates who quite recently were working for the "independent" press, that is, for its liberation from party leadership at all levels and today spoke out no less heatedly saying the new party absolutely must have a newspaper at its disposal. How should one assess this double-standard approach?

Today we do not have the task of analyzing in depth the decisions and documents of the congress. This takes time. The subject of our first remarks is different—to remind people, as was said in the appeal of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Bureau to the delegates of the congress of the "independent Communist Party of Latvia," that "the splitting and separation of communists according to nationality is a path to confrontation, a path leading to a blind alley."

The answer to the question of whether the situation will become a reality or not is still not clear; the future will tell. And it is of fundamental importance these days for each communist to think seriously and determine his position and select a path on which he can produce the greatest advantage for his people and for his socialist homeland. It is very simple and easy to burn bridges. It is much more difficult to restore them. This truth must not be forgotten.

RSFSR

Report on Gorbachev Visit to Moscow Clock Factory

PM0805094390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by A. Fedotov, Yu. Shabanov, and G. Yastrebtsov: "Country's Clocks Show Time of Change"]

[Text] Accuracy! This is a quality characteristic not only of the timepieces produced by the Second Clock and Watch Plant, but of all our life today. The country is at a turning point, and at this responsible time a very great deal depends on how accurately our words and actions, plans and specific results coincide.

The country's clocks and watches show that it is a time of change. This was the central thread of the talks between M.S. Gorbachev, USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the plant collective. For Mikhail Sergeyevich this meeting was a working meeting, a kind of report to the plant's communists: He is running as a candidate delegate to the 28th congress here in Frunzenskiy Rayon's fourth party electoral district. Incidentally, the general secretary's rival in the election campaign for the mandate to the party forum—V.N. Baranov—works at the Second Clock and Watch Plant.

Familiarizing himself with examples of the plant's products, which are exported to many countries, M.S. Gorbachev said:

"I'm happy to be having this meeting. Judging by the wide range of excellent clocks and watches, things are going well for you. The 'Slava' brand is highly valued, and your alarm clocks can be said to waken the entire country—they are essentially used in every home..."

Mikhail Sergeyevich received a warm and cordial female reception from the workers at the quality-control and testing section, which, metaphorically speaking, gives the "thumbs-up" to the production of all the output.

"Do you have any watches here to show the progress of perestroyka?" Mikhail Sergeyevich jocularly asked Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Samokhotskaya, deputy chief of the technical control department.

"I think everyone should have such a watch in their soul. People say that time is gold, but today it is even more valuable than that..."

There is a grain of truth in every joke. It would be good if each of us constantly had a feeling for the pace of perestroyka and, consequently, worked as accurately as a clock. But, unfortunately, this is not always the case. L.A. Samokhotskaya also named off the top of her head around a dozen plants which are failing to meet contract commitments or simply producing shoddy output. How can such people be dealt with?

It is good that the Second Clock and Watch Plant is increasing its output: In the last few years clock and watch production has increased by 1.2 million units merely through exploiting internal reserves—more than one-third of the output goes to the foreign market. Labor productivity growth is running ahead of wage growth. But if the plant collective established clearer ties with their suppliers and if associated plants did not let them down, the results could have been considerably better. This has also affected wages, incidentally.

"We don't earn that much at the moment," Tatyana Kondrashkina, a young assembly worker in Shop No. 19 said, "and there's nothing in the stores to buy with that small amount of money: Wherever you look the shelves are empty."

"And are things any better with housing?" Tatyana Vladimirovna Stepanova noted. "Me and my husband have worked in this shop 23 years solid and we still haven't earned enough for a good apartment—seven of us live together in two shared rooms. We've been on the housing list for 10 years, and there's still no end in sight..."

The collective at the clock and watch plant is predominantly female, and, needless to say, the workers are concerned about issues connected with children's education, family leisure, medical services, and working conditions. The importance of a speedy solution to these problems was stressed by M.S. Gorbachev, who noted that social welfare is not like manna from heaven, nobody will serve it up on a silver platter—it has to be worked for long and hard. But what actually happens? The plants work, the smokestacks smoke, but there are no goods. The relationship between labor productivity and pay has broken down in the country. More and more money is choking the market. For years and decades our leaders took a disparaging attitude to sectors producing consumer goods. We now need to orient the economy as quickly as possible toward serving the needs of people, to change the situation in the countryside, to let peasants work, and to free them from all sorts of unnecessary administrative fetters.

As for housing, policy in this area should be drastically changed. We need a housing market which would release people's initiative, encourage enterprises to build homes for their workers out of their own saved resources, and allow individual housing to be built by those who have the inclination and the resources so to do.

Will not the transition to market relations take us back to capitalism, M.S. Gorbachev was asked by the workers. We should not be afraid of the market, the president answered. The market does not mean capitalism—it has always existed. After all, just what is the market? It is an exchange of goods—something no society can do without. Roman Law already regulated commodity relations. That is why we are planning to set up a social

defense mechanism which would protect people from arbitrary price movements. Above all in the prices of food and prime necessities.

"Market relations," Mikhail Sergeyevich said, "will also encourage your enterprise to be more efficient, to earn more, and, consequently, to invest more money in developing not only production but the social and consumer sphere..."

"We are already trying to ensure that our workers have time for their homes, families, and children," Yu.I. Ryabkova, secretary of the association's party committee, said. "And we are making their work as easy as we can—many of them already work one shift. We also have a staff orders department, a canteen, our own kindergartens, and a leisure center. And yet our conditions cannot be called ideal. We earn foreign exchange and then have to spend it on social needs—this has been discussed at the labor collective council, incidentally..."

At the door to No. 3 Mechanical Shop Mikhail Sergeyevich met with Valeriy Nikolayevich Baranov, his rival in the forthcoming elections to the party congress.

"I greet you as my rival," the general secretary smiled. "I hope we both get elected..."

"Me too," V.N. Baranov replied.

The shop chief showed off his shop and the imported equipment which runs on three shifts so as to make full use of it. We then remarked to Valeriy Nikolayevich:

"You've got a serious rival..."

To which he replied without a hint of irony:

"A very serious and highly respected rival. But I'm not planning to give in without a fight, I've got cards up my sleeve too."

"Such as?"

"That's for my communist comrades to decide. I'll just say that I have my own views about the move to a market economy and conversion. As for my political views, by and large I support the 'Democratic Platform'..."

After familiarizing himself with the plant and its workers, M.S. Gorbachev addressed the association's communists and labor collective representatives, and answered numerous questions.

Discusses Market Economy

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[Video reportage by L. Elin and V. Stepanyuk, identified by screen caption; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Presenter] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had a meeting today with the communists and workforce of the Second Moscow Watch Factory. It is here, in the fourth party constituency of the Frunzenskiy Rayon, that the CPSU Central Committee general secretary is standing as a delegate for the party's 28th Congress:

[Correspondent] The Second Watch Factory Production Association in Moscow is one of the oldest in our country. During the 65 years of its history, the enterprise has produced more than 220 million watches, from simple grandfather clocks to state-of-the-art electronic quartz watches.

Mikhail Sergeyevich looked round the improvised exhibition with interest. It featured the latest wrist watches for women and men, and alarm clocks. Watches with modern face design, both quartz and mechanical ones, are currently in big demand on the international market. Incidentally, the Association exports about a third of its output to European, Asian, and South American countries and to such developed countries as England, Italy, the United States and many others.

Unfortunately it is extremely rare that one can purchase the Slava watches in our shops, and this is despite the fact that their production goes up with every year. How can their production be increased and, yet at the same time, still attain a high international level of quality? This problem, too, was touched upon in a conversation with those in charge of the factory.

Here is a bench where the chronometers are undergoing the final tests. It is, after all, important, to uphold the good name of the Second Watch Factory. The women workers stressed that the quality of the watches depends to a considerable extent upon the suppliers. At present, for instance, it is the raw materials and, in particular, alloys and metal that represent an era of difficulty for the watchmakers.

Here is one of the largest assembly shops, Number 19. Let us note that 70 percent of the workforce of the Second Watch Factory, a workforce that numbers many thousands, are women. And there are even more of them in the assembly line section. This is because what is essential here is a very great degree of accuracy, attentiveness, and patience—everything that is characteristic of women. After all, for the time being there is, unfortunately, a shortage of automated equipment.

Tackling social tasks, concern for young people, cadre problems—conversations about these things sprung up in practically every shop visited by the country's president:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified woman] Mikhail Sergeyevich, let me ask you—one of your first decisions was the decision concerning protection of motherhood and childhood. What do you think—when will this program begin to be implemented?

[Gorbachev] I think that as far as this decision is directly concerned—and it has already been promulgated—and the Supreme Soviet has, as it were, given it rather active support, well, many things will start to happen with the

beginning of the next five-year plan, as it were. As for being rid of heavy work, while in the shops....

[Woman, interrupting] A shorter working day.

[Gorbachev] Yes, a shorter one. This, incidentally, should already be in the works and it should, already at this stage, be implemented by every enterprise on its own. And the fact is, if in view of circumstances of one kind or another, one is unable to do a whole day of work—the trade unions and administration should already begin to deal with this—then one must approach the market. Do not be afraid of the market. In our country this is what they think: If we have a market then we have capitalism and capitalism is a harsh system, indifferent to man's fate. No, the market is a normal thing where there is production; there is also a need to exchange what is produced, but through that? Through the market, of course. We wanted to redistribute things.

[Woman] Nothing comes out of it.

[Gorbachev] It does not come out like this and that's normal. There is little, yes—and to redistribute everything in a country such as ours is a folly and an impossibility. That is, market relations ought to exist, and we shall be going over to market relations, but not immediately at first, since it will affect the tax system, credits, prices and so forth, the monopoly situation, the nonmonopoly situation, and all these questions will arise, therefore we ought to have a protection mechanism to protect the retired people, as well as the workers—that is to say social protection measures ought to exist, compensation, to put it more briefly. And, in particular, what we have in mind is that when we go over to market prices and relations we will [word indistinct] under control the most important positions.

The first thing with which we must begin—and this we have been doing, and are doing, and will continue to do—well, to begin with, more goods are needed. We are currently involving the defense industry, very much so. Through conversion we shall produce and increase—over two to three years we shall increase the production of goods for personal use, the costly ones, boasting the kind of quality the consumer is chasing. Large areas are being made available there, cadres, as well as the designers, are very experienced; there are good reserves there. Well, this conversion will make it possible for us to increase production. But the first thing we must do is, all the same, to ensure that the peasant begins to work, so that there is (?more) food, food. This is the chief issue. That is to say: Increase production of food and goods but, on the other hand, exercise control, so that money is not being given for nothing.

The way it has now turned out is this: The enterprise has been given its freedom, and money from production funds is being transferred to pay wages—well, are we to go on being so generous? Well, today...

[Unidentified man interrupting] [words indistinct] (?Money from these development can be fully put to use).

[Gorbachev, continuing] So, today we are the generous ones, but tomorrow equipment will turn out to be obsolete and tomorrow you will recall you were generous yesterday at today's expense. But if you want the enterprise to exist, you work so that you have a reliable job to go to, this means that you must think both of today and tomorrow. Isn't that so? It's this way at home, where you are your own master. Everything should be thought over, everything.

[Woman] Just as soon as possible (?Mikhail Sergeyevich).

[Gorbachev] It is okay for those who are working, whose output is competitive like yours is, and this output reaches any market and there is nothing terrible about this market, nothing terrible at all. But as for those who are making use of their monopoly position and even wish to foist on us their poor quality output—and we will pass antimonopoly laws and then his wings will be clipped and he will be able to reach only so high and no higher, and competition will emerge into the bargain—then we shall begin to see for real who is worth what and what they are doing. But, after all, the way it is now is that both those who work well and those who work badly get the same. Already now people are changing. But, since this is the case and since (?there are such difficulties) with goods—well, where do the goods come from—they are made in factories. So, everything begins with production.

Well, I wish this—that you produce even more good watches.

[Workforce chorus] Thank you [end recording]

[Correspondent] Conversation on the many problems that the works collective is worried about also continued in the mechanical shop where there are very many young people. Yes—at the works there are no lines for kindergartens and nurseries. The trade union pays three quarters of the cost of passes to rest homes and sanatoria. The housing issue, however, is being resolved slowly. The waiting list for apartments stretches several years ahead, and this despite the fact that the Second Watch Factory is one of Moscow's front-ranking enterprises. This means, then, that questions must be tackled comprehensively and this was emphasized during Mikhail Sergeyevich's conversations with the workers. The meeting with the works' communists and representatives of its workforces ended in the assembly hall where Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev delivered a speech and replied to numerous questions.

Popov on Conversion to Market Economy in Moscow

90UN1719A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 18, 2 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Gavriil Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA commentator L. Velikanova; date and place not specified: "Who Is Calling the Shots in Moscow"]

[Text] [Velikanova] Moscow is looking at beginning its life in the environment of a market economy. What difficulties and conflicts do you anticipate? Independence, including—and even primarily—the independence of local authorities is one of the main premises for the functioning of the market. With this in view we would like to understand how mutual relations between the Moscow Soviet and the republic and Union organs are going to develop, for example relations with the Council of Ministers.

[Popov] First I will refer to the main point, to the vital supply system for the citizens of Moscow in a market environment. It is necessary to evaluate what Moscow needs to receive from the outside and what it can give the country in order for this system to work.

Moscow needs its water supply, power, gas, foodstuffs, goods, and medicines. In brief, there is a very definite list of what Muscovites need to receive from the outside. At the same time, the genuine needs of the city are smaller than those to which the current in-shipments are geared. This may sound paradoxical when the shelves of the shops are barren, but it is so.

In the past decades Moscow was saturated with merchandise and foodstuffs to a greater degree than other localities in an effort to turn it into a showcase of sorts of bureaucratic socialism. The country that was forced to deliver to Moscow the products it manufactured followed them here in order to buy them. Moscow turned into a distribution facility of sorts. This transloading function has turned out not to be innocuous at all. As any incorrect political and economic decision, it has done tremendous harm. It has become the foundation of the shadow economy, corruption, and the development of various forms of bribery.

For example, why was cheap meat to be sold through the stores in small pieces to individual buyers coming from every corner of our country if it could be sold wholesale, through middlemen, at a surcharge on top of the price?

It was done in a very simple manner. Unopened containers sat and clogged terminals in the vicinity of Moscow. The residents of Moscow could not understand why these containers were left unopened for weeks (or longer). Meanwhile the containers were not to be unloaded; they were shipped in their entirety to the cities or republics to which they were resold.

An interesting phenomenon emerged. In essence, justice prevailed in contravention of all official socialist laws: Products and manufactures returned to where they were created; progressive forms of modern wholesale distribution developed. However, these progressive forms were corrupt, shadow economy forms. As a result shadow economy operators profited rather than the country and the people.

A regular market economy may and should crush this system. However, crushing it would call for a realistic look at what Moscow truly needs because we will have to pay for everything that is brought in.

Now about mutual relations between the Moscow Soviet and the Union and republic organs. They should be determined by two laws on the status of Moscow as the capital of the entire country and of the Russian Federation. The recent presidential ukase regulating demonstrations and rallies within the perimeter of the Garden Ring shows how necessary this is. I am not talking now about whether it is constitutional; this is up to the Constitutional Oversight Committee, which has been silent so far.

It is absolutely obvious: Since Moscow is the seat of the government of our country, all the necessary conditions for the regular work of the latter should be ensured. The task of the city, including the city soviet, is to honor all its obligations in this matter. On the other hand it is difficult to imagine a city whose administration is not in control of some part of it. It is clear that, essentially, nothing but conflicts can be expected under this regime. This is why a law on the status of Moscow as the capital of the USSR which would be adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, and a law on the status of Moscow as the capital of the Russian Federation which would be adopted by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet are urgently needed. They should not contravene each other.

As a result of the adoption of both laws, Muscovites and the Moscow Soviet should, naturally, remain the masters of Moscow. However, the status documents should clearly set forth the obligations of the city and its soviet to Union and republic organs so that neither the government of the country nor the government of Russia will have to interfere in managing the life of Moscow.

In the process, issues should be resolved in a comprehensive and global manner. This involves the construction of administrative buildings, the movement of official cars through the city, the location of parking in front of ministries and offices, and many other things, for example, procedures for holding military parades, which are associated with the movement of various materiel through the streets of Moscow and overflights by planes and helicopters. The Moscow Soviet has to spend funds to clean the streets and restore the environment due to all of this.

[Velikanova] Therefore, is Moscow capable of supplying itself? Or, in other words: What can Moscow "sell" to our country?

[Popov] Moscow concentrates a considerable segment of what they usually call the military-industrial complex, highly skilled cadres—scientists, designers, workers, the highest technology, and the best technical equipment our country has. All of this needs to be soundly managed or, more precisely, the Moscow version of efficient conversion needs to be organized.

In the environment of shortages of everything, the temptation is great to reduce this conversion to producing basic things lacking in our country, all the way to forks and spoons, or at best high-technology household appliances, video recorders. However, in the greater scheme of things, we need to find such a conversion scenario which promises the best returns. This is the first issue we will have to handle.

Secondly, we need to revise the type of organization of the industry of Moscow as a whole. For many years now, enterprises with conveyer lines calling for a high share of manual labor have been maintained in Moscow. Native Muscovites themselves and their children do not want to work at such enterprises, but they continue to operate. As a result a vicious circle has emerged: It is necessary to seek additional labor for these industries to continue their operation. Housing construction has swollen out of proportion because of the steady importation of workers, so-called "quota migrants." Apparently, the main body of the populace does not need that many houses and apartments, and at the same time housing is in catastrophically short supply. It is absolutely clear that Moscow will not overcome the critical situation if we continue to develop these branches of industry as we used to.

This is why we need a complete transformation of the branch structure of our economy, gearing it to the types of production that attract the Muscovites and do not require a continuous influx of workers. We will have to consider this transformation seriously in the future because it offers a way out of many dead ends.

[Velikanova] Apparently, the manpower problem and "quota migrations" are also rooted in restrictions on residence...

[Popov] Moscow cannot retain its gifted, even talented specialists who have graduated from the Moscow State University with honors, the future superb scientists it trained and whose talents it discovered. At the same time it is forced to import Vietnamese workers in order to ensure the operation of its enterprises. We can hardly conceive of the future of a city in which it is preordained from the very beginning that everyone talented and gifted will leave, to be replenished with the least-educated and trained. Therefore, this problem also has to be finally resolved.

[Velikanova] Let us go back to the exports of Moscow. What other reserves, thus far invisible, may Moscow mobilize and tap?

[Popov] I believe that the complex of scientific and research institutes of Moscow should become an important source of its export function. Powerful design and development centers are clustered in Moscow. They will begin operating under economic accountability. Of course various ephemeral entities which are actually an extension of the apparatus of ministries will die off. However, an impetus will be given to the development and independence of the institutes that are involved in really important developments. The Moscow Soviet should create favorable conditions for the formation of centers which fill orders coming from other cities.

The fourth export base is found in the sphere of services. Moscow already has major health-care centers, for example the Svyatoslav Nikolayevich Fedorov complex. This is approximately what we should strive for—a center to which people come for treatment from all over the country. Moscow may indeed help reinforce and develop such centers in many fields of medicine. Given a transition to commercial operations in medicine, they are capable of playing an important role in providing financial resources for the city, including hard currency.

The creation of powerful medical centers will affect the treatment of Muscovites themselves.

I am not going to dwell on the analysis of other blocks. However, I would like to say that the Moscow system of higher education may become one of them. I believe that the tuition fees students pay in the colleges of Moscow should not be the same as in other cities of our country since these colleges are particularly in demand. It is up to us to help the colleges build good dormitories, acquire up-to-date training equipment, and become powerful centers of learning. A continuous influx of resources to Moscow's budget will provide returns.

We should think of Moscow as a cultural center, a center of tourism, a historic center. I believe that culture should not be an economically accountable entity. Nonetheless, I believe that certain tourist functions may very well be a source of income.

Finally, we should not forget that Moscow is situated in the focus of all communications in the country and between our country and the world. It may become a major business center for banks, associations, companies, and offices.

In the environment of an administrative economy, an increase in the number of bureaucratic entities results only in additional expenditures for Moscow. Space must be found somewhere, and something needs to be taken away from someone. What if these are going to be commercial offices, which have profits and hard currency and are capable of paying taxes? In this case the accounting is different. Therefore, we will have to crush the bureaucratic system in this sphere as well and organize things on an entirely different, commercial basis, so that every newly organized bank and every new company will provide profits not to individual officials—the "holders" of office space—but rather to the entire city.

Moscow will stand to gain a lot if proceeds from the renting of office space become permanent.

Taking all these factors into account, I do not see any reason for a particularly serious crisis in Moscow's operation in a market economy. However, our transition to it is going to be both complex and difficult. This is why we are embarking on preparatory work immediately, without wasting any time. We will try to prevent life from leading us and pushing us into holes and dead ends; we have to envisage ways out of them.

[Velikanova] Ecological problems are an integral part of the issue of Moscow's economic development in a market environment. Public opinion is set against any kind of construction. However, in this case it is not known how to move ahead and, say, create the above-mentioned centers. How do you intend to resolve this contradiction?

[Popov] It is no secret that the ecological situation in the city is exceptionally difficult. The attitude of the residents has become extremely rigid: "We do not need this." We do not need factories. We do not need a zoo. We do not a commercial center, and we do not even need the metro.

Why has this situation developed? I believe that it is associated with the current type of life of the city. At present individuals receive all the main components of amenities—schools, polyclinics, shops—regardless of whether a certain enterprise is situated in their rayon or not. Why does a rayon need a zoo if it is nothing but trouble, if polyclinics are built with centralized resources?

Now let us imagine that we change the economic situation, and the issue of which polyclinic is to be commissioned in the rayon, if at all, hinges on whether the local budget (that is, a rayon or a micro rayon) has the funds for this. Then the residents are going to consider this. Indeed, opening a zoo is fraught with greater crowds on the street. On the other hand, the opening of a zoo will bring about the appearance of dozens of retail outlets in the rayon. Their contributions will be given to the soviet of a microrayon which will spend them for the provision of amenities, for building a good polyclinic. The same retirees who now vigorously resist the construction of a zoo, recalling that they have to travel great distances to see a doctor and spend several hours in line over there, will decide: Perhaps we should go along with the proposal of the Moscow Soviet?

In short, I am not in favor of "passing on down" to the rayons of Moscow decisions that are unacceptable to their residents from the point of view of ecology. I am in favor of the residents of Moscow making such decisions themselves taking all actual factors into account. Within several years we should ensure that the bulk of capital investment in production in Moscow is allocated for the type of technical reconstruction that will make it ecologically pure.

[Velikanova] I would like to understand how the management of the city is going to be organized. Is anything clear in this matter?

[Popov] First of all, we need to take into account the fact that we will have to operate in the environment of a major political reform in the country—switching to a multiparty system and overcoming the monopolistic position of the old political structure of the Communist Party. Efforts to meet the needs of new political parties and to create conditions for their operation will become the responsibility of the Moscow Soviet. The Moscow Soviet should work out forms which are associated with changes in the political configuration of our country. Certainly we are going to grant permits, but we have no office space to spare, to say nothing of printing plants and paper.

Here is the second aspect: At present Moscow has a two-tier system of government, the Moscow Soviet and rayon soviets. As I see it, it is not adequate for a city as large as Moscow; the introduction of a three-tier system is necessary.

The formation of microrayons endowed with full powers and economic resources will be central to this reform so that the issues of whether such and such street has been swept or whether a hole in such and such a yard has been filled do not become the subject of a discussion not only in the Moscow Soviet but also in a rayon soviet.

Moreover, I believe that it is necessary to restore the foundations of the system that once existed in Moscow, that of yard keepers who would be responsible for everything. These people should control all resources. Those who pave the streets, those who wash them, and those who collect trash should all receive their money from the yard keeper responsible for the state of affairs next to a given building, on his specific territory. The yard keeper himself should report to the self-government organ of a microrayon, that is to the residents evaluating his work, rather than to his superiors.

[Velikanova] How is the Moscow Executive Committee, now subordinated to the Moscow Soviet, going to operate?

[Popov] I agree with the reform concept of the new Executive Committee Chairman Yu.M. Luzhkov, who was elected by the Moscow Soviet, under which the main echelons of city government will be transformed from giant bureaucratic systems into economically independent organizations. They will become smaller, more flexible, and they will compete among themselves. I believe that Muscovites will see changes soon.

However, I do not want to anticipate anything. The changes awaiting the citizens of Moscow are too complex and crucial. I do not think that the leaders of the Moscow Soviet, its presidium, or even the entire Moscow Soviet will be so presumptuous as to begin forcing on the city decisions that seem acceptable to them. On the contrary, I am sure that we need to introduce a different system.

Fundamental issues of the operation of the city or the rayons should be resolved through the vigorous involvement of the residents themselves. We should set up an active city center for public opinion research. In the most crucial cases, citywide referendums should be held.

Goals, Problems of New Moscow Soviet Discussed

90UN1592A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 13 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Yu.A. Vinogradov, secretary of the executive committee and people's deputy of the Moscow Soviet and member of the organizing committee preparing the first session, by Yu. Kazarin: "'Disagreements Among Us There Are, But the Goals and Tasks Are the Same'"]

[Text] [Kazarin] Yuriy Aleksandrovich, you are one of the few present deputies of the Moscow Soviet who were deputies before. As an outgoing secretary of the ispolkom [executive committee] you have worked with deputies of both the past and this present soviet. What can you say, comparing the old and new corps of deputies?

[Vinogradov] Truly, I have found myself at the intersection of many roads linked to the start of the work of the new soviet. Entirely new people have now joined the Moscow Soviet—people of different experience of life and different sentiments and with a different set of professional qualities. There are considerably fewer workers, for example—they now constitute 14 percent. Earlier, when the soviet was formed according to the general schedule of allocations, there were several times more workers—47 percent. There are considerably fewer women in the Moscow Soviet now: They were more than 47 percent, now they are 8.3 percent.

The majority now is composed of scientific associates, engineers, leaders of cooperatives, associations, foundations.... This category of deputies is distinguished by actively developed thinking and a high intellectual level and at the same time, however, greater abstraction in thinking and less knowledge of actual social problems, municipal services, and the life of the city. Many interesting unusual, unexpected ideas are being put forward—this is very good. But for some deputies, it seems to me, this has at this stage become an end in itself. On joining the Moscow Soviet people want to show themselves off right away with an entirely exceptional formulation of an issue, super-radicalism, and assertiveness in the rejection of what went before them.

There are among the deputies people who are quite habitual, so to speak, for various convenings of the city soviet, but their number has diminished. These are top managers, scientists, and party and soviet officials. There have come to be far more legal experts and quite a good many economists. There are in the soviet approximately 20 representatives of the mass media—also more than there were previously. There are now among the deputies many nontraditional persons—a housewife, for instance, an unemployed person, a pensioner, the leader of a youth housing complex, the director of a high school, a consultant of the USSR UN Assistance Association, clergymen and a senior lecturer of the Moscow Religious Academy....

[Kazarin] How professional is this body in its approach to the city's problems? This question is being asked in letters from some VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA readers.

[Vinogradov] It is to a considerable extent unprofessional, of course. The deputies have insufficient knowledge of various legal niceties, do not always have a grasp of current laws, attempt to comprehend the effect of the administration mechanism purely empirically, gropingly....

[Kazarin] Initially the last soviet was also, after all, not that professional in this respect....

[Vinogradov] I believe this unprofessionalism may be overcome. People are now working very actively. If they continue this way, they will sooner or later reach the requisite level of competence. Sometimes new knowledge is needed here, sometimes simply the possession of more information. Study, what is more, systemic study, is needed.

Simultaneously the executive committee, with the help of specialists, is now preparing a computer data system for the deputies. It will make it possible to rapidly obtain information in the most varied fields, and this, in turn, will afford the deputies an opportunity to adopt competent decisions.

After all, the great professionalism of the former soviet amounted to its great experience and real knowledge of the levers of administration. But the people themselves were less active. It was as if there was in them an inner censor, who did not permit any questioning of proposed decisions, alternatives to be advanced, issue to be taken, or serious matters to be raised.

[Kazarin] Yuriy Aleksandrovich, will there not occur in Moscow the same thing that happened in Omsk, where the city soviet ispolkom resigned, unwilling to cooperate with the new corps of deputies, which had been acting unprofessionally, giving, in the ispolkom's opinion, incompetent instructions and making incompetent demands on the ispolkom? I mean not the ispolkom apparatus, but the members of the ispolkom elected at the session.

[Vinogradov] It should be noted that so far the period of preparation for the first session has afforded no grounds for such concern. Businesslike relations have taken shape between the ispolkom and the organizing committee formed by the deputies. This does not mean that there are no contradictions. But so far we have found solutions, as a rule. The question of how the soviet's relations with the current ispolkom will take shape and how continuity in the formation of the new one will be secured has also arisen, of course.

Serious disagreements have now emerged here. The organizing committee and leaders of the "Democratic Russia" bloc submitted a proposal that the question of the election of the ispolkom chairman be examined only in the second half of the session. Given this procedure, the ispolkom chairman would not be left with sufficient time to choose deputies and hold consultations with them, with the deputy blocs and so forth. There would be no time for the selection of leaders of main administrations and the important committees, who have to be approved by the session.

The result would be that the new ispolkom would not be formed at the first session—this would be deferred several months. There would arise in this case a need to accord the old ispolkom temporary authority, as it were. This is, in my view, an unprofessional approach. And how is it to be suggested to people that they work without a clear prospect, "in a state of suspended animation" and without certain competent functions and the necessary authority? One would not envy such an executive. It will be necessary to be responsible in full, and to a growing extent, what is more, because the city's socioeconomic situation is meanwhile becoming more complicated, and the crisis phenomena are not abating, the reverse rather....

[Kazarin] In addition, it is in April-May-June that the ispolkom will need to decide matters of exceptional importance....

[Vinogradov] Of course. These include the formation of the plan for the city's development in the 13th five-year period with regard for the transition to a market economy. Assimilation of the principles of Moscow's self-financing and self-administration—a most complex experiment to be conducted in accordance with a special government ordinance. It is in these months that questions connected with building next year and questions of preparing for winter and of providing the city with fuel and power and of the supply of resources are decided. Also included here is the preparation of the city for the fruit and vegetable campaign, as we call it....

[Kazarin] And, naturally, all this will have to be done by the new ispolkom—that which will have to work in accordance with plans which are being drawn up and contracts being concluded now.

[Vinogradov] I believe that it would be better for the city if both the chairman and the new ispolkom were determined more quickly. Discussion in the organizing committee is still under way on this issue. And, for all that, I am sure we will reach a solution and that the "Omsk version" will not be repeated in Moscow.

[Kazarin] Whether we like it or not, four factions have taken shape in the Moscow Soviet. Sometimes polar-opposite, mutually exclusive opinions are being expressed on many issues. How will all this be reflected in the work of the first session? What are the differences in principle between, say, the "Democratic Russia" bloc and the "Moscow" group? Will this not complicate the work of the soviet?

[Vinogradov] This question is certainly worrying many Muscovites, the deputies themselves and officials of the ispolkom apparatus. I would like to mention first of all that the emergence of blocs and groups of deputies was not predetermined and that there are no inevitable circumstances which have given rise to the formation of factions.

Look at it just from one angle: There are in the Moscow Soviet currently 270 communists—more than half the deputies. And what delineation could there be here, seemingly? But communists are in all four factions. And there has been a particular delineation between "Democratic Russia" and "Moscow."

A statement of the "Moscow" group of deputies was published yesterday. It says clearly: It was not this group, and I am a member of it, which instigated strict factional policy—this policy was determined by the actions of "Democratic Russia."

My first meetings with deputies from this bloc took place in an atmosphere of prejudice, mistrust, and sharp attacks even on the ispolkom and on me, as its representative, an "apparatchik," unwarranted, groundless attacks in my view.

I would like to mention the following also. This airy shift of sentiments among many deputies in the "Democratic Russia" bloc puts one on guard. Positions virtually change in the course of a day. Sometimes there is talk of penal battalions for the "apparatchiks" and of the deportation of hypothetical saboteurs and members of their families from Moscow, sometimes directly opposite statements are heard—about the need for joint work.... I find this incomprehensible.

I believe that the delineation has occurred, to speak of what lies on the surface, from tactical considerations: Some support blocs of deputies, others are opposed; some are for a radical policy of reforms, others for a moderate policy. In reality, the essence of the differences goes considerably deeper. It is revealed, I believe, in the letter of the party Central Committee which was published the day before yesterday, "For Consolidation on a Basis of Principle." Quoting, I believe, would be inappropriate, everyone has had time to ponder this letter himself. It reveals to a considerable extent the essence of the disagreements among us in the Moscow Soviet also, and they are very serious. But I hope that in joint work some convergence of positions might occur. After all, life is a stern examiner and puts everyone in his place. So a certain convergence of views is possible.

[Kazarin] I would like to cite the work experience of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Initially there were clashes of people who were out-and-out irreconcilable the whole

time. But now on the most complex issues the deputies are finding paths toward mutually acceptable, effective solutions.

[Vinogradov] Speaking of the first days of the work of the Union Supreme Soviet, you reminded me of what the new people's deputies arriving at the Moscow Soviet were like. Many glowed with excitement and were really on some nervous high (it could jokingly be observed that there is among the deputies a psycho-neurological physician and there are psychological therapists among the candidates for seats in the soviet which are still vacant). The first thing that changed in the Moscow Soviet was the smoke factor: Smoke, which greatly troubled our fire team, rose to the upper stories from the hall in which the meetings were being held. This came from nervous deputies smoking—they sensed the immense burden being heaped on their shoulders. They have now begun to smoke less, and people themselves have become calmer, more restrained and more attentive to one another's positions.

E.A. Bakirov, chairman of the organizing committee, said at a working meeting: Everything is moving so quickly and smoothly that we will have completed everything in two hours, perhaps. This evoked cheerful and distrustful liveliness. And we probably worked at that time five and one-half hours and did not resolve all the scheduled issues.

I recall how one deputy said in connection with something or other: "We need urgent and deep immersion in Moscow subject matter." To which another observed: "That's all very well, but how would we surface from such a depth?"

In any event, in preparing for the session there has come to be ever increasing understanding of the problems, efficiency, constructiveness, and that very professionalism about which we have been speaking.

[Kazarin] And how are the organizing committee and the ispolkom planning to organize the work of the first Moscow Soviet session?

[Vinogradov] People's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] from Moscow, representatives of the supreme soviets of the country and the republic, chairmen of rayon soviets and rayon ispolkoms and representatives of independent activity organizations and public self-management bodies have been invited to the session, whose opening is scheduled for Monday.

The task will be to embark as quickly as possible, but not, of course, to the detriment of the solution of procedural matters, on the election of a credentials commission, which is to check and confirm the deputies' authority. Then, the approval of the standing orders of the first session and the election of a chairman and deputy chairman of the soviet. At the end of the first part of the session we plan to form the soviet presidium. I hope the question of the ispolkom chairman will be decided here—we have already spoken about this.

We then intend to announce a break—for several days, the session will decide. The commissions of the Moscow Soviet will begin work in this time, and there will be consultations on personnel issues. The second part of the session will evidently be more protracted: It will have to discuss the urgent tasks and problems, approve the standing orders of the Moscow Soviet, decide personnel matters, and elect judges and people's assessors of the district courts. It would be a good thing, in my opinion, to conclude the session as early as April in order to make a start on realization of the adopted decisions more quickly.

[Kazarin] It is now frequently being asked: What real changes can Muscovites expect from the new soviet?

[Vinogradov] It is reasonable to assume that rapid deep-seated changes will not be achieved—this is unrealistic. There are in the air drafts of effective solutions, but these are individual, particular issues. They could have considerable repercussions in society and evoke discussion, "oh's" and ah's" even—what bold, decisive people there are in the Moscow Soviet now.

But it will still take a considerable amount of time for the solution of fundamental problems—production of consumer goods, food supply in connection with the transition to contract prices, the transport and environmental problems (special sessions of the Moscow Soviet have been devoted to them), the problem of housing and social justice here and many others. But they are largely reserved to Union and republic departments and will be very difficult to resolve, since the city soviet lacks the legal authority. A law on the status of Moscow as the capital is needed here. A bill is in preparation, and the Moscow Soviet will have to involve itself in this also.

There is a mass of deep-seated questions which will not produce immediate results, but with which the soviet needs to deal at once. The standing commissions and the whole soviet will have to work in a new way, meet more often perhaps, and build their relations with the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom and with the rayon component of the soviets, where everything is being renewed also, on a different qualitative basis.

The next, immensely important stage of transformations in our country is starting, and this is being perceived greatly in Moscow and the city's affairs. I would like to be, as always, an optimist. If we are sufficiently firm, composed, and creative people capable of generating, latching onto, and realizing new ideas, we will overcome the crisis phenomena, achieve an improvement in the life of Muscovites, revive people's faith in the potential of the authorities, and persuade them that it makes sense to participate in political and social life and that there is hope for the revival of all that is best with which Moscow has been associated in the minds of tens and hundreds of millions of people.

Deputy Discusses 'Potential' of Russian Republic

90UN1740A Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 18, Apr 90 p 5

[Article by Yuriy Manayenkov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and RSFSR People's Deputy: "The Spiritual Potential of Russia"]

[Text] I was elected a deputy of Russia in my native area, in the Chernozem area. As you might have guessed there were many meetings and loud discussions and passions seethed, all the more so that two of my fellow citizens appeared as my opponents. I would admit that the words of the citizen of Lipetsk V.S. Spivakov which, in general, were not addressed to me in particular have touched a raw nerve and have pained my soul to this day:

"Are we really not Russians? We have become soft, and we pay no heed to the covenants of our ancestors. We no longer smile, we are liberal, we travel abroad to get a trifling gadget. Our minds are wide open to the loudmouths, to the detractors of socialism hungering for power who are drumming into our populace little by little that we, the amateurs, will not manage to accomplish anything, that perestroyka will fail... It is a shame to live like that! I am ashamed for Russia!.."

Vladimir Stepanovich was categorical, but there is no concealing that he is not the only one to be concerned about Russia. Russsia, the fate of its people, the historic path we have traveled and the one that will yet become history are the talk of many people, and not only in Russia. The "Russian question" keeps sounding, even far away from Russia, to be sure not very loudly now but increasingly louder every time; it is sounding in a variety of languages, equivocally, and with the motifs and topics polarized to the extreme.

For some people this amounts to revealing pain for what has happened, hope for the worthy and healthy future of the great people, a nationwide catharsis with our eyes open to the world and seeing the unique chance that perestroyka provides for the rebirth, the upsurge of Russia and the entire country. For others it represents nostalgia for erstwhile patriarchal attitudes which resembles a prayer either for one's good health or a "rest-in-peace" prayer. Yet others make a bugaboo out of the Russian question, scaring "our people" rather than "their people" in pursuit of their own gain. There also are those who, encouraged by separatist passions outside the confines of Russia, would not mind redrawing these confines. Having failed to master properly the creative arithmetic of addition and multiplication, they prefer to "subtract" and "divide" with Scythian haste, as in the old times which, let us hope, have faded into oblivion. There are also others... all those who have filial feelings, those to whom the Land of Soviets is not a stepmother, are tormented by this thought: What is it, why is it, and how am I to respond to this? Now uneasy headlines have begun to appear on the pages of newspapers, in this newspaper one day and in another the next day: "What Next?"

The five-year venture of perestroyka has shaken up the country and all of us. We are on the move, we are different. We no longer follow the beaten track in marching formations under someone's command, nor will we ever. Intellectual freedom—wasn't our dream of it so alluring just yesterday? So it turns out that it has many facets, like any other freedom. Some people got sidetracked, some went every which way, and some have lost their way while feverishly figuring out whether their "personal," hopeless dilemmas are universal.

This is a dramatic metamorphosis. I would not maintain with piercing sarcasm, as one of my acquaintances did, that only now we are getting to see who really stands for what, despite this being true. Everything that happens in the mind usually grows in soil. To be sure, there is soil and soil, and grain and weeds grow on the same lot. However, the extremes and rash steadfastness that may be appropriate in a family quarrel, if at all, are pernicious in political assessments. It is not ideas that are dangerous but their interpreters who pretentiously get to work on them, especially in the context of the current situation. At present, we are in essence at a historical crossroads open to all winds, as in October 1917. Perestroyka called on our society and mobilized it to recreate and multiply the moral potential brought to life by October. This context is particularly complex and contradictory: The economy is not yet on its feet; our market is out of balance; the social "water line" of a segment of the populace is at the extreme mark; the tears of many have been repeatedly shed over the unsettled state of interethnic relations. It is no surprise that ideological and ethical values are revised so torturously, that diametrically opposed points of view mount and clash harshly. Moreover, after many decades of social muteness, and in part the atrophy of universal self-awareness, the need to pour it all out is even unavoidable.

However, we should look for answers not in our past and current resentment and discord but in consolidation, gentle and comradely rallying of the people and the peoples, naturally, with full responsibility not only for tomorrow but also for today and yesterday. Perhaps there is a reason why even a staunch paladin of intellectual freedom such as Academician Sakharov set forth in his annals in boldface: "Stepping away from the brink of an abyss means for humanity to overcome estrangement." Exactly so. Therefore the slogan "Proletarians of all countries unite!" which some people are in a hurry to archive is alive and, moreover, is being endowed with a new, revolutionary, and creative content. For us, it is one more reminder of how fruitless negation is which knows nothing of being constructive. In the course of still new cycles of history, the people and the peoples examined themselves and the surrounding world from the height of a wheel, a steam engine, the wing of a plane, and now they are doing it from space. Every time, those of them who, in their nihilistic negation or temptingly soothing self-conceit, "saw the light" to the effect that finally we are now second only to god, or we are god ourselves, were quickly returned to our imperfect earth by incorruptible

reality to face the severe countenance of not even life but survival. So we, the Russians, in the upward flight of our national self-awareness and the restoration of our patriotism, should not go for the extremes that easily, with the unscrupulousness of a simpleton, or "work ourselves up," as some people are already prompting us to do. It is naive to put cards into the hands of those who would play them against you.

It is not the extremes, national frenzy, and egocentrism, it is not the loss of national memory and self-corruption, these antipodes of spirituality and culture, but rather spirituality and culture themselves that are capable of saving and beautifying the world. We will somehow overcome "growth diseases," critical ferment of the mind, material shortages, and deficits. However, the deficit of personalities, the crisis of the spirit, and the educational level of the people may keep our society feverish for a long time yet to come. This is what we need to be concerned about, all of us, at all "stations" of society—from families and schools to state structures, to the entire state, to every ideological, political, and social institution.

Even at present the gap between politics and economics is extremely threatening; our transition to a regulated plan-market mechanism is on the agenda. If this arrangement, which justifiably promises to resuscitate the ruble, is going to be completely devoid of the enlightenment and upbringing of the people and the enhancement of its awareness, the material emphasis will cause the spirit to list; it will lead to an altogether tectonic subsidence of the ideological and moral strata of our society. I think that Nikolay Berdyayev, who is now experiencing a renaissance, was right, if declarative to a degree: "When the spirit of the people is corrupted and extinguished, the people leave the historical scene, retire into the background, and wither." However, we are not footloose wanderers. Spirituality and esthetic perception have always been characteristic of the Russian people, and the ethical breadth and openness of their souls were such that frequently not a corner was left there for themselves. This is the time to recall the soul, to nurture it with the life-giving sap of the feelings of charity, integrity, repentance, conscientiousness, and admiration of the beautiful, much of which we have lost on the bumpy road of history... and not only by way of a speedy recompense to the church and the renaissance of our common sacred places, though this is important as well. How is this to be done?

By elevating the family, the school, and the college? By a revised interpretation and intensification of all social, ideological, and cultural "levers?" Which way should their vector be pointed? Who is going to be made a priority? When the above themselves raise those questions they frequently create an impression that that they are kicking the responsibility to each other on an extensive football field of upbringing, whereas the subject of upbringing itself is not "a player." Meanwhile, if we were to exclude at least one of the components, either named or unnamed, and there will be no sum that is personality. As they say, there is a multitude of such components. Say, perhaps we should not measure spirituality in terms of the tonnage of pulp and paper? Meanwhile, it is a fact: Having proudly called ourselves the nation with the highest readership in the world, we only began in 1985 to close little by little the gap separating us from the United States in terms of publishing books and brochures. As far as the number of newspapers per 1,000 readers is concerned, we are behind the GDR, which has no forests, to say nothing of Japan.

Let us take a topical example—cooperatives. Since they are here to stay, we should see the original sense of their existence not only in the material aspect but also in the scientific-technical, cognitive, and esthetic aspect. The consumer appetites of the people should not be stimulated even in the name of the noblest goals unless their intellect is stimulated at the same time. Meanwhile, in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], two percent of cooperatives are involved in research and scientific activities, 2.1 percent in design and development operations, and 1.4 percent in the organization of leisure activities. There is a reason for this. For example, if you procure and process secondary raw materials you make in excess of R500, but if you entertain people, it is 160. There is no concealing that the profit motive calls the shots during such "entertainment." It would be naive to expect a vigorous social upsurge as long as the priorities of morality and intellect are going to be subordinate to the profit motive.

Such trends in the state structures are all the more fraught. Do you remember how excursions, trips, and tourism for young people and schoolchildren suddenly became complicated when enterprises and ministries switched to economic accountability? At first, it was because the Ministry of Civil Aviation canceled the 30 percent reduction in airfares, later it was due to more expensive bus trips, transportation on ships, and higher tariffs of the RSFSR Ministry of Housing and Communal Management. Finally, transportation and hotels came to account for up to 85 percent of all travel expenses. It is not easy to show a child his native land, the republic, the country, partake in its sacred places, and bring out a spark of patriotism in him, as they do, for example, in Japan. Over there it is mandatory for a citizen who is growing up to visit the country's capital and its places of interest before graduating from school.... The CPSU Central Committee supported the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] and the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] which have allocated R153 million for local history research, excursions, tourism, and other patriotic work. Pertinent assignments were given to the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and other offices. However, does this not ring out as a warning in its own right?

It is capable of tolling like a bell in the environment of territorial self-government. After all at present, just as in the bad old times, they undertake building a new shop, store, farm, or road here and there (which is good) with

enviable generosity and zeal, but the miserly grimace continues to surface when it comes to spending just a cinch for a school, a club, a day care center, a teacher, or an instructor....

Recently they told me: "Look, as soon as a teacher gives an interview there is talk of wages, scanty school facilities and study aids, poor aid by sponsors—where is their elevated spirit? Indeed, but was it not us, our attitude toward teachers that reduced them to supplicants, and reduced our society along with them? Since the time of V.I. Lenin we have not had a cohesive scientific concept of upbringing; we are merely getting close to creating it, frequently acting improvidently and intuitively in our search for new paths, forms, and techniques. At the same time, the educational system of Russia in a way exists in a variety of times, with its different facets developing at various rates due to the great number of its geographical and ethnic variants and dispersion throughout space, throughout krays, oblasts, and autonomous entities. Now that our new thinking has attracted the entire world, such thinking should first of all apply exactly to the educational system and other institutions of humanism and civilization in our country. Yes, this does not promise an immediate harvest. This may be the reason why, in the course of successive cycles of social development, full-fledged material "sowing" was not done in the field of education, schooling, and culture but rather in more precocious "fields" that were bound to bear fruit in the lifetime of the current generation. However, there is no other way. Otherwise we will go on living on credit, awaiting still new "crops."

In the pedagogical community it is a custom to assert "the cult of knowledge," "the cult of diligence," "the cult of discipline...." All cults are ugly, but the cult of one's mother, father, teacher, instructor—spiritual mentors or, as they were called before, pastors—needs to be instilled. An individual gets his life from his mother, his name from his father, and his teacher opens the path of life to him. If we were to interpret perestroyka as the greatest social revolution of the 20th century—which is indeed so—then, with a view to its future and its consequences, we also need to understand something else: Peace in the family, peace and harmony in the circle of relatives, loved ones, friends, acquaintances, and strangers, are a necessary premise for peace and accord in a society.

These are the reflections prompted by my meetings with fellow citizens. I believe that we will not be ashamed either of ourselves or of Russia if all Russians, in a joint family with other peoples of the USSR, tap our tremendous moral and spiritual potential in order to serve the motherland and perestroyka together, persistently, and with our characteristic Russian diligence.

Further on Russian Communist Party Congress

PM0305125590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 p 1

[I. Potekhina article; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "'Crush the Rich!'"]

[Text] It was under this slogan, in our reporter's opinion, that the initiative congress of the Russian Communist Party took place in Leningrad.

I could, of course, base my account of the Russian Communist Party's initiative congress on the fact that they were reluctant to admit KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's own correspondent to the congress. On how they gave me a thorough grilling at the press center, to see whether I met certain criteria, and then spent several days deciding whether or not I was fit to attend. On how I eventually received accreditation but found myself in an extremely awkward position because entry to the building where the congress was taking place was barred to many of my colleagues (even including those from central newspapers). After this it would have been perfectly possible to draw the conclusion: We say the congress was undemocratic.

I could also focus my attention on the status of the initiative congress. Carefully analyze the composition of its participants, of whom a mere 32 delegates out of 615 were elected according to the full program procedure, that is, in party districts. I could tell how another group was sent to the congress by party forums at various levels (oblast and rayon conferences and primary organizations). And then quote from a letter from Kamchatka communists published in the youth newspaper SMENA, in which they categorically refused to recognize the congress delegates from Kamchatka as their plenipotentiary representatives. Or, for example, give the floor to guests of the Russian Communist Party congress, whose invitations were exchanged for credentials. And after that the guests took part in the voting. After all these comments it would be perfectly possible to become indignant and pose the rhetorical question: Is such a meeting of like-minded people really a congress (and what's more, as certain delegates insisted, a constituent one)? And does it have the right to decide the fate of all Russia's communists?

However, so advantageous an approach to the subject must be flatly resisted. Because this congress demands nothing short of the most serious treatment.

The document adopted by the initiative congress as the basis for discussion in primary organizations and for adoption at the second stage of the congress says:

"The Russian Communist Party as part of the CPSU is starting to operate in conditions of the acute economic and political crisis which is taking place under the auspices of perestroyka.... Petty bourgeois and bourgeois aspirations to enrichment and life at others' expense are intensifying. The logical continuation and expression of these aspirations was the orientation of the economy toward market forces, which ripened during the period of 'developed socialism,' was extolled by its creators, who are now passing themselves off as perestroyka's foremen, and runs counter to the world trend toward socialization."

"The abolition of ownership by the whole people will lead to the consolidation of negative trends in the economy and will play into the hands of our country's emerging stratum of the super-rich, with their gamble on private entreprise and the legalization of accumulated capital and with their greed for profit and individualism.

"The congress calls on communists who are RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and USSR people's deputies and members of the 'Union' group to raise the question of suspending the Law on Ownership and submitting the question to a nationwide referendum," the congress' resolution on the economic situation in Russia says.

Oh, how one wants immediately to object. That no realistic alternative to the market has so far been proposed. That we have already fought against the rich and as a result have bred paupers. That, unless we find a way out of the prevailing economic situation, we will again only divide and not multiply. But most importantly, that it is very rash to make such statements on behalf of the whole working class and all Russian communists.

But though I think we should worry, it is not about the initiative congress delegates' position. And not about the present number of its supporters.... What should worry us is a different question: How many people will rally to the Russian Communist Party's banners when the transition to the market has become a reality?

For it was not for nothing that the initiative congress was convened in Leningrad. And not for nothing that it was representatives of major industrial primary organizations who suggested holding it. Leningrad remains a city of the proletariat, as it was 70 years ago—a most powerful industrial center. Who needs the output it produces is another question. But a huge, more or less well oiled mechanism providing work not for thousands, but for millions of people operates here. The sectors of industry which the market will hit hardest—power machine building and heavy and chemical industry (according to economists' preliminary estimates, almost two-thirds of such enterprises will have to close down)—are concentrated here. And this means that not only economic but also political problems will be concentrated here. Leningrad risks becoming a city of unemployed people.

Today we can curse the Russian Communist Party all we like for its conservatism and ideas of "subjugating personal interests to public interests." We can analyze and criticize in detail its ideologists' arguments against a multiparty system.

But the Russian Communist Party congress, which today announces the catastrophe approaching us in the form of the market (and the restoration of capitalism), is a warning to us all. It is a reminder of how carefully social protection measures and measures for sharply reorientating industry must be thought out before embarking on the market. So that history is not begun anew.

Leningrad Party Conference Views Possible 'Split'

LD0705205490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1430 GMT 7 May 90

[Excerpts] Leningrad, 7 May (TASS)—The first stage of the joint 29th oblast and 27th city conference of the Leningrad organization of the CPSU has closed in the city on the Neva. [passage omitted]

A decision that was adopted notes that a critical time had come in the life of the party, when the CPSU finds itself on the brink of an ideological and organizational split. Restraint in the processes on democratization of interparty life by party committees of all levels, the document stresses, is one of the main causes of the crisis. Communists see a way out of the situation in the transfer of power from the apparatus to the party masses. They described the overcoming of the party crisis, on the basis of working out a precise ideological platform of the CPSU, as the main task of the 28th CPSU Congress.

The delegates forwarded a proposal to the CPSU Central Committee on the speedy working out of a draft law on parties and public organizations, taking into account the opinion of the country's communists, and tabling it in the form of a legislative initiative to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The second stage of work includes plans to adopt a resolution on the political situation in the country, and proposals to the platform and the rules of the CPSU for the 28th Party Congress from the Leningrad party organization. The final stage of the conference will take place after the party congress. At this final stage, congress materials will be discussed and a program of action of the Leningrad party organization will be adopted.

Restructures City, Oblast Bodies

LD0705162990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 7 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The first stage in the work of the united oblast and city conference of the Leningrad CPSU organization has ended. The delegates decided to liquidate the CPSU city committee and to create unified electoral bodies of the Leningrad party organization, that is, an oblast CPSU committee and a control and auditing commission. It was also decided to elect five oblast committee secretaries on main directions of work in the Leningrad party organization.

Election of secretaries and members of the buro of the oblast party committee took place. As a result of secret voting, candidates for the duties of secretaries on ideology and social and economic policy did not get the necessary number of votes. They will be elected in the second stage of the conference which will begin on 8 June.

Report on Leningrad City Council Proceedings

90UN1616C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 25 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent T. Putrenko: "Council In Search of a Counsel"]

[Text] **"When will there finally be a new 'master' in the city?" many Leningraders complain. Probably, due to the centuries-old Russian habit, the people of the city on the Neva relate their hopes for a new life not so much to the activity of the elected Leningrad City Council as to the personality of the new chairman. What is behind these hopes? Are they a legacy of the past? Or do they indicate how young our democracy is?**

The first session of the new Leningrad City Council will last, with short intervals, for three weeks, and its end seems far away yet. The session is proceeding in a rather tempestuous manner. The deputies commissions are being formed with difficulty. The deputies get involved in heated debates about the structure of the Leningrad City Council, about the necessity of altering the status of Leningrad. Should it remain "a city doomed to an oblast fate," should it demand a republic status, or should it become "a free city" like Hamburg, which for some reason is always cited as an example of such? What should we do to the old executive committee? All these questions are being discussed now by the deputies in the building of the former Mariinskiy palace on Isaakiyevskaya Square.

It is a painful and slow process when a new power is being born. That is probably the way it should be, but we are running out of time. Unpredictable conflicts intensify and sometimes break out, as happened during the well-known events at the Leningrad TV studio. These may be conflicts with the old executive committee bureaucracy, with city party officials, or with Union ministries. Our city is obviously ruled by a diarchy or even a triarchy. Any expert can explain how dangerous such periods are for history. Can it be true then that the election of the first city official will somehow settle the conflicts and allay raging emotions?

Even before the elections we were debating who the people would want to see elected chairman of the Leningrad City Council. Different people who are popular in Leningrad were named. According to an opinion poll, the majority of the population prefers the USSR people's deputy, a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Sobchak. But he is not a Leningrad City Council deputy yet. However, we learned recently that Anatoliy Sobchak "was persuaded" to run in one of the vacant electoral districts.

New Karelian Supreme Soviet Chairman Elected

LD0805082990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0600 GMT on 8 May reports that, after a three-candidate secret ballot, Viktor Nikolayevich Stepanov has been elected chairman of the Karelian Supreme Soviet. He is a local-born man, aged 43.

In a two-minute interview, Stepanov says there are many social, economic, spiritual and cultural problems requiring attention. He says that constructive attitudes are generally in evidence, but also warns of the need to beware of excessive haste in trying to deal with them.

Western Republics

Ukraine Plenum Discusses Constitutional Changes

LD0705195190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] A plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee took place today. It examined questions for the coming first session of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet. A decision was adopted on the new wording of Article 6 and 7 of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, a draft of which will be introduced by way of a legislative initiative for examination by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Ivashko Chairs Ukrainian Party Commission

LD2404120790 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1845 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] A meeting of the commission on preparations for the 28th congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party has taken place. The commission was formed at the March plenum of the republican Communist Party. Comrade Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee, presided over the meeting.

The commission discussed the draft proceeding rules, the election of the republic's communist leadership, and a loose draft of the report on the political situation in the republic and the main trends in the work of Ukraine's Communist Party at the present stage.

It was emphasized that it is necessary to provide a profound analysis of the distribution of political forces in the republic, the state of affairs within the party, and the preference that will be given to measures to ensure a dignified way of life for the people.

Ivashko Receives Canadian Delegation

LD3004115890 Kiev International Service in English 2330 GMT 29 Apr 90

[Text] Vladimir Ivashko, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, and Vitold Fokin, deputy prime minister of the Ukrainian SSR, received today a delegation of members of the House of Commons of the Canadian parliament. The two sides discussed questions of deepening multilateral cooperation between Ukraine and Canada.

Ivashko Nominated for Ukrainian Chairman

LD0805105490 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1845 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] The plenum of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Central Committee, held in Kiev today, discussed the matter of holding the first session of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet. The plenum decided to recommend from the Communist Party of Ukraine, Comrade Volodymyr Antonovych Ivashko, first secretary of the Central Committee, for the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR; and Comrade Vitaliy Andriyovych Masol for the post of chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.

The plenum also passed a decision on the new phrasing of Articles 6 and 7 of the Ukrainian SSR constitution. The new texts will be submitted, on the initiative of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, for discussion at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

An organizational matter was dealt with. The plenum released Pogrebnyak from the post of candidate member of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee Politburo in connection with his retirement on pension.

Dnepropetrovsk Officials Abusing Positions

WA1704180390 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 1 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by journalist V. Zemlyanoy with a commentary by S. Sadoshenko, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast: "From the Ispolkom Storage Room, or a Mystery Book Story"]

[Text] **For many residents of Dnepropetrovsk it was an open secret that some of the administrative and party leaders were abusing their official positions.**

But it was completely unexpected to discover the existence of a restricted access cafeteria in the building housing the gorkom [city party committee] and the gorispoikom [city soviet executive committee]. A citizens' commission had been created at one of the meetings with the duty of checking on the legitimacy of various benefits and privileges, and now its members noticed the bags filled to the brim being carried by gorispolkom employees as they were leaving work. It turned out that the storage room of the cafeteria was being used to sell goods to the gorispolkom workers. A gorispolkom instructor, M. Makaryan, was an immediate supervisor of the process. Food was available there which the citizens had not seen in city stores for ages.

When the commission members walked into the storage facility and started opening refrigerator and closet doors they received an even bigger surprise. A cafeteria employee, G. Sokirchuk, had stored there Indian tea, Brazilian coffee, two bags of cocoa powder, some cured meat, ham, "Yubileynaya" and "Sovetskaya" sausages, several kinds of cheese, candy, condensed milk, sprats, squid tentacles, and even champagne. Of course one cannot find this kind of food in Dnepropetrovsk for any price.

"We also found two bottles of liqueur which somehow "evaporated" by the time the OBKhSS [Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] officials arrived on the scene," says a member of the citizens' commission, V. Ryzhkov. "The empty champagne bottles disappeared also."

Commentary by S. Sadoshenko, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast:

After I received this letter I called Dnepropetrovsk Gorispolkom Chairman V. Pustovoytenko.

"I consider it a provocation directed against me, personally," said Valeriy Pavlovich. "We have not had any pre-ordered packages or gourmet foods in the cafeteria for a long time and now, all of a sudden... We did not know about the existence of such goods in the storage room. It is true that instructor M. Makaryan was there. However, he went there not to supervise the sale, but to stop it. We have already taken some measures: Some of the cafeteria employees, including its manager, were fired."

This sounds like a story out of a detective book. The citizens hope that the people's deputies who gather for the first session of the city council on 3 April will be able to solve this particular mystery.

Artists Picket Against Ukrainian Appeal

LD2004121990 Kiev International Service in English 1800 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Today, a group of delegates of the Republic's conference of the Union of Artists of Ukraine have picketed for half an hour the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the republic. Among the picketers were the union members from Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol oblasts. They protested against the appeal of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Council of Ministers in connection with the situation in west Ukraine.

According to the proposal of the conference's delegates from these regions, its participants unanimously approved the resolution in which they sharply criticize the appeal of the communist party of Ukraine Central Committee and the leadership of the republic.

Lvov Christian Democratic Party Convention Held

LD2204193990 Kiev International Service in English 2330 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Today a founding convention was held by the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party in the city of Lvov. The convention is being attended by almost 250

delegates along with their guests from the Christian Democratic Movements of the Soviet Republic of Georgia, the Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union, and also from West Germany.

And now highlights from the interview given to Radio Kiev by a delegate to the convention, Oleksandr Dryga: In their activities the Christian Democrats are guided by Christian morality, says Oleksandr Dryga. And what the other kind of policy without God and God's teaching is like, we know from our observations of the 73-year-long history of the Soviet state.

Our main task is the democratic political struggle for an independent Ukrainian state; for the right of its people to be free on their free land; for the liquidation of all the colonial structures in the fields of policy, economy and culture.

Speaking about the presentday situation in the Ukraine, here we have the four religious denominations, that is, the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the first place; the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which had been in existence for a long time since the unification of the Ukraine with Russia; and also there is the Russian Orthodox Church, and recently the Moscow patriarchate decided that there should be the Ukrainian Orthodox Church here. I think if we have the supporters of all these denominations in our party, we shall have peace among them, said Oleksandr Dryga.

Ukrainian Committee Flies Illegal Flag

90UN1628C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "The Gorispolkom Broke the Law"]

[Text] With the participation of 22 newly elected deputies, the ispolkom [executive committee] of the Stryy City Soviet of People's Deputies in Lvov Oblast adopted a ruling to display the yellow-and-blue flag on the building of the City Soviet. The next day a meeting was organized with yellow-and-blue and red-and-black flags at which I.P. Matiytsiv, chairman of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], announced the ruling. After the national hymn, "The Ukraine Lives On," was sung, the yellow-and-blue flag was hung on the building of the City Soviet. V.G. Sinyukov, first deputy procurator of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], comments on these events at the request of a RATAU correspondent:

"The actions of the Stryy Gorispolkom and the newly elected deputies who took part in this act are clearly illegal, because the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and other legislative acts have been crudely violated. In particular, Article 167 of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution stipulates what the state flag of the Ukrainian SSR is. A decree on the state flag was approved by a 3 May 1956 ukase of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers approved instructions on usage of the state flag."

In accordance with the 5 June, 1981 Ukrainian SSR Law "On Flags and Banners of State and Public Organs of the Ukrainian SSR and Their Officials," such flags and banners are subject to registration in a manner determined by the USSR Council of Ministers. The use of flags and banners which have not been registered in the proper manner is not allowed. This also pertains to yellow-and-blue flags. They have not been recognized in the manner established by law for state symbolism, and consequently actions relating to their use and display on buildings must be stopped by the organs of law and order.

The procurator of Lvov Oblast has introduced a recommendation to the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies regarding the illegality of the actions of the Stryy Gorispolkom. The question of halting and banning similar instances of violation of the law was raised.

It is surprising that the initiators and active participants in these illegal actions were deputies, who should care about observing the law most of all.

Ukrainian Independent Journalists' Union Formed

LD0705120590 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 5 May 90

[Text] The constituent congress of a union of independent journalists of the Ukraine opened in Kiev today. The delegates mostly represent unofficial publications, as well as the printed organs of political and public associations that have sprung up in the republic during the years of restructuring.

The delegates' attention is focused on the coordination of actions concerning the development of these publications and also the guarantees of social protection for journalists.

The congress will continue tomorrow. It will adopt the action program and the rules of the new trade union.

Problems Over Party Newspapers Reported

LD0705124790 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 5 May 90

[Excerpts] Today is the Day of the Press. It is marked on the date Lenin founded PRAVDA, organ of the CPSU Central Committee. We contacted the Ukrainian Communist Party [UCP] Central Committee and asked how many party publications exist in the Ukraine today. Pavlo Kunyk, one of the executives, gave the following reply:

[Begin recording] [Kunyk] We publish more than 2,000 titles. Of these, only two magazines are purely party organs. The rest are sponsored by us and the appropriate soviets or public organizations.

[Unidentified correspondent] However, today we encounter facts when newly elected soviets come out against this cooperation with local party committees and strive for exclusive ownership of existing papers. For example, something like this has developed around the Lvov oblast organ, VILNA UKRAINA.

[Kunyk] Well, a multiparty system is getting into its stride. Some soviets in the Western Ukraine consist of nonparty members, and it turns out that the copublishers have mounted the diametrically opposite stands. Thus, this problem will be solved by founding new papers in those areas. [end recording]

[Announcer] The problem is acute not only in the Western Ukraine, but in Kiev as well. The newly elected city soviet will have to decide the fate of the VECHIRNIY KYYIV paper, which has up to now been the organ of both the city party committee and the city soviet. Let us turn to Vitaliy Karpenko, chief editor of VECHIRNIY KYYIV, and people's deputy of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

[Begin Karpento recording] The staff of our paper discussed this question at a meeting and unanimously decided to hand the paper over to the Kiev city soviet, while the other daily PRAPOR KOMUNIZMU, which is also sponsored by both the party and the soviet, should remain in the hands of the city party committee. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Oh, I see on the display a report from Dnepropetrovsk. It says that unknown persons have put out of action the distribution motor vehicles of the oblast and city newspapers. There is an assumption that it is in revenge for critical articles in both papers. Precise answers will be obtained by the investigators.

Presidum Changes Voroshilovgrad to Lugansk Oblast

LD0705194390 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1845 GMT 4 May 90

[Summary] The Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has resolved to rename Voroshilovgrad as Lugansk and the oblast as Lugansk Oblast.

Repeat Elections Held in Belorussia

LD2404090690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1518 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondents Vladimir Bogdanor and Vladimir Grod]

[Text] Minsk, 23 Apr (TASS)—On Sunday yet another stage in the election campaign—the repeat elections of people's deputies in 18 constituencies—took place in Belorussia (a republic in the west of the USSR).

Whereas during the first round of voting on 4 March 34 candidates stood in these constituencies, this time, thanks to the growing activity of the voters, the names of 65 people were entered on the voting list. In spite of forecasts, however, such a large number of candidates did not lead to a greater spread of votes. Deputies have been elected in exactly half the constituencies. Among them there are lawyers, party and local soviet staff, a scholar and philosopher, the chairman of a collective farm, and a military man. The latter, lieutenant-colonel Valeriy Pavlov, did, moreover, beat Major-General Leonid Klimov, his own boss and rival in the constituency.

There was special interest in the results of the repeat elections for the Tereshkovichskiy constituency in Gomel Oblast, where Vladimir Brovikov, former USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the republic of Poland, appeared on the list of candidates. He recently acquired notoriety for his criticisms of the country's leadership. However, on the very eve of the election, Brovikov withdrew his candidacy on the grounds that he has not worked in Belorussia for quite some time.

The republic's State Security Committee, an institution which had previously been closed to the public eye, was represented by five candidates at the repeat elections. One of them became a people's deputy at the first attempt.

Repeat polling is to be held in eight constituencies where no deputy has so far been named. In a further constituency, repeat elections have again been called because none of the candidates there managed to win over half of the votes.

So in Belorussia's new Supreme Soviet, 288 of 360 seats have been filled. The next round of voting is set for 5 May.

Report on Beating of TV Reporter in Moldavia

PM2004161990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by E. Kondratov report: "Why Was Journalist Beaten Up?"]

[Text] Kishinev—At the Moldavian Supreme Soviet sitting on Wednesday [18 April] deputies spent about an hour heatedly discussing the problem of whether or not to expel Central TV's correspondent Ivan Petkov from the auditorium; his reports, several deputies stated, have been arousing indignation among people since they are not objective and rather, are providing disinformation to the country.

Petkov was not expelled given the simple fact that he was not in the auditorium at the time. The speakers, who could hardly be accused of being non-intellectuals—a producer, poet, journalist, and lawyer—demanded that Petkov be replaced by a local TV journalist who would work "well." A clergyman even demanded that a "political assessment" be made of the TV journalist's work. Nor was the audience calmed by P. Luchinskiy, first

secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, who reported an agreement with Central TV to replace Petkov. Nor was the appeal heeded from central newspapers' own correspondents, who tried to explain their particular situations to the parliamentarians—not the Republic's representatives on the Moscow papers, but just the opposite: full and independent staffers with central publications.

Unfortunately for him, I. Petkov appeared in the auditorium near the end of the sitting. This cost him dear: Scarcely had Petkov left the parliament building and crossed the street when he was chased and surrounded by a group of furious youths. They were highly abusive, cut Petkov's forehead, and kicked him. The militia saved the journalist from a worse fate. Commentary is hardly necessary—far more necessary is a law governing the press...

I am by no means a devotee of Ivan Petkov's TV reports. I would go further: My views are the opposite of his on many issues. But, after all, who needs all of us—journalists and nonjournalists—to think alike?

Caucasus

Armenian 'Guerrillas' Attack Police Posts

LD0805135190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Alarming news from Armenia: The press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs reports that on 7 May a group of about 25 Armenian guerrillas, armed with submachine-guns and grenades attacked the guard room of Bagramyan Rayon Department of Internal Affairs. The attackers took a pistol from the guard and stole from the strongbox three devices for firing 15-mm signal cartridges. Yesterday a similar attack was mounted on the guardroom of (Nariyskiy) Rayon Department of Internal Affairs where 120 signal cartridges were stolen along with five devices for firing them. Investigations are under way.

Armenian Party Leader Warns of 'Civil War'

NC0605145890 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 23 Apr 90

["Statement by Vladimir Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, at the republican party economic aktiv conference; with certain abridgments"—ARMENPRES headline]

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 23 Apr (ARMENPRES)—[passage omitted] V. Movsisyan noted that the situation in the republic is in fact very complex and critical. I would be committing a sin, he said, if I even slightly blur the colors or doctor the picture of the situation. It is difficult to admit, but today our people are going through critical times.

After being drawn into interethnic clashes for the past year, we now face a new crisis. There are dangerous propensities toward internal national discord which might even lead to civil war. This danger occurs at a time of deep political, social, spiritual, and economic crisis; a crisis that exists in virtually all spheres. [passage omitted]

What is more perturbing, he said, is that instead of diminishing, these processes are actually increasing. Let us recall the recent days we experienced: 6, 9 and 14 April. The unprecedented incident which took place at the Supreme Soviet Presidium was a blow to the honor and dignity of our people. The people will never forget that. No one will respect a people who lack self-respect. I want to assure you that all the culprits will be brought to account. You are already aware that the republic's procurator and the internal affairs minister have been removed from their posts. [passage omitted]

It is necessary to create a national concordance council to seek ways to extricate ourselves from the crisis and to mobilize all the forces of the people. [passage omitted]

Armenia's Movsisyan Elected Presidium Member

NC0405143790 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Yerevan, 30 Apr (ARMENPRES)—The 12th extraordinary session of the 11th convocation of the Supreme Soviet of Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] was held on 29 April at the Stepan Shaumyan hall.

The deputies established the agenda "on the prevailing situation in the Armenian SSR and NKAO and the question of resolving it."

A proposal was made to complement the membership of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Armenian SSR. Vladimir Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, was elected as member of the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Armenian Construction Agreement Signed With UN

LD0405212490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1412 GMT 4 May 90

[Text] Vienna, 4 May (TASS)—The UN Industrial Development Organization and the Soviet Union signed an agreement here today on carrying out a project for the construction of a cold storage plant in Leninakan (Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic). The construction will be completed using resources collected by the Armenian community in the United States as help for the population of the Republic who suffered during the earthquake. The overall cost of the project comprises around $5 million.

The construction of this major facility, the operation of which is planned to begin in the middle of 1991, will to

a significant degree resolve the issue of storage and supply of meat products and poultry to the residents of Leninakan.

Side-by-side with the construction of the cold storage plant the implementation of several other projects is expected, including the construction of a factory for the production of disposable syringes, the purchase of stone-cutting machines, and a number of others.

Armenian Government Sets Up NKAO Committee

NC0405131190 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Yerevan, 30 Apr (ARMENPRES)—As was already reported, the Armenian Council of Ministers set up a committee for material assistance to Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—NKAO] and established its by-laws. The main purpose of the committee is to assist the governing bodies in NKAO and in the Armenian-inhabited regions and villages adjacent to the oblast in solving social and economic problems. The committee is headed by the minister of finance of the Armenian republic. People's deputies and representatives of the interested organizations are to be included in the committee.

Material assistance to NKAO will be provided through the Executive Committee of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies and executive committees of the rayon and village soviets of people's deputies of the Armenian-inhabited regions bordering NKAO.

Money and means of material assistance for NKAO will be obtained from those who donate work on weekends and from other activities; from enterprises, organizations, and establishments; from the contributions by the enterprises and organizations to be decided upon by the work collectives; and from grants from Soviet and foreign citizens, foreign organizations, diaspora Armenian organizations, and from other sources.

All financial contributions for material assistance to NKAO are deposited in the 700810 account number of the USSR Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development and at the Armenian republican bank's Yerevan city department.

Letter to Gorbachev on NKAO Armenians Viewed

NC2804080290 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 27 Apr 90

[Text] The leading party bodies of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] have sent a letter to Soviet President Gorbachev, to the USSR Supreme Soviet leaders, to the members of the Presidential Council, to party and soviet officials, and to the central press. The letter says in part:

By using the various local mass media, radio and television, loudspeakers, and leaflets, Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, and Safonov, commandant of the area under a state of emergency, are provoking the NKAO residents to break the law.

Dozens of times every day, the Armenian residents are demanded either to give in to Azerbaijan or to leave Karabakh and their legitimate homes. Under the harsh conditions of the blockade on roads and rail routes, they [not further identified] are cancelling air flights and preventing the landing of transport planes and helicopters with the intention of stifling the oblast both economically and morally.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to let everyone know that Polyanichko, Radayev, Safonov, and others are acting selfishly.

We strongly request that an independent commission be sent to the NKAO which will safeguard the Armenian residents of the oblast from violence, from other steps that will continue the genocide, and from the implementation of a policy of apartheid in the oblast.

Foteyev Views Demographic Change in NKAO

NC0405151090 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] Yerevan-Stepanakert, 30 Apr (ARMENPRES)—V. Foteyev, chairman of the Union Monitoring and Observation Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met with the Stepanakert aktiv at the congress hall of the party city committee on 27 April. Those present expressed indignation about the latest incident in Stepanakert, seeing it as a provocation aimed at creating anti-army and anti-Russian sentiment among the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. V. Foteyev replied to participants' questions and noted that the commission he heads will focus on the issues raised. He specifically said that particular attention will be given to that point in the 28 November 1989 decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet which precludes change in the demographic charecter of the NKAO.

On the same day, USSR people's deputy Zori Balayan briefed his constituency in the Askeranskiy rayon center. He expressed the conviction that no provocation could disrupt the just struggle of the people of NKAO for real self-determination. He stressed that the NKAO problem has never been removed from the agenda. After all, the issue basically is that the Armenians of NKAO must live in their native land in their own homes and till their own fields. The people gave new instructions to their deputy and (?demanded) a political solution to the NKAO problem.

Foteyev addressed this meeting also. He briefed the people about the duties of and problems faced by the Union Monitoring and Observation Commission [words indistinct].

26 Apr Stepanakert Incident Reported

NC2904093490 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 28 Apr 90

[Text] On the evening of 26 April, Stepanakert was hit by another round of incidents. Once again the armed forces fired at a group of people who had gathered in front of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] oblast's executive committee building (?to protest) the detention of well-known NKAO residents, the poets Gurgen Gaprilyan, Grachya Beglaryan, Sokrat Khanyan, and (Arta Vitovasyan), as well as lecturers (Prona Balayan) and (Gamlet Grigoryan) of the local pedagogical institute. Four people were wounded, one of them seriously. Fortunately, however, this time no one was killed.

Residents Appeal Against Election of Deputy

LD0705120390 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 22 Apr 90 p 1

[Excerpts] Appeal to Comrade A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet from the residents of Khodzhaly in Askeranskiy Rayon in the NKAO of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

Esteemed Anatoliy Ivanovich,

The writer Z. Balayan, who lives sometimes in Yerevan and sometimes in Moscow, was elected USSR people's deputy for national-territorial constituency no. 729 which includes our village.

How does he make use of his mandate as people's deputy? Despite repeated appeals to him not once, either before or after the elections, has he met the Azerbaijani population of his constituency, although a year has passed. He has no interest in our concerns and problems. Each time he comes to Stepanakert he delivers more inflammatory addresses, stirring up enmity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis who have lived on this territory for centuries. He is particularly "passionate" when the USSR Supreme Soviet makes important decisions aimed at normalizing the situation in our region. As a USSR people's deputy he openly hinders the implementation of these decisions and calls on Armenians living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] "to campaign to the end" for its separation.

We do not understand how a man who sows division in the unity of our peoples and kindles enmity between the nationalities can be a people's deputy. Why does the USSR Supreme Soviet view his provocative actions with such equanimity? Or do our laws not concern the country's people's deputies? In our view nobody needs this sort of "cultured" deputy.

Strikes in Stepanakert organized by Balayan, Pogosyan, Grigoryan and their followers, have had repercussions throughout the USSR. We think that there is no place for Z. Balayan among the true elected representatives of the people. Ordinary people, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, are forced to pay for his nationalist sermons.

We ask you to examine the issue of Z. Balayan remaining in the country's parliament and of recalling him from being a USSR people's deputy.
Voters from the village of Khodzhaly in Askeranskiy Rayon in the Aazerbaijani SSR. [passage omitted]

(The appeal was adopted at a village rally which was attended by 1,800 people)
E. Mamedov, chairman of Khodzhaly Rural Soviet.

Turkish Journalists Freed in Azerbaijan

LD0505234290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1513 GMT 5 May 90

[Text] Baku 5 May (Azerinform-TASS)—Irfan Sapmaz, Rafet Balli, and Mucahit Buber—citizens of the Republic of Turkey and correspondents for the Turkish newspaper MILLIYET and GUNAYDIN—have been freed from custody. They were detained on 18 April 1990 for illegally crossing the state border between the USSR and Iran.

A criminal case was brought against them by the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Committee for State Security. The republic's Procuracy after examining the material it had received, proclaimed them guilty of violating the state border. However, taking into account the circumstances of the crime, the sincere repentance of the Turkish citizens for their actions, as well as their appeals to the chairman of the Presidium of the Azerbaijani SSR Supreme Soviet and other organs of power in the republic, the Procuracy has made the decision to drop the criminal proceedings.

Ethnic Georgian Club Set Up in North Ossetia

LD3004144790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Text] A new club has been set up in North Ossetia, named Gertoba [Unity], and has united people of the Georgian ethnicity living in Ordzhonikidze. The inaugural conference has approved the rules of the new association and its symbolism, and elected the board.

A delegation from Georgia, as well as representatives of the Greek and Armenian clubs functioning in the city, participated in the work of the conference. A one-year work plan for the club was worked out. Great attention is paid to studying the culture and history of the Georgian people and to meetings with prominent figures of culture and art of the fraternal republic.